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"THE DUTY TO DEFEND THEM":' A NATURAL LAW
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE BUSH
DOCTRINE OF PREVENTIVE WAR
William C. Bradford*
INTRODUCTION
We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather.
President George W. Bush
2
The horrific events of September 11, 2001 heralded an Age of
Terror 3 in which wicked malcreants bent on acquiring weapons of
mass destruction 4 (WMD) will abjure all legal restraint 5 and deliber-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis;
Articles Editor, Journal of National Security Law and Policy; U.S. Army, 1989-2001. I am
indebted to colleagues who were gracious enough to review and comment upon
earlier drafts, includingJeffAddicott, Lou Beres, Robert Chesney, Steve Dycus, Derek
Jinks, Gerard Magliocca, Jordan Paust, Mike Ramsey, Lee Schinasi, Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Jim Torke, Ruth Wedgwood, and George Wright. I have been fortunate to
have the invaluable assistance of dedicated librarians Michelle Burdsall and Richard
Humphrey; Nate Leach and Keith Donnelly provided loyal research assistance.
1 See Glenn Frankel & Dana Milbank, In Britain, Bush Answers Critics on Iraq,
WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2003, at Al ("The people have given us the duty to defend
them, and that duty sometimes requires the violent restraint of violent men.")
(quoting President George W. Bush)
2 President's Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 38 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 1529 (Sept. 12, 2002).
3 Terrorism, defined as the "threat or use of violence in order to create extreme
fear and anxiety in a target group so as to coerce them to meet the political objectives
of the perpetrators," has descended into new depths of destructiveness and barbarism
in recent years. Oscar Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases,
11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 309, 309 (1989).
4 A "weapon of mass destruction" is defined as "any weapon or device that is
intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant
number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of... toxic or poi-
sonous chemicals or their precursors; . . . a disease organism; or . . . radiation or
radioactivity." 50 U.S.C. § 2302(1) (2000).
5 Terrorism, the "totalitarian form of war and politics," rejects any obligation to
adhere to the dictates of law or morality and in so doing "shatters international hu-
manitarian law." Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetrators or
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ately murder civilians to advance their anti-civilizational designs. The
sobering prospect that successive attacks in which enormously destruc-
tive nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons might be brought to
bear upon its civilian population 6 by suicidal terrorists living within its
midst greatly enhanced its perception of vulnerability and prompted
the United States to undertake a dramatic revision of its national se-
curity strategy in response to this existential threat. 7 The September
2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 8 also
known as the Bush Doctrine, warns transnational terrorists and rogue
states that the United States has abandoned deterrence in favor of a
robust and proactive strategic doctrine that sanctions the use of mili-
tary force to eliminate threats posed by the intersection of WMD and
an emerging breed of undeterrable adversaries, 9 before they can ma-
terialize. Specifically, the Bush Doctrine unmistakably claims the legal
Their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights Versus the State's Duty to Protect Its
Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 195, 233 (2001). Among the more reprehensible
tactics they employ is sheltering their number in areas populated by civilians in order
to "exploit the rules of the game ... which categorically state that the civilian popula-
tion must not be involved in the armed conflict." Id. at 234. This and other violations
of international humanitarian law were committed by forces fighting for the Saddam
Hussein regime in Iraq. See Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Is Preparing to Try Iraqis for Crimes
Against Humanity and Mistreating Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2003, at B14 (listing
Iraqi violations of international humanitarian law, including mistreatment, perfidious
surrender, fighting in civilian garb, using civilians as human shields, and employing
hospitals for cover).
6 Fear that the terrorists responsible would attempt further attacks shaped the
perceptions of the public and of government decisionmakers in the aftermath of Sep-
tember 11. BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 349 (2002).
7 It may be impossible to overestimate the severity of the threat posed by the
intersection of transnational terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. See KATHLEEN
BAILEY, DOOMSDAY WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF MANY 6 (1991) (describing this intersec-
tion as the gravest threat ever posed to U.S. national security); Guy B. Roberts, The
Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A Legal Regime for Enforcing the Norm Prohibiting
the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 483, 483-84
(1999) ("The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ... is one of the most
significant and protracted threats to international security . . . ever faced by
mankind.").
8 See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002),
available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY].
9 The Bush Doctrine contends that deterrence, predicated upon the mainte-
nance of the threat that attacks against the United States will be met with an over-
whelming response and thus redound to the detriment of the attacker, is ineffective
against terrorists and rogue states who have no values against which the threat of
force in response might counsel restraint. See id. at 15 (contending the "terrorist
enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents;
whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death," is not susceptible to deterrence).
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right to unilaterally preempt and eliminate an incipient threat that,
even if not yet operational, will, if permitted to mature, be reducible
only at a much greater cost in lives and treasure. 10 For the United
States, the lesson of September 11 is unmistakably clear: "Take care of
threats early."'"
Immediately upon its promulgation the Bush Doctrine sparked a
legal debate over whether the use of military force to prevent megater-
rorism on the order of September 11 constituted one of the permissi-
ble exceptions to a general prohibition on the use of force in
international relations, and whether the substantive and procedural
obligations concerning resolution of international disputes incum-
bent upon member states of the United Nations could countenance
the resort to self-help under such circumstances. 12 Although the U.S.-
led intervention against and deposition of the Hussein regime in Iraq
in March and April 2003 was predicated not upon an argument in
favor of preventive war,' 3 but upon far less controversial legal justifica-
tions,' 4 the characterization of the grounds for intervention for do-
10 See id. (stating that the "immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of
potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not
permit... let[ting] our enemies strike first"); see also NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 3 (2002), available at http:/www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf ("Because deterrence may not succeed,
and because of the potentially devastating consequences of WMD use against our
forces and civilian population, U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies
must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in ap-
propriate cases through preemptive measures."); David E. Langer, Bush Renews Pledge
to Strike First to Counter Terror Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2002, at A3 (reporting a
message from President Bush to U.S. troops home from Afghanistan that the United
States will preemptively strike against states developing WMD and that "America must
act against these terrible threats before they're fully formed").
11 WOODWARD, supra note 6, at 350 (quoting President George W. Bush in a dis-
cussion with National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice).
12 SeeJordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533, 533 (2002) (describing debates).
13 The Bush Doctrine, rather than establishing an expanded doctrine of preemp-
tive self-defense, transcends preemption in favor of the doctrine of preventive war.
See infra note 203 (defining the doctrine of preventive war). Some use the terms
preemption and prevention interchangeably. See, e.g., George K. Walker, The Lawful-
ness of Operation Enduring Freedom's Self-Defense Responses, 37 VAL. U. L. REv. 489, 536
(2003) (equating preemption and prevention). Others equate anticipatory self-de-
fense, preemptive self-defense, and prevention. However, there are important distinc-
tions between these terms that this Article will elaborate. See infra Part II.
14 Neither the Bush Administration nor the United Kingdom defined the March
2003 intervention against the Hussein regime as a preventive war, but, rather as a
Chapter VII enforcement action with legal authority claimed under prior U.N. Secur-
ity Council resolutions, specifically Resolutions 678 and 687 requiring, as a condition
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mestic political consumption by the Bush Administration as a
preventive war,15 along with a widespread perception that interven-
of the ceasefire negotiated in 1991, that Iraq permit inspections to verify disarma-
ment. See President's Address to the Nation on Iraq, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc.
338, 339 (Mar. 17, 2003) ("Under Resolutions 678 and 687, both still in effect, the
United States and our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of
mass destruction."); Frances Gibb, Attorney-General Gives MPs Legal Basis for War, TIMES
(London), Mar. 18, 2003, at 2 (quoting the Attorney-General of the United Kingdom
as stating: "the government would be legally justified in declaring war on Iraq because
of the 'combined effect' of three U.N. resolutions"); Letter from John Negroponte,
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, to Ambassador Mamady Traore, President of
the U.N. Security Council (Mar. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usembassy.it/file
200303/alia/A3032109.htm (providing the U.S. position on legal justification and
indicating primary focus on material breach of resolutions). International law schol-
ars concur that the material breach of these resolutions constitutes a necessary and
sufficient basis for intervention. SeeJane Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A Transi-
tional Moment, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 629 (2003) (characterizing this legal rationale as
a plausible argument); Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council
Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 576, 578 (2003) (contending
that the use of force against Iraq in March 2003 was warranted by the "continuing
effect" of relevant Security Council resolutions and by Iraq's material breach of these
resolutions). Iraqi refusal to permit weapons inspections thus constituted a breach of
the 1991 ceasefire and, under international law governing armistices, permitted bel-
ligerent parties to resume hostilities to secure the objectives specified under Resolu-
tions 678 and 687. SeeJohn Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 563, 565-69 (2003) (analyzing the international law of armistices and justifying the
2003 intervention on the basis of Iraq's material breach of U.N. resolutions by its
refusal to permit good faith inspections in the winter of 2002-2003, violating the con-
ditions of the ceasefire, and referencing Iraqi ejection of weapons inspectors in Octo-
ber 1998, described by the Security Council as a "flagrant violation of resolution 687
... and other relevant resolutions") (quoting S.C. Res. 1205, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess.,
3939th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1205 (1998)). Legal counsel for the U.S. Depart-
ment of State supports the interpretations of international legal scholars. See William
H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 557, 563 (2003) (describing the 2003 intervention not as preventive war but as the
result of Iraq's material breach of Security Council resolutions, violation of a ceasefire
agreement, and the "final episode in a conflict initiated more than a dozen years
earlier by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait"). For a thorough examination of the sources of
legal support for the 2003 intervention and for an argument that the Bush Adminis-
tration did not characterize its action as a preventive war, see Sean D. Murphy, Assess-
ing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEo. L.J. (forthcoming 2004).
15 In his address to the nation on March 17, 2003, President Bush, although he
referenced humanitarian considerations and self-defense arguments as well as Iraqi
violations of the 1991 ceasefire, rested his justification for the intervention largely on
the ground that "[i]n 1 year, or 5 years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free
nations would be multiplied many times over," and that failure to "meet that threat
now, where it arises, before it can appear suddenly in our skies and cities" would be an
act of national "suicide." President's Address to the Nation on Iraq, 39 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 338, 340 (Mar. 17, 2003).
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tion could not be legally justified on any other basis, 16 has thrust the
contentious assertion of the right of states to engage in preventive war
to the forefront of international legal discourse. In some quarters it is
no longer understood merely as a doctrine around which to orient
debates concerning the intervention in Iraq specifically, or the norms
and institutions that should govern contemporary international rela-
tions more generally, but, rather, as an "international constitutional
moment"'17 that will prove decisive for the future of international
law. 18 Without conceding that intervention in Iraq was an act of pre-
ventive war, the United States and allied states claim the forcible
ouster of the Hussein regime as a triumphal success, entirely consis-
tent or at least reconcilable with international law, that liberated the
people of Iraq and rescued the credibility of the United Nations after
16 A number of commentators reject the argument that existing Security Council
resolutions standing alone provide adequate legal justification for the March 2003
intervention. See Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq,
97 AM.J. INT'L L. 607, 613 (2003) ("Neither the text nor the debates on the adoption
of Resolution 687 reveal the slightest indication that the Council intended to em-
power any of its members, by themselves, to determine that Iraq was in material
breach."); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Good Reasons for Going Around the UN, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2003, at A33 (opining that "[m]ost international lawyers will probably reject
this claim [that Resolution 1441 authorized the use of force] and find the use of force
illegal under the terms of the [U.N.] Charter"); Yoo, supra note 14, at 567 (conceding
that many international legal scholars and a number of states, including France, Ger-
many, and Russia, do not accept the prior Security Council authorization justifica-
tion). Moreover, several commentators, after analyzing the evidence adduced by the
United States, reject the United States' claim to have acted in self-defense on the
ground that no imminent threat existed. See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, What Future for the
UN Charter System of War Prevention?, 97 Am.J. INT'L L. 590, 598 (2003); Miriam Sapiro,
Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 599, 603 (2003). For
a discussion of the element of "imminence" in respect to a claim of self-defense under
international law, see infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
17 See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitu-
tional Moment, 43 HARv. INT'L LJ. 1, 2 (2000) (writing in response to the debate over
the Bush Doctrine of preventive war in the context of the then proposed Iraqi inter-
vention: 'Just as in 1945, the nations of the world today face an international constitu-
tional moment.").
18 See Kofi Annan, In Annan and Chirac's Words: 'For* in the Road' and 'Call a Sum-
mit, 'N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2003, at A13 (stating that the assertion of the right to en-
gage in preventive war stands as "a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the
United Nations was founded"). Many observers concur with the assessment that the
advent of the Bush Doctrine is, "[w]ithout question, the most pressing issue in the
international realm." Jeffrey F. Addicott, Proposal for a New Executive Order on Assassina-
tion, 37 U. RiCH. L. REv. 751, 754 (2003); see also Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note
17, at 2 ("Few events in global history can have galvanized the international system to
action so completely in so short a time.") (quoting British Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw).
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an ignominious decade marked by failures to prevent famine, end ge-
nocide, and enforce the disarmament of rogue states. However, a
number of states and commentators excoriate the decision to inter-
vene without Security Council imprimatur as ajurispathic act posing a
grave threat not only to a half-century long commitment to multilater-
alism, 19 but to the international rule of law20 and, derivatively, to
global order.
Even if it were possible to forge a consensus as to whether the use
of force against Iraq in March 2003 can better be described as an ille-
gal act of preventive war that bodes ill for international law and insti-
tutions, or as a benevolent police action in defense of human rights
and law-governed international society, the resolution of this issue
would not be dispositive of other questions at the core of the current
international constitutional crisis: In a world with no central enforce-
ment mechanism, must a state cower in terror until it absorbs a devas-
tating first strike from WMD armed terrorists before acting in self-
defense, or may it resort to self-help? Does the failure of the framers
of the U.N. Charter to anticipate the virulence of contemporary ter-
19 See Annan, supra note 18 (insisting that U.S.-led intervention against the Hus-
sein regime has posed a "fundamental challenge" to multilateralism and to the role of
the United Nations in preserving peace and security); see also Steven R. Weisman, An
Audience Unmoved, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2003, at Al (reporting that French President
Jacques Chirac has termed the legal division over the 2003 intervention as "one of the
gravest threats to multilateral institutions in modern times"). Some go so far as to
accuse the United States of seeking to "disable the United Nations"-the better to rid
the United States of "an international regime that is insufficiently responsive to both
America's needs and the reality of [the United States'] disproportionate power" and
establish an "American protectorate" in its stead. Franck, supra note 16, at 617; see
also Stromseth, supra note 14, at 637 (suggesting the result of United States' actions
consistent with the Bush Doctrine will be the circumscription of the United Nations).
Thus, for, Franck and others, the Bush Doctrine represents a mortal threat to the
international legal regime governing the use of force. Franck, supra note 16, at 610
(blaming the United States for the "death" of international law governing the use of
force); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Review Essay: Re-leashing the Dogs of War, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 446, 446 (2003) (reviewing CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE (2000)) (noting the resurfacing of the suggestion that international law gov-
erning the resort to force is moribund as a result of the Iraq intervention).
20 See Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: Future Implications of the
Iraq Conflict, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 553, 553 (2003) ("[M]ilitary action against Iraq in
spring 2003 is one of the few events of the UN Charter period holding the potential
for ... destruction, of the system of law governing the use of force that had evolved
during the twentieth century."). The effect of noncompliance upon the continued
vitality of international law, an issue raised but by no means answered by the Iraqi
intervention, is the "most profound epistemological question" in the international
legal academy. Tom J. Farer, The Prospect for International Law and Order in the Wake of
Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 621, 621 (2003).
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rorism and the lethality of modern weapons technology2 render the
Charter framework an unsalvageable anachronism, or does the U.N.
Charter provide a "viable legal framework if the rules are refined to
take account of recent experience and emerging security threats"?
22
Put slightly differently, does the lethal and barbarous marriage of
WMD and international terrorism require a fundamental reinterpreta-
tion or reimagination of the international law governing the use of
force in self-defense against terrorists and rogue states, to include the
identification of profoundly different rules and norms better tailored
to facilitate state survival?23 If so, is the Bush Doctrine a jurisgenera-
tive approach to legal reform that elaborates a well reasoned basis for
the extension of the War on Terror to terrorist groups and their state
sponsors, even where such terrorists and states are not presently en-
gaged in overt acts of aggression against the United States, or is it an
abject negation of law altogether that threatens to rend the legal
fabric of global order? In other words, in the Age of Terror may
states, when their very survival is threatened, engage in preventive war
to defend their own survival, and does the Bush Doctrine provide an
adequate legal foundation for this claimed entitlement? Finally, are
other states impressed with a corresponding obligation to support, or
at least not interfere with, coercive diplomacy and the use of force,
where necessary, in defense of this right?
Part I of this Article will analyze the primary customary and treaty-
based sources constituting the international legal regime governing
21 See RobertJ. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on U.S. " International
Law and Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 Wis. INT'L L.J. 153, 214 (1994) (describ-
ing the U.N. Charter as a time-bound document).
22 Stromseth, supra note 14, at 637.
23 See Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 17, at 2 (arguing that an effective
response the new threat environment of the post-September 11 era dictates the devel-
opment of new rules); see also Addicott, supra note 18, at 775 (inquiring whether the
"traditional international rules related to the use of force ... actually work in the real
world" of transnational terrorism). A number of commentators describe the threat
environment of the twenty-first century as so radically at variance with the geopoliti-
cal, technological, and ideological conditions that obtained in the immediate after-
math of World War II that the U.N. Charter cannot any longer, without substantial
modification or reinterpretation, serve the purpose of preventing armed conflict for
which it was intended. See, e.g., MichaelJ. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Case for
Anticipatory Self-Defense, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 28, 2002, at 24, 26 (arguing that the
U.N. Charter is fundamentally incompatible with the contemporary defensive require-
ments of states by virtue of the emergence of robust transnational terrorist groups
and state sponsors, unforeseeable by the framers, who possess the capacity to deliver
devastating attacks with essentially no warning and against whom the Charter does
not expressly authorize states to undertake measures now revealed as necessary in self-
defense).
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self-defense, as well as relevant state practice in the post-Charter era,
to evaluate the arguments of the legality of measures undertaken in
anticipation of an armed attack, as well as the continued functionality
of the U.N. Charter framework in the Age of Terror. Part II will ex-
amine the Bush Doctrine as an expression of a doctrine of preventive
war that entirely transcends the debate over the use of armed force in
anticipation of an imminent attack. Part III will present the claim that
an examination of historical sources of international legal obligation
predating the Charter and a less restrictivist, less positivist read of the
Charter reveals a natural legal basis for the right, and, even more
pointedly, the duty of states to engage in preventive war where neces-
sary to defend their nationals and vital interests against existential
threats. Part IV will examine the U.S. Constitution, and in particular
its allocation of competence over defense matters, as a domestic ex-
pression of a Presidential legal duty, arising under natural law, to de-
fend the United States against external threats. It will then make the
assertion that the Bush Doctrine is an expression of the intent to faith-
fully discharge this natural legal duty and that the doctrine of preven-
tive war it elaborates is not only theoretically consistent with
obligations under international law, but even promotive of the ends
law is intended to secure, even if the exercise of the right to preven-
tive war is subject to some important qualifications. Part V will offer
proposals to harmonize the Bush Doctrine with the U.N. Charter
framework and guide formal international legal institutions, including
the Security Council and the International Criminal Court, toward en-
hanced functionality in the simultaneous defense of the natural right
of states and peoples to life and the promotion of law-governed order
and justice in the international system; several criticisms will be antici-
pated and, to some degree addressed in concluding remarks.
I. SELF-DEFENSE IN THE CHARTER ERA
Self-defence is Nature's eldest law.
John Dryden 24
A. Sovereignty Circumscribed: The U.N. Charter and the
Prohibition on Aggressive War
For most of history the sovereign prerogative of states to resort to
armed conflict was largely immune from regulation under interna-
24 John Dryden, Absalom and Achitopel (London, J.T. & W. Davis 1682).
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tional law.25 Sovereignty was its own justification for war: although the
Peace of Westphalia of 164826 was motivated in part by collective inter-
ests in preventing religious disputes from giving rise to interstate con-
flicts, states continued to claim, as a constituent aspect of their
sovereignty, the right to engage in war in response to a host of per-
ceived offenses, to collect debts, and to acquire territory well into the
twentieth century.27 However, early twentieth century efforts to regu-
late the resort to war, most notably the Covenant of the League of
Nations28 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928,29 advanced the crystal-
lization of an as yet inchoate international customary prohibition 30 on
"aggressive" war, commonly defined as the use of armed force against
25 YoRAm DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 176 (1994). As late as
the seventeenth century, jurists proclaimed that the right of self-defense extended to
the vindication of any national claim. See I D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 339
(1965).
26 See Treaty of Peace of Munster, Oct., 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 271; Treaty of Peace
of Osnabruck, Oct., 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 119 [hereinafter Treaty of Westphalia] (end-
ing the Thirty Years' War and establishing the modern system of sovereign states).
27 See Modes of Redress, 6 Hackworth DIGEST § 561, at 152-55 (discussing the
legal bases for state practice in employing force in the early twentieth century).
28 See COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS art. 12 (committing states-parties not
to resort to war against other states-parties "within three months" after an unsuccess-
ful attempt to arbitrate the dispute).
29 See Treaty Providing for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National
Policy, Aug. 28, 1928, art.1, 46 Stat. 2343, 2345, 2 Bevans 732, 734 [hereinafter Kel-
logg-Briand Pact] ("condemn [ing] recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies, and renounc[ing] it, as an instrument of national policy" in relations
between states-parties).
30 International law consists of treaty-based, as well as customary, sources of law.
See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187 (enumerating sources of international law as treaties, cus-
tom, general principles, and the opinions of expert commentators). Customary inter-
national law evolves from the practice of states consistent with the subjective
understanding that such practice is legally obligatory. North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 20). State practice, particularly by
directly affected states, is the most concrete element. See Michael Akehurst, Custom As
A Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 18 (1977). To become binding,
the practice must be consistent, settled, and uniform. See Prosper Weil, Towards Rela-
tive Normativity in International Law?, 77 Am.J. INT'L L. 413, 433 (1983). Although the
International Court ofJustice (ICJ) has specifically addressed the question of the req-
uisite degree of consistent practice necessary to constitute custom-determining that
it need not be universal-no authoritative judicial pronouncement exists to delineate
the precise boundaries of customary international humanitarian law. See Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 88 (June 27) ("The Court does
not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding prac-
tice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule.").
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the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. -'
In turn, the emerging jus ad bellum32 proscribing aggressive war found
positive expression in the Charter of the United Nations, 33 which en-
tered into force in 1945, as well as application at Nuremburg,3 4 and
quickly acquired the status of a peremptory norm.3 5 Article 2(4) of
31 The precise definition of "aggression" has bedeviled international lawyers for
nearly a century. SeeJuLIus STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 88-91 (1958) (sug-
gesting it may be impossible to overcome politics and achieve a universal definition);
Jonathan A. Bush, "The Supreme Crime" and its Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the
Crime of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2324 passim (2002) (chronicling the his-
tory of attempts to define the term). Nevertheless, progress has been made in recent
decades, and in 1974 a definition was adopted without vote by the United Nations
General Assembly. See Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975) (enjoining mem-
bers from the "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state," and establishing a rebuttable presumption that the "first use
of armed force by a state in contravention of the Charter" constitutes prima facie
evidence of aggression but, by limiting aggression to force used "in contravention of
the Charter," suggesting that some first uses of force may be permissible). In inter-
vening years a general definition of aggression has emerged that includes the ele-
ments of a military attack, not otherwise justified by international law, directed against
the territory of another state. See Louis Rent Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel, Pre-
emption, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 Hous. J. INT'L L. 259, 263 n.5 (1991) (synthe-
sizing various definitions of aggression).
32 The strand of international humanitarian law known as the jus ad bellum gov-
erns the right to resort to armed force, whereas the jus in bello governs the methods
and means employed in war and specifies who and what are legitimate targets. See
William J. Fenrick, Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 767, 770 (1999) (differentiating the jus ad bellum from the jus in bello).
33 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political
independence of any state . . ").
34 See 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 209, 218-22 (1947) [hereinafter TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS] (con-
victing defendants of conspiracy to wage "aggressive war").
35 A peremptory norm, also known as a norm of "jus cogens," is the most powerful
genre of all the sources of international law. A norm of jus cogens "is a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344. The prohibi-
tion against aggression in international relations is widely regarded as having attained
the status of a norm with the character of jus cogens. See 2 ARTHUR WATTS, THE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1949-1998, at 741 (1999) ("'[T]he law of the Charter
concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous ex-
ample of a rule in international law having the character of jus cogens.'") (quoting
the International Law Commission 1966 Commentary to the Final Draft Articles on
the Law of Treaties); Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.CJ. at 100 (holding that
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the Charter categorically proscribes "the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,"36 and
thus, fifty-eight years into the Charter era, it is "well settled in modern
international law that no nation may engage in aggression."
37
B. Sovereignty Preserved: The Inherent Right of Self-Defense
Nevertheless, imposition of a sharp prohibition on aggression has
not disabled the "inherent right" of states to self-defense, 38 nor has it
prevented state practice inconsistent with what former Justice Hersch
Lauterpacht termed the "guiding norm" of the U.N. enterprise: "there
shall be no violence." 39 Although the U.N. Charter has had a trans-
formative effect on the law governing the resort to force, 40 states re-
main free under customary international law to use force "in
conformity with the Charter."41 Accordingly, states continue to resort
to armed self-help to defend their territory and political indepen-
dence against aggression and to protect their nationals and property
abroad from serious threats of death or injury,42 and they do so with-
the norms represented by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter approached jus cogens
status).
36 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. The text of the Charter only admits of two excep-
tions to Article 2(4), namely Article 106, which allowed the current permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council to undertake collective action prior to the establishment
of the Security Council, and Article 107, which allowed states to take action against
the Axis Powers during World War II. See id. arts. 106, 107.
37 Addicott, supra note 18, at 769.
38 "Self-defense" under international law may be defined as "a lawful use of force
... under conditions prescribed by international law, in response to a previous unlaw-
ful use (or, at least, a threat) of force." DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 175.
39 Thomas M. Franck, The Use of Force in International Law, 11 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 7, 7 (2003).
40 Scholars debate not whether the U.N. Charter has transformed the jus ad bel-
lum but the degree to which it has done so. See Timothy Kearley, Regulation of Preven-
tive and Preemptive Force in the United Nations Charter: A Search for Original Intent, 3
WYOMING L. REV. 663 passim (2003) (examining the intent of the Article 51 drafters in
an attempt to answer this debate).
41 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 66 (July 8).
42 See Beck & Arend, supra note 21, at 199 ("No nation should be limited to using
force to protect its citizens ... to situations in which they are within its boundaries.")
(quoting the U.S. State Department Legal Advisor); Jordan J. Paust, Responding Law-
fully to International Terrorism: The Use of Force Abroad, 8 WHITTIER L. REv. 711, 729
(1986) (enumerating lawful bases for the use of force in self-defense); Abraham D.
Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REv. 89, 96 (1989)
(noting that states "have traditionally defended their military personnel, citizens,
commerce, and property from attacks"). The Israeli rescue of hostages held by ter-
rorists at Entebbe Airport in Uganda in 1976 is perhaps the most familiar example of
the use of force in defense of nationals. See Security Council Debate and Draft Resolutions
2004] 1375
1376 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:4
out impinging either the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of states that fail in their duty to protect aliens and alien
property within their jurisdiction. 43 Moreover, self-defense remains so
intrinsic to the concept of sovereignty even in the Charter era that the
right is "one that would be asserted by nations absent recognition in
international law."
44
In fact, the Charter does not of its own force disable or impair the
right to self-defense, nor is it at all likely that its framers intended that
it do So.45 Article 2(4), although broadly drafted, prohibits only three
Concerning the Operation to Rescue Hijacked Hostages at the Entebbe Airport, U.N. SCOR,
31st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/PV.1939 (1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1224, 1231 (1976).
43 See D.W. BoWETr SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-104 (1958) (charac-
terizing the use of force to protect nationals as lawful); MVREs S. McDouCAL & W.
MICHtAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 862-70 (1981)
(supporting use of force to protect nationals); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
DisPUTs, WAR AND NEUTRALIY § 135(6) at 309 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)
(finding intervention to protect nationals lawful);JULIUS STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS
24-26 (1974) (contrasting aggression in violation of Article 2(4) with defensive mea-
sures consistent with Article 2 (4)); John Norton Moore, Grenada and the International
Double Standard, 78 AM.J. INT'L L. 145, 153-54 (1984) (declaring protection of nation-
als by armed force lawful); Jordan J. Paust, The Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez, 85
YALE L.J. 774, 800 (1976) (finding it unlawful to use force to protect nationals not
actually in danger). Although analysis of the literature suggests that a majority of
contemporary commentators now supports the right of a state to protect its nationals
where necessary by armed force, for opposing views see IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 301 (1963) (rejecting the right of inter-
vention to protect nationals); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BE4AVE 145 (2d ed. 1979)
(same); PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 169-70 (3d ed. 1948) (expres-
sing doubt about the legality of intervention to save lives and property); HANS KELSEN
& ROBERT TUCKER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 64-87 (2d ed. 1966) (rejecting
the right of intervention to protect nationals).
44 Byard Q. Clemmons & Gary D. Brown, Rethinking International Self-Defense: The
United Nations'Emerging Role, NAVAL L. REv. 217, 218 (1998).
45 See BROWNLIE, supra note 43, at 271 (finding "no indication that the Charter
language was meant to do anything other than reflect the current right of self-de-
fense"); EVELYN SPEYER COLBERT, RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 203 (1948)
(branding the notion that signatories to the Charter intended to restrict the right of
self-defense in any way as "inconsistent with practical realities and their expressed
interests"); TIMOTHY L.H. MCCORMACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE IS-
RAELI RAID ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR 159 (1996) (concluding, after an exten-
sive analysis of the legislative history of the drafting conference, that the U.N. Charter
was not intended to terminate the customary international law with regard to the use
of force, or to draw all uses of force within the scope of Article 2(4)); Sean D.
Magenis, Natural Law as the Customary International Law of Self-Defense, 20 B.U. INT'L L.J.
413, 414 (2002) (explaining that framers of the U.N. Charter did not intend to limit
the natural right of states to self-defense as it existed at customary international law)
(citing Melvina Halberstam, The Right to Self-Defense Once the Security Council Takes Ac-
tion, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 229, 240-43 nn.50-63 (1996)); W. Thomas Mallison & Sally
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specific applications of force in international relations: (1) the threat
or use of force prejudicial to the territorial integrity of states; (2) the
threat or use of force contrary to the political independence of states;
and (3) the threat or use of force "in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations."46 In other words, all those
uses of force not excluded by operation of Article 2(4) are permitted,
and provided that a particular use of force cannot legitimately be con-
strued as challenging either the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of a state or as inconsistent with the primary purpose of the
United Nations-the "maintenance of international peace and secur-
ity"4 7 -the use of force in question is arguably permissible. 48 The ex-
ercise of the right to self-defense, even where it involves armed force,
is thus not inconsistent with the maintenance of international peace
and security and not contrary to the Charter. Even more directly, Ar-
ticle 51 recognizes49 the "inherent right" of a state subjected to aggres-
sion to engage in self-defense, and to receive the assistance of other
states to that end. 50 In sum, the Charter is not limited in its ends to
the promotion of international peace, nor is it most accurately con-
strued when the exceptions to Article 2(4) are read narrowly: the
V. Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack ofJune 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggres-
sion or Self-Defense?, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417, 420 (1982) (concluding from the
drafting history of the Charter that the text incorporates the inherent right of self-
defense as it existed ex ante in customary law in toto); George K. Walker, Anticipatory
Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era: What the Treaties Have Said, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
321, 351-52 (1998) (noting that the Charter framers understood self-defense to be an
inherent and inalienable right). But see Thomas M. Franck, When, If Ever, May States
Deploy Military Force Without Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
51, 58 (2001) (examining the travaux prparatoires of the Charter and concluding that
the framers intended a transformative approach to the law of force that would pre-
clude the use of force in self-defense unless preceded by an armed attack).
46 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
47 Id. art. 1(1).
48 See Bowrr, supra note 43, at 185-86; Paust, supra note 12, at 536; Michael N.
Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH.J. INT'L L. 513, 521-22. But
see Rex J. Zedalis, On the Lawfulness of Forceful Remedies for Violations of Arms Control
Agreements: "Star Wars" and Other Glimpses at the Future, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 73,
90-92 (1985) (conducting detailed exegesis of the travaux raratoires of the U.N.
Charter and reaching the conclusion that "Article 2(4) was not intended to permit
force to be used even when not inconsistent with a purpose of the U.N.").
49 It is important to note that Article 51 is not an affirmative grant but is rather
the recognition of an inherent right of self-defense. See Clemmons & Brown, supra
note 44, at 241; see also Walker, supra note 45, at 351-52 (clarifying the status of the
fight to self-defense in the Charter as a recognized, and not a conferred fight).
50 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent fight of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations . . ").
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framers recognized that justice, measured in terms of the right of
states to resist and defeat aggression, is a concomitant of peace, partic-
ularly in a world in which there is no effective international monopoly
on the right to use force and no sovereign to which states may turn for
resolution of their disputes, vindication of their rights, and guarantee
of their security.
C. Whither Customary International Law Governing the Resort to Force?
The Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-Defense
1. Restrictivists: Plain Language and Security Council Primacy
Abridge States' Rights under Customary International Law
Some commentators contest the argument that the customary in-
ternational law of self-defense is little transformed by the Charter, sug-
gesting instead that a further reading of Article 51, coupled with an
examination of the drafting history of the entire document, supports
the conclusion that a much more prohibitive regime in derogation of
the customary international law of self-defense was created in San
Francisco in 1945. For this restrictivist camp, Article 51 explicitly qual-
ifies the right to individual or collective self-defense to those circum-
stances in which an "armed attack" has occurred 51 and, in the absence
of the satisfaction of this condition precedent, states that resort to
armed force cannot avail themselves of the self-defense exception to
the general prohibition of Article 2(4), which in any event is to be
read very narrowly consistent with the primary purpose of the United
Nations-maintaining peace. 52 Moreover, Article 51, which provides
further that "[n] othing in the present Charter shall impair the inher-
ent right of ... self-defense, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security"53 can be read to
have structurally modified the inherent right to self-defense by subor-
dinating it to the Security Council-the U.N. organ charged with pri-
mary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security.54 Although it is hotly debated to what extent and with what
51 See, e.g., Bert. V.A. Roling, The Ban on the Use of Force and the U.N. Charter, in THE
CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION ON THE USE OF FORCE 3, 5 (A. Cassese ed., 1986).
52 See Michael Franklin Lohr, Legal Analysis of U.S. Military Responses to State-Spon-
sored International Terrorism, 34 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 18 (1985) (summarizing the restric-
tivist argument regarding Article 51).
53 U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added).
54 Article 24 of the Charter confers upon the Security Council "primary responsi-
bility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Id. art. 24. Under
Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council is specifically empowered to "deter-
mine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
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degree of success the Security Council must intervene in a given case
to preclude a state from employing force in self-defense, 55 and al-
though the record of the Security Council in maintaining interna-
tional peace and security is abominable,5 6 the plain language of
sion." See id. art. 39. Should the Security Council make such a determination, it may
at its discretion make recommendations as to measures to restore international peace
and security, or it may call upon members to take a wide array of "measures not in-
volving the use of armed force," to include, inter alia, the "complete or partial inter-
ruption of economic relations... and the severance of diplomatic relations." Id. arts.
40, 41. Should such nonforceful measures prove inadequate, or should the Security
Council decide that such measures would not suffice, the Council may authorize
member states to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security." Id. art. 42. The Security Coun-
cil may also authorize regional organizations to undertake enforcement measures
consistent with the restoration of international peace and security. Id. arts. 52, 53.
55 Some scholars, interpreting Article 51 literally, contend that once the Security
Council becomes seized of a matter the right of self-defense is automatically sus-
pended. See Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Shifting Boundaries of the Right of Self-Defence-Ap-
praising the Impact of the September 11 Attacks onjus Ad Bellum, 36 INT'L LAw. 1081, 1089
(2002) (positing this interpretation of Article 51); Sean M. Condron, Justification for
Unilateral Action in Response to the Iraqi Threat: A Critical Analysis of Operation Desert Fox,
161 MIL. L. Riv. 115, 131-34 (1999) (surveying proponents and critics of the "literal-
ist" interpretation of Article 51). According to this literalist interpretation, it matters
not whether the Security Council takes effective measures against the aggressor; the
right of a state to self-defense is in abeyance. Critics of this literalist interpretation
suggest that to prevent an injured state from taking measures in self-defense despite
the ineffectiveness of the Security Council would be "an implausible-indeed ab-
surd-interpretation" entirely inconsistent with the intent of the framers of the Char-
ter to protect, rather than render illusory, the inherent right of self-defense. Oscar
Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 Am. J. INT'L L. 452, 458 (1991)
(criticizing the literalist interpretation, and noting that in the scenario where the
Council calls an invader to withdraw, such a decision by the Council "could not be
intended to deprive the victim state of its right to defend itself when the invader has
not complied with the Council's order"); see also Schmitt, supra note 48, at 532 (insist-
ing that "the mere fact that the Security Council... is considering the situation ...
does not deprive a State of its right to self-defense"); Roger K. Smith, The Legality of
Coercive Arms Control, 19 YALEJ. INT'L L. 455, 497-98 (1994) (noting that language that
would have explicitly terminated the right of continuing self-defense upon the Secur-
ity Council becoming seized of a dispute was proposed and rejected at the San Fran-
cisco drafting conference). According to this pragmatic interpretation of Article 51,
the right to self-defense cannot be suspended upon anything short of an affirmative
Security Council finding that the state acting in self-defense has exceeded the scope
of Article 51, to the point where its actions in response to aggression constitute an
independent threat to international security. Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., Article 51: Lim-
its on Self-Defense?, 13 MicH. J. INT'L L. 336, 351-52 (1992) (stating that the right to
self-defense terminates only upon an explicit Security Council determination that
continued measures in self-defense would constitute aggression).
56 Only a quarter-century into the Charter era, commentators were eulogizing
the Security Council on the ground that it had failed in its mission of preserving
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Article 51 supports the restrictivist argument that the customary right
of self-defense has been abridged by the investment of the primary
responsibility for peace and security in the Security Council, even
where the Security Council fails to respond or responds ineffectively.
The customary international law doctrine of anticipatory self-de-
fense 57 -a subset of the broader body of custom predating the Char-
ter, which holds that when a state is faced with an imminent threat of
armed attack it may lawfully resort to proportional acts of defensive
international peace and security. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?
Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 810-11,
822 (1970) (noting the abuse of Charter provisions by states falsely claiming to act in
self-defense, the spurious invocation of the authority of regional organizations, and
the inability of the Security Council to enforce prohibitions on the use of force).
Subsequent analyses of the performance of the Security Council offered four and
nearly six decades, and several genocides, after its founding, supports the argument
that it has failed abjectly. See MichaelJ. Glennon, The Fog of War: Self-Defense, Inherence
and Incoherence in Article 51 of United Nations Charter, 25 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 539,
540 (2002) ("Between 1945 and 1999, two-thirds of the members of the United Na-
tions-126 states out of 189-fought 291 interstate conflicts in which 22 million peo-
ple were killed.... The upshot is that the Charter's use-of-force regime has all but
collapsed."); O'Connell, supra note 19, at 449 (describing the Security Council as
"limp [ing] on under a cloud of questioned legitimacy" after its exclusion in favor of
NATO during the Kosovo Crisis in 1998-1999); W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the
Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALEJ. INT'L L. 279, 280 (1985) (suggesting
that states have ignored the Charter provisions governing the use of force, and modi-
fied the role of the Security Council, by practice); Roberts, supra note 7, at 484
(describing contrary state practice as having rendered Charter provisions governing
the use of force "moribund"); Wedgwood, supra note 14, at 581 (describing the Secur-
ity Council as having "enormously weakened its own prestige by ineffectual responses
to the disastrous conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s"). Some
commentators lay much blame at the foot of states and suggest that their failures to
participate in Article 43 agreements and to otherwise contribute to collective security
is at the root of Security Council ineffectiveness. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROB-
ERT BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER
PARADIGM 56-58 (1993) (suggesting states "are simply not committed enough to the
principle of collective security to be willing to use force in circumstances that seem to
have little direct relevance to their own national security goals"); Annan, supra note
18 (reminding member states that the United Nations has not yet proven "that [the]
concerns [of 'uniquely vulnerable' states] can, and will, be addressed effectively
through collective action").
57 Anticipatory self-defense is sometimes referred to as "preemptive self-defense."
See, e.g., Kearley, supra note 40, at 665; Sapiro, supra note 16, at 600. Although it is
possible to differentiate the two, this Article accepts the argument that anticipatory
self-defense and preemptive self-defense are largely equivalent; nevertheless, there is a
crucial distinction between these terms and the doctrine of preventive war, discussed
infra Part II.
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armed force to preempt the attack before it is inflicted 58-has of late
become the wedge that has broadened the theoretical division be-
tween restrictivists and pragmatists on the subject of self-defense.
That a customary right of states to engage in anticipatory self-defense
existed in the pre-Charter era is uncontroverted. 59 European multilat-
eral defense treaties codified express provisions for the collective exer-
cise of self-defense in anticipation of aggression as late as the early
twentieth century,60 and with the Monroe Doctrine the United States
issued a clear expression of its intent to engage in anticipatory self-
defense should any European power attempt to extend its sphere of
influence into the Western Hemisphere. 61 The classic recitation of
the doctrine, enunciated in the Caroline case, established a more se-
cure foundation in international law for the right of a state to antici-
pate a threat with force, provided that "the 'necessity of . . self-
defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and
no moment for deliberation.'" 62 The Caroline formulation, which ac-
58 In the strict sense, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense is inapplicable to
ongoing conflicts, under which the formal state of belligerence has been created,
military operations are not designed to anticipate enemy attacks, and the rights of
belligerents to self-defense cannot be said to depend upon whether it is possible to
demonstrate an imminent threat, as the threat exists from the moment of the first
strike. See Schmitt, supra note 48, at 536 ("Once the first attack in an ongoing cam-
paign has been launched, the issue of anticipatory self-defense becomes moot. Immi-
nence is irrelevant because an armed attack is already underway.").
59 See AREND & BECK, supra note 56, at 72 (finding a near-consensus on the ques-
tion); 1OPPENHEIM, supra note 43, §§ 133-133e, at 300-03 (discussing the historical
instances of anticipatory self-defense); Louis Ren6 Beres, Israel, Lebanon, and Hizbul-
lah: A Jurisprudential Assessment, 14 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 141, 150 (1997) (same);
Ruth Wedgwood, Strike at Saddam Now, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28, 2002, at A16 (asserting the
general acceptance of anticipatory self-defense by international lawyers since the Caro-
line case).
60 See Walker, supra note 45, at 327-35 (examining treaties from the eighteenth
through twentieth centuries that established collective self-defense regimes and incor-
porating anticipatory self-defense provisions as support for the existence of a right at
customary international law to invoke the doctrine); see also id. at 350 (interpreting
the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and other treaties as
supportive of the customary international legal right to anticipatory self-defense).
61 See Elihu Root, The Real Monroe Doctrine, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 427, 432 (1914)
(describing the Monroe Doctrine as an expression of a U.S. right to engage in antici-
patory self-defense if challenged in the Western Hemisphere by a European power).
62 Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Lord Ashburton, British
Plenipotentiary (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in National Jurisdiction: Its Legal Effects, 2
Moore DIGEST § 217, at 412. The facts of the Caroline case are as follows: during an
uprising against British rule in Upper Canada in 1837, a British officer authorized an
armed band of irregular forces to cross into the United States to destroy a vessel, the
Caroline, then moored in port, by sending it over the Niagara Falls. From the availa-
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quired near-universal acceptance over the course of the next century
as the authoritative expression of the right of states to anticipatory
self-defense, influenced the interpretation of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact 63 and the jurisprudence of the Nuremburg Tribunal, 64 which
cited it approvingly even in denying the defense proffered by Nazi
defendants to charges of aggressive war.65 However, although the ex-
istence of the right to anticipatory self-defense under traditional cus-
tomary international law is well established, the question remains
whether the transformations wrought upon the international legal re-
gime governing self-defense by the establishment of the U.N. Charter
include impairment of the right of states to engage in anticipatory
self-defense even under the narrowly delimited circumstances of
necessity resulting from an imminent threat of sufficient magnitude.
66
ble information, it appeared that the Caroline was to be used by Americans to provide
arms and supplies to Canadian insurgents, and the British Government characterized
the destruction of the Caroline-in the context of diplomatic correspondence con-
cerning the criminal trial of a captured British national-as an act of anticipatory self-
defense. Diplomatic correspondence between Britain and the United States resolved
the dispute and provided authoritative expressions in support of the qualified right of
states to engage in anticipatory self-defense. See 1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES
UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 189-90 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854) (offering
contemporaneous support for the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense as articulated
in the Caroline case). For a discussion of the Caroline case, see Thomas Graham, Jr.,
National Self-Defense, International Law, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 4 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 1, 6-8 (2003).
63 See Walker, supra note 45, at 342-43 (noting that fourteen of the parties to the
Kellogg-Briand Pact signed a statement of authoritative interpretation of the Pact stat-
ing that the Pact did not affect their "inalienable" right of self-defense, to include the
right to anticipatory self-defense).
64 SeeJudgment, 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 34, at 448
(holding that the German invasions of Denmark and Norway did not meet these re-
quirements: "[P] reventative action in foreign territory is justified only in case of 'an
instant and overwhelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means, and
no moment of deliberation."').
65 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East restated the Caroline case
in approving the exercise of anticipatory self-defense by the Netherlands in response
to an impeding Japanese attack upon its possessions in the South Pacific. See United
States v. Araki, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST, THE To-
KYO JUDGMENT 382 (B.V.A. R61ing & C.F. Rfiter eds., 1977) ("The fact that the
Netherlands being fully apprised of the imminence of the attack in self-defense de-
clared war against Japan . . . cannot change that war from a war of aggression on the
part of Japan into something other than that.").
66 To the requirement of imminence, some commentators add the requirement
that the threat be of sufficient magnitude to justify the resort to anticipatory self-
defense on the theory that lesser threats can be managed without the resort to force
that carries with it the prospect of being in violation of the general proscription on
the use of force. See Addicott, supra note 18, at 778. Moreover, the exercise of antici-
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For restrictivists,6 7 anticipatory self-defense, despite its pedigree,
patory self-defense, as well as the use of force generally, is subject to the requirement
of proportionality, which provides that an injury should be requited reciprocally, but
not with a greater injury, and that military force not be employed to cause damage
excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated. See R.R. Baxter, Moderniz-
ing the Law of War, 78 MIL. L. REv. 165, 178-79 (1977) (discussing application of the
rule of proportionality). The requirement that a state, prior to exercising anticipa-
tory self-defense, exhaust peaceful remedies is a customary international legal duty
that has found a place in the Charter. See U.N. CHARTER art. 33 (requiring states to
first seek peaceful settlement of disputes).
67 A number of commentators hew to the restrictivist position and reject the post-
Charter viability of the customary international law doctrine of anticipatory self-de-
fense as incompatible with the regime regulating the resort to armed conflict estab-
lished by the Charter. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 43, at 273-79 (asserting that the
correct interpretation of the Charter rules out anticipatory self-defense); ANTHONY
D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 32 (1987) (noting that "the
majority of commentators are now of the view that Article 51 of the [Charter] has
made it illegal to 'jump the gun' and fire first in anticipation of armed attack"); DIN-
STEIN, supra note 25, at 183-85 (rejecting the interpretation of Charter that includes
preventive war); HENKIN, supra note 43, at 141-44 (arguing that interpreting the
Charter to permit anticipatory self-defense is "unfounded"); Louis HENKIN, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw: POLITICS AND VALUES 121-22 (1995) (arguing that allowing anticipatory
self-defense "would nullify the key limiting phrase in Article 51-'if an armed attack
occurs"'); JEssuP, supra note 43, at 166-67 (arguing that although the documentary
record from the formation of the U.N. Charter "does not afford conclusive evidence
• .. the general tenor of the discussions, as well as the careful choice of words
throughout Chapters VI and VII of the Charter relative to various stages of aggrava-
tion of dangers to the peace," support the restrictivist position); HANS KELSEN, THE
LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 797-98 (1950) (noting that Article 51 "does not use the
term 'aggression' but the much narrower concept of 'armed attack,' which means
that a merely 'imminent' attack .. .does not justify resort to force"); JOSEF L. KUNZ,
THE CHANGING LAW OF NATIONS: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 571-72 (1968) ("Arti-
cle LI prohibits 'preventive war'"); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 43, § 52aa, at 156 (argu-
ing that "the Charter confines the right of armed self-defense to the case of an armed
attack as distinguished from anticipated attack or from various forms of unfriendly
conduct falling short of armed attack"); AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRES-
SION 126 (1979) ("Although we agree that the concept of 'armed attack' provided by
Article 51 should be restrictively interpreted ... it is difficult, however, to accept that
recourse to measures of self-defence should be delayed until an armed attack has
taken place in all cases ...."); Josef L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM.J. INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947) (finding
Article 51 to prohibit "preventive war"); Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Ter-
rorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 537, 541 (1999)
(finding that "the Charter... seems to preclude an open-ended use of anticipatory
self-defense"); Robert W. Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense: The Customary Law, 66 AM.
J. INT'L L. 586, 594 (1972) (setting out the restrictivist position); Quincy Wright, The
Cuban Quarantine, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 546, 560 (1963) (arguing that the "Charter in-
tended to limit the traditional right of defense by states to actual armed attack"); cf.
Tom J. Farer, Law and War, in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER:
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is "fertile ground for torturing the self-defense concept"68 and a dan-
gerous warrant for manipulative, self-serving states to engage in prima
facie illegal aggression while cloaking their actions under the guise of
anticipatory self-defense and claiming legal legitimacy. 69 Analysis of
the legitimacy of an act of anticipatory self-defense requires replacing
the objectively verifiable prerequisite of an "armed attack" under Arti-
cle 51 with the subjective perception of a "threat" of such an attack as
perceived by the state believing itself a target, and thus determination
of whether a state has demonstrated imminence before engaging in
anticipatory self-defense lends itself to post hoc judgments of an infi-
nite number of potential scenarios, spanning a continuum from the
most innocuous of putatively civilian acts, including building roads
and performing scientific research, to the most threatening, including
the overt marshaling of thousands of combat troops in offensive dispo-
sitions along a contested border. Establishing the necessity of antici-
patory self-defense in response to a pattern of isolated incidents over a
period of time is an equally subjective task susceptible to multiple de-
terminations and without empirical standards to guide judgment. 70
History is replete with examples of aggression masquerading as antici-
patory self-defense, 71 including the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 15, 42-51 (Cyril E. Black & Richard A. Falk eds., 1971) (ex-
amining the different approaches to interpreting the Charter's provision on self-de-
fense and their underlying values); Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A
Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND ClVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD 229, 244 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974) (noting that in practice
Article 2(4) has not been cited to condemn humanitarian intervention by member
states). At least one restrictivist approves of anticipatory self-defense on policy
grounds but rejects the doctrine as incompatible with legal obligations assumed
under the Charter. See Glennon, supra note 56, at 539 (suggesting that although an-
ticipatory self-defense can be a sound policy argument "it would plainly violate Article
51 of the United Nations Charter").
68 Clemmons & Brown, supra note 44, at 228.
69 See Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 394-410 (Richard A. Falk et al. eds., 1985) (devel-
oping arguments in support of this concern).
70 See Paust, supra note 42, at 732 (questioning how one can judge the self-de-
fense requirements of necessity and proportionality when responding to specific ter-
rorist attacks in various parts of the world with lulls of time between each).
71 See Clemmons & Brown, supra note 44, at 221-23 (chronicling the history of
the "over-zealous" application of anticipatory self-defense, including in the War of
Spanish Succession (1702-1714) and the Anglo-Franco-Danish Conflict (1807)); id. at
235 (characterizing Indo-Pakistani wars as instances where both sides claimed they
were acting in self-defense); John-Alex Romano, Note, Combating Terrorism and Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction: Reviving the Doctrine of a State of Necessity, 87 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1048
n.163 (1999) (noting the rejection by the International Law Commission of the Ger-
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193172 and the German invasion of Poland in 1939,73 and by simply
recharacterizing their actions as anticipatory self-defense rather than
aggression dedicated to territorial revanchism or fulfillment of relig-
ious obligations, self-interested states such as China, North Korea, Pa-
kistan, or members of the Arab League, restrictivists warn, might
claim the legal entitlement to attack, respectively, Taiwan, South Ko-
rea, India, and Israel.74 Moreover, taken to its logical extreme the
doctrine of anticipatory self-defense might be interpreted as authoriz-
ing a state under the leadership of a paranoid decisionmaker to attack
the entire world on the false suspicion of threats emanating from
every corner.
75
In short, restrictivists champion the Charter as a rigidly positivist
legal framework in which anticipatory self-defense is an unwelcome
and even repugnant legal anachronism that blurs the distinction be-
man claim that its invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium in 1914 was an act of antici-
patory self-defense).
72 See League of Nations, O.J. Spec. Supp. 177, VI, at 42 (1933) (rejecting the
Japanese claim of anticipatory self-defense in view of facts which demonstrated the
absence of a threat from China without prejudicing the general availability of a de-
fense of anticipatory self-defense).
73 The Nuremburg Tribunal concluded that the German invasion of Poland was
not predicated upon "an intention formed in good faith and honesty of conviction to
protect one's safety, that safety being immediately threatened," in convicting German
defendants of conspiracy to launch an aggressive war against Poland. 2 TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 34, at 207. For restrictivists, the essential purpose
of Article 51 was to preclude "bogus claim [s] to be acting in self-defense" such as the
German invasion of Poland. Franck, supra note 16, at 620.
74 See Harold Hongju Koh, Foreward: On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv.
1479, 1516 (2003) (presenting examples of disputes ripe for exploitation through
false claims of anticipatory self-defense as the legal justification for aggression). In
the words of French President Jacques Chirac:
As soon as one nation claims the right to take preventive action, other coun-
tries will naturally do the same .... What would you say in the entirely hypo-
thetical event that China wanted to take pre-emptive action against Taiwan,
saying that Taiwan was a threat to it? ... Or what if India decided to take
preventive action against Pakistan, or vice versa?
Elaine Sciolino, French Leader Offers Formula to Tackle Iraq: Chirac Wants Support of UN.
Before Action, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at Al.
75 The proper exercise of anticipatory self-defense requires far more than the
judgment that another state might eventually harbor ill will toward another state, or
that a state may be waxing in power; capacity, coupled with direct and specific intent
to make immediate use of that capacity by aggressive action, are necessary elements
which must be proven. See Taft & Buchwald, supra note 14, at 557 ("One state may
not strike another merely because the second might someday develop an ability and
desire to attack it."). Put somewhat differently, "pure capability is not a sufficient
casus belli .... And pure capability with a smarmy attitude is not casus belli." Six
Degrees of Preemption, WASH. PosT, Sept. 29, 2002, at B2.
2004] 1385
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
tween aggression and self-defense by substituting a highly subjective
imminence standard in place of an objective requirement of an ante-
cedent armed attack. All but a handful of restrictivists conclude that
to read Article 51 as anything other than a clear and deliberate mea-
sure intended by the framers to override and extinguish the custom-
ary law as an independent source of an inherent right of self-defense
and impose a restrictive obligation upon states-parties would jeopard-
ize the legal project of restraining state discretion in regard to the
resort to armed force. 76 Accordingly, for restrictivists, Article 51 is un-
ambiguous in its requirement that an armed attack occur prior to the
lawful exercise of self-defense, and "unless troops, planes or ships
cross an international border to commence an attack, '77 the right of
anticipatory self-defense simply does not arise.78 Moreover, any appli-
cation of military force undertaken absent an armed attack is ipso
facto an aggressive act in violation of the plain terms of Article 2(4)
unless authorized by the Security Council; 79 in theory, a state engag-
76 See John Quigley, A Weak Defense of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 10 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. LJ. 255, 257 (1996) ("In a world which is hard pressed to stop aggressive war, it
makes little sense to open a loophole large enough to accommodate a tank divi-
sion."); see also Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense 15 (Aug.
2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf ("The UN Charter was
adopted for the very purpose of creating a far wider prohibition on force than existed
under treaty or custom in 1945 ... ."). A handful of restrictivists may be amenable to
the conclusion that a vestigial right under customary international law entitling states
to resort to anticipatory self-defense is available in those highly unusual circumstances
in which a threat is "nearly certain to materialize," the threat is of a very high order of
magnitude, and nonforceful options are certain to fail. Schmitt, supra note 48, at 531.
However, the overwhelming majority of restrictivists read Article 51 as having extin-
guished any other source of an inherent right to self-defense apart from that stated
and qualified by Article 51. See, e.g., J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 417
(Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); BROWNLIE, supra note 43, at 271-72; JESSUP,
supra note 43, at 166-68; H. KELSEN, RECENT TRENDS IN THE LAW OF NATIONS 913-14
(1961); cf. A.L. Goodhart, The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, 79 RECUIEL DES COURs 183,
192 (1951) (noting that the Charter is not a source of rights but rather a source of
limitation on the inherent rights of the member states).
77 Condron, supra note 55, at 131.
78 See HENKIN, supra note 67, at 295 ("[T]he Charter intended to permit unilat-
eral use of force only in a very narrow and clear circumstance, in self-defense if an
armed attack occurs.") (emphasis added).
79 The International Court of Justice, in a much-criticized-and cited-opinion,
offered strong support for the restrictivist position, holding that the legitimacy of a
claim to self-defense rests upon and is "subject to the State concerned having been
the victim of an armed attack," thus seeming to restrictivists to categorically reject the
doctrine of anticipatory self-defense as incompatible with the U.N. Charter, and in
particular Article 2(4). See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 103 (June 27) (separate opinion of Judge Ni).
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ing in anticipatory self-defense without such authorization could itself
become branded an outlaw and the target of Security Council action
under Article 42.
2. Pragmatists: The Charter Accommodates Custom and Necessity
In stark contrast, pragmatists8 0 assert that, as an essential constitu-
ent of sovereignty, the traditional right of states to self-defense is to be
80 A number of commentators espouse views that can collectively be termed the
"pragmatist" position, which asserts that the post-Charter viability of the customary
international law doctrine of anticipatory self-defense was intended by the framers of
the Charter and is necessary in a world lacking a central executive with the power to
sanction aggressors. See, e.g., BowErr, supra note 43, at 191 ("It is not believed [that
the Charter] restricts the traditional right of self-defence so as to exclude action taken
against an imminent danger but before 'an armed attack occurs.'"); BRIERLY, supra
note 76, at 418-21 (rejecting the restrictivist interpretation of Article 51); McCOR-
MACK, supra note 45, at 253-84, 302 (setting forth a more pragmatic approach to
analyzing self-defense); MvYEs S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, THE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF WAR: TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 241
(1994) ("A rational appraisal of necessity demands much more than simple ascertain-
ment of the modality of the initiating coercion."); McDoucAL & REISMAN, supra note
43, at 988-91 (citing the view that customary international law allows for anticipatory
self-defense); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 150-52
(1991) (finding it unnecessary to interpret Article 51 as "exclud[ing] absolutely legiti-
mate self-defense in advance of an actual attack"); STONE, supra note 43, at 2-3 (re-
jecting the restrictivist view of the Charter); ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS,
JR., THE CONCEPT OF ACCREssION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 58 (1972) ("The limitations
of aggression only to instances of armed attack and possible threats thereof is too
narrow."); William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination:
The US. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REv. 667, 725 (2003) (discussing the use of
anticipatory self-defense to kill Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein); Beres, supra
note 31, at 266 (arguing that a literal interpretation of Article 51 "ignores the reality
that international law cannot compel a state to wait until it absorbs a lethal first strike
before acting to protect itself'); George Bunn, International Law and the Use of Force in
Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have to Take the First Hit?, NAVAL WAR C. REv., May-June 1986,
at 69, 73-74 (finding an "inherent right" to anticipatory self-defense); Franck, supra
note 45, at 68 (arguing that the use of force is tolerated under the Charter system);
Claude Humphrey & Meredith Waldock, The Regulation of Force by Individual States in
International Law, 81 R.C.A.D.I. 451, 496-99 (1952); David K. Linnan, Self-Defense, Ne-
cessity and U.N. Collective Security: United States and Other Views, 1991 Du, EJ. CoMP. &
INT'L L. 57, 65-84, 122 (stating that the "proper treaty interpretation" of the Charter
includes a customary law of self-defense); Rein Mfillerson & David J. Scheffer, Legal
Regulation of the Use of Force, in BEYOND CONFRONTATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA 93, 109-10 (Lori Fisler Damrosch et al. eds., 1995) (finding that
the Charter did not extinguish anticipatory self-defense but did put limits on it); John
F. Murphy, Commentary on Intervention to Combat Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, in Aw
AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 241, 242 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David
J. Scheffer eds., 1991) (considering the U.S. justification for its intervention in Pan-
ama as a pragmatist rationale); William V. O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense
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presumed to have survived the Charter in the absence of compelling
evidence to the contrary,8I and that available evidence indicates the
intent that the Charter coexist with, rather than trump, custom as an
independent source of rights and duties under the international law
pertinent to the use of force.82 Accordingly, anticipatory self-defense,
in Counterterror Operations, 30 VA.J. INT'L L. 421, 423-24 (1990) (supporting the. right
of preemptive self-defense); W. Michael Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion
in the Post-Cold War World: Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra, at 26, 44-47 (rejecting a "rigid and noncontextual
reading" of the Charter); Reisman, supra note 56, at 280 (noting that "the Charter
acknowledged the inherent limits of its structures in the prevailing international polit-
ics by reserving to states the right of self-defense"); Oscar Schachter, The Right of States
to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1634 (1984) (noting that it is not necessary
to read the Charter to exclude legitimate anticipatory self-defense); Michael N.
Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century War and Its Possible
Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 MIcH.J. INT'L L. 1051, 1071 (1998) (posit-
ing inherent right to self-defense); Sofaer, supra note 42, at 95 (arguing that a "sound
construction" of the Charter would allow for anticipatory self-defense); Ruth Wedg-
wood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 559, 566
.(1999) (justifying American attacks in Afghanistan against Bin Laden under "the cus-
tomary law of self-defense"); Abraham D. Sofaer, Iraq and International Law, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 31, 2003, at Al0.
81 See BowETr, supra note 43, at 184-85 (arguing that member nations of the
U.N. still have all of those rights accorded to them under international law which they
have not surrendered, including the right of self-defense); McDouGAL & FELICIANO,
supra note 80, at 236 ("[Anticipatory self-defense] has long been honored in tradi-
tional authoritative myth as one of the fundamental 'rights of sovereign states' [and]
limitations or derogations from sovereign competence are not lightly to be
assumed.").
82 The travaux prparatoires of the Charter is silent with regard to anticipatory self-
defense, and some scholars read into this silence an intent to "eliminate the preexist-
ing right to act in anticipation." HENKIN, supra note 43, at 141; see also Zedalis, supra
note 48, at 100 ("Had Article 51's reference to self-defense 'if an armed attack occurs'
not been intended to eliminate the preexisting right to act in anticipation, some ef-
fort to have the travaux capture that fundamental point would have seemed natural.
The failure of the travaux to do so, therefore, is somewhat suggestive."). However,
many scholars are doubtful that the travaux supports the restrictivist argument. See,
e.g., Schachter, supra note 80, at 1634 (noting that "it is not clear that article 51 was
intended to eliminate the customary law right of self-defense"). Pragmatists interpret
any indeterminacy in Article 51 to mean that the inclusion in Article 51 of the words
"nothing ... shall impair the inherent right" evinces a clear intent not to restrict the
pre-Charter customary legal rights of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense.
See Summary Report of Fourth Meeting of Committee, Doc. 885,1/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O.
Docs. 387, 400 (1945) (stating that under the Charter "self-defense remains admitted
and unimpaired"); Clemmons & Brown, supra note 44, at 234 ("To the extent Article
51 ... provide[s] that the inherent right of self-defense is not impaired, the anticipa-
tory right should stand, as it was customary law before the Charter existed.").
Pragmatists differ further from restrictivists in regard to the language relevant to the
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a subset of the inherent right of self-defense that antedates the Char-
ter, coexists easily with the text of Article 51, a provision the plain and
natural meaning of which neither compels, nor was it intended to
compel, the cramped restrictivist conclusion that self-defense is per-
mitted under international law if, and only if an armed attack oc-
curs.8 3 Thus, to restrictivist claims that the resort to anticipatory self-
defense without the pre-authorization of the Security Council consti-
tutes aggression, pragmatists counter with the assertion that because
the inherent right to self-defense, to include anticipatory self-defense,
is a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted, 8 4 the all
too frequent failure of the Security Council to take effective measures
to thwart a would-be aggressor does not preclude or place outside the
analysis, insisting that the French language version of Article 51, which uses the
phrase "aggression arme"-armed aggression-instead of "armed attack," was in-
tended to accord states a margin of appreciation to permit them to respond to armed
aggression in the form of threats, even in the absence of an armed attack, and as such
is a better interpretation of the framers' intent. See Mallison & Mallison, supra note
45, at 420-21 (arguing that the French text, which is equally as authentic as the En-
glish version, more accurately reflects the negotiating history and the intent of the
parties). For pragmatists, the travaux preparatoires clearly reveals that anticipatory self-
defense survives the Charter as an independent source of legal authority for self-de-
fense in the face of threatened attack. See MCCORMACK, supra note 45, at 184-85
(discerning a clear intent to preserve the customary doctrine of anticipatory self-de-
fense); Graham, supra note 62, at 3-4 (summarizing the restrictivist position on the
survival of the customary law of self-defense in the Charter era); Beth M. Polebaum,
Note, National Self-Defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age,
59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 187, 202 (1984) (summarizing this position as of 1984).
83 See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.CJ. at 347-48 (Schwebel, J.,
dissenting):
I wish, ex abundanti cautela, to make clear that, for my part, I do not agree
with a construction of the United Nations Charter which would read Article
51 as if it were worded: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if, and only if, an
armed attack occurs..." I do not agree that the terms or intent of Article 51
eliminate the right of self-defense under customary international law, or
confine its entire scope to the express terms of Article 51.
84 Scholars diverge in their opinions as to precisely which norms can be consid-
ered to be peremptory norms in international law. See Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness
of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MiCH. J.
INT'L L. 1, 2 (1995) (arguing that the idea of peremptory norms in international law
is indefensible). However, at least two commentators conclude that the right to self-
defense has attained the status of norm of jus cogens. See Louis Ren6 Beres, On Assassi-
nation as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 321, 322 n.3
(1991); Carin Kahgan, Jus Cogens and the Inherent Right to Self-Defense, 3 ILSAJ. INT'L &
COMP. L. 767, 827 (1997). If the right to self-defense is a norm of jus cogens, it trumps
treaty-based norms, including those created or reflected by the U.N. Charter, in the
event of conflict. See Walker, supra note 45, at 352 n.212.
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law the prudent exercise of anticipatory self-defense, particularly
when the survival of the threatened state is at risk.8 5 In other words,
nothing in the language of Article 51, its drafting history, or its rela-
tion to the object and purpose of the U.N. Charter compels the ab-
surd conclusion that the framers intended to abolish the customary
right of states to anticipatory self-defense "when [their] survival is at
stake."8
6
Moreover, pragmatists argue, not only is anticipatory self-defense
compatible with the Charter, but ongoing processes of technological
development, proliferation of WMD, and radicalization of interna-
tional relations have so enhanced the magnitude of the threats to ci-
vilian populations and the speed with which enemies can attack that
the Caroline standard for "imminence," developed in a pre-WMD era,
is no longer sufficient to simultaneously restrain states while guaran-
teeing their survival.8 7 For pragmatists, the conceivable acts of aggres-
85 See Timothy Kearley, Raising the Caroline, 1999 WiS. INT'L LJ. 325, 345 (chal-
lenging the notion that Security Council inactivity with respect to threatened aggres-
sion renders an act of anticipatory self-defense in the face of that aggression an illegal
act); see also Taft & Buchwald, supra note 14, at 557 ("An otherwise lawful use of force
does not become unlawful because it can be characterized as preemption.").
86 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.CJ. 226, 263
(July 8) (opining that one should not lose sight of the inherent right of every state to
survival).
87 In regard to the determination of imminence, pragmatists assert that funda-
mental changes in political and military circumstances that render a legal test inap-
propriate to a contemporary threat environment demand that the test be revised to
reflect current realities. See Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-
Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 598 (1963) (contending, in regard to the proliferation
of nuclear weapons in the 1960s and the application of the Caroline test to that threat
environment, "that a test formulated in the previous century for a controversy be-
tween two friendly states is hardly relevant to contemporary controversies, involving
high expectations of violence, between nuclear-armed protagonists"). Professor Mc-
Dougal noted further that
under the hard conditions of the contemporary technology of destruction,
which makes possible the complete obliteration of states with still incredible
speed from still incredible distances, the principle of effectiveness, requiring
that agreements be interpreted in accordance with the major purposes and
demands projected by the parties, could scarcely be served by requiring
states confronted with necessity for defense to assume the posture of 'sitting
ducks.' Any such interpretation could only make a mockery, both in its ac-
ceptability to states and in its potential application, of the Charter's major
purpose of minimizing unauthorized coercion and violence across state
lines.
Id. at 600-01. More recent pragmatists observe that technological transformations
not foreseeable at the time of the drafting of the U.N. Charter have enabled methods
of intelligence collection, such as satellite intelligence and communications in-
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sion against which states were historically entitled to defend included
not merely transborder attacks but also military preparations under-
taken as preludes to or as threats of an attack, 88 and to read the Char-
ter hypertechnically to require that a state assume the posture of a
"sitting duck" and submit to a potentially decisive first strike, thereby
risking its very survival, would "eliminate the customary law right of
self-defense"89 and "protect the aggressor's right to the first stroke."90
Such a principle would "be a denial of that essential reciprocity be-
tercepts, that yield proof of the hostile intent of adversaries long before an actual
armed attack and should thus permit states to act in self-defense in anticipation of
such attacks. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Case for Anticipa-
tory Self-Defense, WK LY. STANDARD,Jan. 28, 2002, at 24, 26 (arguing that "modern meth-
ods of intelligence collection ... now make it unnecessary to sit out an actual armed
attack to await convincing proof of a state's hostile intent").
88 Pragmatists take a far more expansive view than do restrictivists on the ques-
tion of precisely what constitutes aggression against which states are entitled to exer-
cise their inherent right of self-defense. See Neil H. Alford, Jr., The Legality of American
Military Involvement in Viet Nam: A Broader Perspective, 75 YALE L:J. 1109, 1113 (1966)
(positing that the definition of "armed attack" should comprehend preparatory stages
rather than a solitary event); Humphrey & Waldock, supra note 80, at 498 ("Where
there is convincing evidence not merely of threats and potential danger but of an
attack being actually mounted, then an armed attack maybe said to have begun to
occur, though it has not passed the frontier."); Richard G. Maxson, Nature's Eldest
Law: A Survey of a Nation's Right to Act in Self-Defense, PARAMETERS, Autumn 1995, at 55,
65-66 (requiring only "objective indicators," such as troop buildups and increased
alert levels, to satisfy the imminence requirement); McDougal, supra note 87, at 598
(stating that conditions giving rise to a finding of aggression are not limited to an
"actual armed attack" but include "imminence of attack of such high degree as to
preclude effective resport by the intended victim to non-violent modalities of re-
sponse"); Polebaum, supra note 82, at 203 ("The Charter should not be read to re-
quire one nation to permit another the benefits of military armament, surprise attack,
and offensive advantage, against which no defense may lie."). As Colonel Roberts
further explains,
[a]ggression does not usually begin, and injury is not usually incurred when
the first weapons are fired. The uses of force are usually but one phase of a
competition of interest and power. As Clauswitz observed, the aggressor is
often peace-loving, and it is his resistant victim who causes war to erupt: "[a]
conqueror is always a lover of peace (as Bonaparte always asserted of him-
self); he would like to make his entry into our state unopposed; in order to
prevent this, we must choose war."
Roberts, supra note 7, at 517 (footnote omitted).
89 Romano, supra note 71, at 1036 (quoting Schachter, supra note 80, at 1634).
90 Humphrey & Waldock, supra note 80, at 498; see also id. ("[I] t would be a trav-
esty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending State to allow its assailant to
deliver the first, and perhaps fatal, blow."); Christopher Clarke Posteraro, Intervention
in Iraq: Towards a Doctrine of Anticipatory Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Proliferation Interven-
tion, 15 FLA.J. INT'L L. 151, 183-85 (2002) (arguing that "in light of the availability of
weapons of mass destruction" a doctrine of anticipatory self-defense is available de-
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tween States, without which the supposed rule of law and the princi-
ple of sovereign equality can be but the merest mockeries."91 The
argument that the definition of imminence must be pegged to the
spite claims of state territorial inviolability, and "[elven failure to suppress terrorist
activity may justify action in self-defense").
91 STONE, supra note 31, at 101. Professor Stone asks the following rhetorical
questions to underscore his point that a restrictivist interpretation of the Charter that
abolishes the customary doctrine of anticipatory self-defense is inconsistent with the
requirements of law, politics, and morality:
[Sluppose military intelligence at the Pentagon received indisputable evi-
dence that a hostile State was poised to launch intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles, at a fixed zero hour only 24 hours ahead, against New York, Boston and
Washington, would it be an aggressor under the Charter if it refused to wait
until those cities had received the missiles before it reacted by the use of
force? . . .[I]s it bound by law to wait for its own destruction?
Id. at 99. Some restrictivists concede that a coherent theory of legal regulation of
force in international relations must make room for anticipatory self-defense in some
very limited circumstances. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 189-90 (arguing that
the United States could legally have attacked the Japanese fleet en route to Pearl
Harbor on the ground that the United States had "convincing" intelligence that the
Japanese were committed to attack); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 81 (3d
ed. 2000) (allowing the permissibility of anticipatory self-defense where the enemy
demonstrates "a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that makes
that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting, or doing any-
thing other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk"); see also WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN,
THE THREAT OF TOTAL DESTRUCTION AND SELF-DEFENSE 259-60 (1964) (" [l]n the ab-
sence of effective international machinery the right of self-defence must ... be ex-
tended to the defence against a clearly imminent aggression, despite the apparently
contrary language of Article 51."). However, not all restrictivists are as tolerant of
even a slight exception under such circumstances, and thus even before the conclu-
sion of the U.N. Charter, representatives to the San Francisco Conference questioned
whether the argument that the Charter could be construed to abolish customary
rights of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, was politically and legally
defensible. See, e.g., Report by the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Annex,
Agenda Item 54, 392-93 (1952) (indicating questioning of the delegates by U.S.
Representative Maktos and Belgian Representative van Glabbeke as to whether the
United States, if it had received prior notice of an impending Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, would have been branded an aggressor had it engaged in anticipatory
self-defense to destroy the Japanese forces detailed to bomb Pearl Harbor). A former
jurist of the ICJ demonstrates the continued incongruity of the restrictivist position
nearly sixty years later:
[C] ommon sense cannot require one to interpret an ambiguous provision in
a text in a way that requires a state passively to accept its fate before it can
defend itself. And, even in the face of conventional warfare, this would also
seem the only realistic interpretation of the contemporary right to self-de-
fence ....
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT
242 (1994).
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swiftness of delivery and destructiveness of weapons technology is not
new; as President John F. Kennedy noted in 1962:
Neither the United States of America nor the world community of
nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on
the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world
where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient chal-
lenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear
weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any
substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change
in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to
peace.
9 2
However, revolutions in political and military affairs over the
course of the last forty years have fundamentally transformed the na-
ture of armed conflict at a pace beyond the demonstrated capacity of
the law to adapt, and the introduction of WMD, ballistic missiles, and
information warfare have contracted the battlespace, reduced the
time necessary to deliver deadly payloads, and greatly multiplied the
costs of miscalculation. 93 For pragmatists, the emergence of far more
92 The Soviet Threat to the Americas: Address by President Kennedy, 47 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 715, 716 (1962). Sixteen years earlier the U.S. representative made an al-
most identical point in attaching a memorandum to the report of the U.N. Atomic
Energy Commission to the Security Council, stating the U.S. position that "[i]t is...
clear that an 'armed attack' is now something entirely different from what it was prior
to the discovery of atomic weapons." The memorandum continued, noting that "it
would therefore seem to be both important and appropriate.., that the treaty define
,armed attack' is [sic] a manner appropriate to atomic weapons and include in the
definition not simply the actual dropping of an atomic bomb, but also certain steps in
themselves preliminary to such action." The First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission
to the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 2d Sess., Special Supp., Annex 4, at 106, U.N. Doc.
5/Supplements (1946).
93 Pragmatists argue that determinations of imminence must evolve in parallel to
transformations in military technology and the nature of the international system;
standards appropriate in earlier historical eras when the marshaling and deployment
of force took far more time under conditions of greater transparency and with far less
threat to civilians are unsuited to the present. See Polebaum, supra note 82, at 228
("When war machines operated at a slower and more deliberate tempo and could not
threaten the very existence of humanity, a standard of justifiable self-defense, requir-
ing a nation to wait for an armed attack on its soil, was a reasonable and stabilizing
rule."); Yoo, supra note 14, at 572-73 (noting that the conjunction of weapons
proliferation and the evolution of radical transnational terrorism has "dramatically
increased the degree of potential harm, . . . vastly improved the capability for stealth,
... and render[ed] threats more imminent because there is less time to prevent their
launch"). The proliferation of weapons of far greater destructive capacity, coupled
with the structural complexities in identifying, locating, and deterring suicidal ene-
mies that take cover deep within the civilian infrastructure of sponsoring states and
target states alike, has spawned the greatest threat to international peace and security
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elusive and deadly threats posed by the intersection of international
terrorism and WMD has rendered restrictive standards for determin-
ing imminence irrational and even dangerous. 94 Some pragmatists go
so far as to suggest that technological transformations have drawn
whole categories of threats to the verge of imminence, 95 thereby au-
thoritatively resolving in the affirmative the debate over whether antic-
ipatory self-defense has a place in the Charter era;96 others simply
demand that in an "age of instant deliverables '97 the interpretation of
the Charter keep pace with technological developments and that far
more relaxed standards for determining when anticipatory self-de-
fense may be lawfully exercised be developed,98 particularly in regard
to the intersection of terrorists and WMD. 99
in history, and in defending against this threat, pragmatists rail against the applica-
tion of antiquated legal standards wholly incompatible with the nature and intensity
of the threat.
94 See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 56, at 552 (suggesting that critics of anticipatory
self-defense are "fight[ing] a losing battle with common sense" and that "no rational
decision-maker" can be expected to refrain from anticipatory self-defense when an
attack is imminent).
95 See McDougal, supra note 87, at 601 (noting, while discussing the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis, that in light of advances in modern weaponry and the speed of delivery,
reaction time to a nuclear attack from Soviet missiles in Cuba would be so short as to
make the distinction between "attack" and "imminent attack" meaningless).
Pragmatists assert that by burrowing deeply into the civilian populations of the states
they seek to target, only to quickly become operational and attack without warning,
terrorists have transformed the practical definition of imminence beyond the capacity
of antiquated legal definitions to stretch. See Yoo, supra note 14, at 572.
96 See Walker, supra note 13, at 521-23 (concluding that, save for "those who may
not be familiar with new weapons technology and the WMD threat," the "debate over
whether [anticipatory self-defense] is or is not permitted under international law...
has become largely moot").
97 Wedgwood, supra note 59.
98 See, e.g., Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and Rogue States: The Failure of
the Charter Framework, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 735, 744-50 (2002) (arguing that transfor-
mations in technology and strategy have overtaken Article 51 and necessitated re-
laxed legal rules to govern application of anticipatory self-defense).
99 See Beres, supra note 84, at 323 (warning that in an era of terrorism, interna-
tional law should not be regarded as "as suicide pact," but should allow for anticipa-
tory self-defense under certain conditions); Yassin El-Ayouty, International Terrorism
Under the Law, 5 ILSAJ. INT'L & CoMP. L. 485, 492 (1999) (stating that "in the case of
universal and catastrophic terrorism ... striking at the terrorists does not wait until a
definite nexus is established between the terrorists and their actions"); Graham, supra
note 62, at 8 (warning that the proliferation of WMD "make[s] waiting for an actual
armed attack exceedingly dangerous"); Roberts, supra note 7, at 485 (arguing that,
when rogue states or terrorist groups possessed of WMD directly threaten the survival
of another state, the threatened state has the right to engage in anticipatory self-
[VOL- 79:41394
"DUTY TO DEFEND THEM"
Accordingly, pragmatists have offered a range of proposals to
channel the application of anticipatory self-defense to the contempo-
rary threat environment consistent with their view of lawfulness. The
most restrictive of these require that a state be prepared to demon-
strate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it exhausted diplomatic reme-
dies 00 and took action only during the "last possible window of
opportunity in the face of an attack that was almost certainly going to
occur"1° 1 or that the resort to anticipatory self-defense was unlawful
yet excusable on the grounds of extreme necessity
0 2 or duress. 10 3
defense "to either deter acquisition plans, eliminate acquisition programs or destroy
illicit WMD sites").
100 Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement generally requires that states at-
tempt direct negotiations with the alleged aggressor state and make appeals to the
Security Council. See Polebaum, supra note 82, at 198-99.
101 Schmitt, supra note 48, at 535. The most restrictive of the proposals for evalu-
ating the lawfulness of anticipatory self-defense deviate very little from the Caroline
requirement of imminence. See, e.g., Beres, supra note 84, at 329 n.33 (maintaining
"that the danger posed... [be] instant and overwhelming" and "involve the threat of
immediate and catastrophic (e.g., nuclear/biological/chemical) attack"). To this
standard some would add the requirement, imported perhaps from Christian just war
doctrine, that the harm to be prevented be greater than that occasioned by the appli-
cation of anticipatory self-defense, a requirement clearly met in cases involving the
intersection of terrorism and WMD. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 14, at 574-76 (creating a
"reformulated" standard incorporating this requirement). The most restrictive of the
pragmatists would hold states to an evidentiary standard identical to that associated
with the common law criminal justice system, and require states exercising rights
under anticipatory self-defense to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the factual pred-
icate underlying their claims by post hoc presentations of the intelligence information
available at the time of the decision to engage in anticipatory self-defense. See Beres,
supra note 84, at 321-22 (insisting that certain due process "rules," including the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, be maintained to protect against abuse of an-
ticipatory self-defense in the assassination context); Schmitt, supra note 48, at 531
(warning of the risk that a lesser standard will promote aggression). Some
pragmatists would add still further preconditions, including the publication of the
threat in such a manner as to enhance the prospects for diplomatic resolution. See
Polebaum, supra note 82, at 210 (requiring publicization "so that the threatening
nation's intent can be dbated in international fora and pressure exerted to defuse
[the] crisis").
102 The domestic criminal law systems of many common law states permit a "neces-
sity" defense in which the violent self-help is immunized under narrow circumstances
where there is no morally justifiable or reasonable alternative. See Martin E. Vein-
sreideris, The Prospective Effects of Modifying Existing Law to Accommodate Preemptive Self-
Defense by Battered Women, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 613, 621-23 (2000) (discussing the basis
for and widespread availability of the necessity defense). A "state of necessity" under
international law is analogous, denoting circumstances in which the "only means for
the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril" is to
adopt conduct "not in conformity with an international obligation of that State." State
Responsibility: Titles and Texts of Draft Articles Adopted by the Drafting Committee, U.N.
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More permissive proposals dispense with imminence considerations
to require instead that a state prove (by some objective evidence) the
exhaustion of peaceful remedies and the existence of a "coherent"
threat. 10 4 The most permissive proposals would legitimate the resort
GAOR Int'l Law Comm'n, 51st Sess. at 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.574 (1999). The most
restrictive pragmatists would allow states arguably faced with the choice between elim-
ination or the prudent exercise of anticipatory self-defense to elect preemptive force
out of "necessity," and the conduct of states electing anticipatory self-defense out of
necessity, even if technically unlawful, would be effectively "pardoned" and fully im-
munized under international law. See Romano, supra note 71, at 1045-46 (proposing
a necessity based standard that would "preclud[e] the wrongfulness" of anticipatory
self-defense). Some pragmatists characterized the necessity standard as, in effect, not
a guide for judging the lawfulness of an application of anticipatory self-defense, but
rather a defense against what would otherwise be unlawful conduct. The defense
carries with it the benefit of preserving what they claim is a general prohibition
against anticipatory self-defense, giving way only under circumstances of genuine
peril such as is created by possession of WMD by terrorists-actors whose conduct, in
comparison to defending states, is demonstrably more culpable. See Franck, supra
note 39, at 13 (allowing for the "flexible application of existing rules, in accordance
with ... contextual exigencies and with narrow exceptions for situations of extreme
necessity").
103 Pragmatists offering a duress based argument do not contend that anticipatory
self-defense is lawful, but instead would permit a defending state to engage in an
otherwise prohibited use of force when there is a "clear and present danger" and
moral choice-whether to engage in anticipatory self-defense or to accept destruc-
tion-is not in fact possible. See DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 141-42 (describing the
duress doctrine in international criminal law).
104 Mark E. Newcomb, Non-Proliferation, Self-Defense, and the Korean Crisis, 27 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 603, 621 (1994). Intermediate pragmatists develop a series of catego-
ries of evidence that states must assemble to prove the objective and subjective merits
of a resort to anticipatory self-defense. See Graham, supra note 62, at 9 (requiring a
demonstration of threatening alterations in military posture, "past conduct or hostile
declarations" that "reasonably lead to a conclusion that an attack is probable," the
availability to the enemy of and capacity to use specific weapons systems, and exhaus-
tion of diplomatic solutions); Maxson, supra note 88, at 66 (stressing that the "past
conduct or hostile declarations" of the alleged aggressor are important to a determi-
nation of imminence and thus the lawfulness of an exercise of anticipatory self-de-
fense). Some pragmatists would tie the lawfulness of an exercise of anticipatory self-
defense to an evaluation of the capacity of a targeted state to defend against a particu-
lar threat by other means, while granting that terrorist threats, by virtue of the diffi-
culty in locating and targeting loose bands of individuals in the civilians' midst, may
not be susceptible to reduction by any means other than anticipatory self-defense. See
Schmitt, supra note 48, at 534. Still others in the intermediate category would require
satisfaction of additional steps as conditions precedent to the lawful exercise of antici-
patory self-defense, including a declaratory statement that a state in possession of
WMD constitutes a concrete "threat to the vital national security interests of the state,
regional security, and international peace and security" and a formal "finding that
further delay in undertaking the preventive strike will ... unreasonably increase the
possibility of harm to its civilian population." Roberts, supra note 7, at 519, 522.
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to anticipatory self-defense under a forgiving "reasonable state stan-
dard" that would inquire solely whether the defending state could be
considered, on the basis of available information, to have had "no ade-
quate alternative," viewing all the circumstances from the perspective
of and in the light most favorable to the defending state.' 0 5 This rea-
sonable state standard does not establish an a priori probability
threshold to define the imminence of enemy threats or impose spe-
cific criteria to guide post hoc lawfulness evaluations, but rather ac-
cords states a broad margin of appreciation1 0 6 to determine and apply
those measures that will best harmonize their rights to self-defend
with the faithful performance of their legal obligations. Significantly,
mistakes, so long as they can be construed as reasonable, do not
render the resort to anticipatory self-defense unlawful under this most
permissive standard,10 7 which served as the basis for adjudicating
105 See, e.g., Louis J. Capezzuto, Preemptive Strikes Against Nuclear Terrorists and Their
Sponsors: A Reasonable Solution, N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 375, 393-96 (1993)
(advocating a substitution of the imminence requirement in cases of anticipatory self-
defense with a reasonableness standard); W.T. Mallison, Jr., Limited Naval Blockade or
Quarantine-Interdiction: National and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International
Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 335, 360 (1962) ("[A] target state is authorized to [under-
take anticipatory self-defense] when it reasonably expects that it must use the military
instrument of national policy to preserve its physical integrity and continued exis-
tence .... ) (emphasis added). Several commentators would admit prior bad acts
and statements of the threatening state to substantiate, post hoc, the reasonableness
of the exercise of anticipatory self-defense. See, e.g., Polebaum, supra note 82, at 210
(considering that "past acts may indicate whether the threatening nation has shown a
sufficient disregard for the threatened nation's integrity and civilian life to persuade
it to take the . . . threats seriously").
106 The doctrine of "margin of appreciation," developed in the European Union
(E.U.), directs courts to accord a measure of deference to member states in determin-
ing whether actions taken to harmonize domestic law with E.U. law are consistent with
member state obligations under relevant treaties. See generally R. St. J. MacDonald,
The Margin of Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 83 (R. St. J. MacDonald et al. eds., 1993).
107 Under general principles of law common to the domestic systems of many
states, the use of force in self-defense is justifiable even if the defender is mistaken
about the necessity to act in self-defense, provided the mistake is "reasonable." See,
e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (1985) (deeming acts of self-defense premised
upon mistaken but sincere beliefs justifiable, unless the beliefs are negligently or reck-
lessly acquired); 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 259, 358-59
(4th ed. 1936) (discussing the availability of pardons for killing "by misadventure or
in self-defence" under English common law); MCCORMACK, supra note 45, at 271 (stat-
ing that all major legal systems-"Western states with common law or civil law jurisdic-
tions, Eastern European states, Asian states, Latin American states"-as well as
religious systems, broadly recognize the individual right of self-defense); Dolores A.
Donovan & Getachew Assefa, Homicide in Ethiopia: Human Rights, Federalism, and Legal
Pluralism, 51 Am. J. COMP. L. 505, 507 (2003) (noting the availability of a mistake
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the individual criminal liability of defendants at Nuremburg 1 0 8
Notwithstanding the sharp theoretical bifurcation on the ques-
tion of its lawfulness in the abstract, anticipatory self-defense is almost
invariably appraised in light of, and following, specific applications of
defense in cases of individual self-defense resulting in death in European and African
legal systems). Building upon this tolerance for mistake in domestic legal systems,
proponents of a permissive standard argue that the mistaken exercise of anticipatory
self-defense, whether as the result of an overestimation of the magnitude or immi-
nence of a threat or of the premature resort to force when diplomatic measures are
later revealed to have had prospects for success, should not give rise to a finding of
unlawfulness in violation of Article 2(4) under the reasonable state standard unless
the defending state's actions are manifestly unreasonable. In evaluating whether the
mistaken actions of the defending state are unreasonable, permissive pragmatists in-
sist that the proper determinant is not what the facts are subsequently determined to
have been, but rather what the defending state believed them to have been at the
time it elected to engage in anticipatory self-defense. DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 191
("Hindsight knowledge, suggesting that-notwithstanding the well-founded contem-
poraneous appraisal of events-the situation may have been less desperate than it
appeared, is immaterial" as the "invocation of the right of self-defence must be
weighed on the basis of the information available .. . at the moment of action, with-
out the benefit of postfactum wisdom."); Mallison, supra note 105, at 359-60; Walker,
supra note 45, at 374 ("A national leader should be held accountable for what he or
she . . . knew or reasonably should have known, when a decision is made to respond
[with anticipatory self-defense.]"); Polebaum, supra note 82, at 220 ("Whether an ac-
tion is justifiably taken in self-defense . . . should be judged from the perspective of
the threatened nation.").
108 See 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 34, at 208-22 (noting
that the standard for determining individual criminal liability in regard to the deci-
sion to undertake anticipatory self-defense requires an evaluation of what the defend-
ants knew or should have known in making the decision, and that mistakes
occasioned by uncertainty or inaccurate information are to be judged by a reasonable-
ness standard). Even the prosecution implicitly recognized that mistake was an availa-
ble defense. See 19 id. at 461-62 (recording the statement of Hartley Shawcross,
British Chief Prosecutor, that individuals are liable for acts claimed as exercises of
anticipatory self-defense, where such acts were abuses of discretion or acts that
"twist[ed] the natural right of self-defense into a weapon of predatory aggrandize-
ment and lust," but not in cases of misapprehension of facts). Nevertheless, although
it recognized that sovereign states were entitled to a broad margin of appreciation in
their decisions with regard to the use of force in self-defense, the Nuremburg Tribu-
nal did not accept the argument that measures of anticipatory self-defense were en-
tirely self-judging, on the ground that the international law governing the use of force
would otherwise be gutted of any force. 19 id. Although the doctrine of margin of
appreciation cannot be expanded to effectively render the resort to anticipatory self-
defense self-judging, since the Nuremburg trials there has been no contrary, authori-
tative judicial statement in regard to individual criminal liability in connection with
the decision to undertake anticipatory self-defense, and state decisions are arguably
immunized upon subsequent review, provided that they are not manifestly unreasona-
ble. Walker, supra note 45, at 370-71.
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the doctrine in practice; moreover, although a specific exercise of an-
ticipatory self-defense is immediately opened to contestation, its legal
legitimacy is often not ripe for review until long afterwards, when the
defending state finally declassifies and submits the sensitive intelli-
gence that established the factual predicate upon which its decision to
act rested to public review. 10 9 Accordingly, a review of relevant prac-
109 Some commentators insist that states engaging in anticipatory self-defense sub-
mit to an international 'Jurying" process whereby the evidence adduced by the state
seeking a variance is "tried" aforehand, with the onus on the requesting state to prove
the purity of its motives, the proportionality of the proposed use of force, and the
severity of the threat. See Franck, supra note 39, at 15-16; Graham, supra note 62, at
13-14 (insisting that if international relations is to become law-governed, "states must
openly justify their actions," including decisions to engage in anticipatory self-de-
fense, and present their decisions for the review of states and international organiza-
tions). However, considerations of bureaucratic inefficiency, opposing political
interests, and the absence of effective transnational procedures for protecting shared
intelligence sources and methods militate against submission to an international jury.
To wit, the establishment of the factual predicate of an imminent threat is a time-
consuming process made all the more so by the machinery of the U.N. system. See
Michael A. Lysobey, How Iraq Maintained its Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs: An
Analysis of the Disarmament of Iraq and the Legal Enforcement Options of the United Nations'
Security Council in 1997-1998, 5 UCLAJ. INr'L L. & FOREIGN Arr. 101, 152-53 (2000)
(describing determinations of material breaches of peace and security as "plodding"
and subject to "the whim of whatever immediate political and economic factors are
motivating the Council"); Michael P. Scharf, Clear and Present Danger: Enforcing the
International Ban on Biological and Chemical Weapons, Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and
Criminalization, 20 MicH. J. INT'L L. 477, 508-09 (1999) (discussing the bureaucratic
inefficiencies of the U.N. system). Moreover, proof requires the sharing of intelli-
gence, something states are loathe to do with all but their closest allies for fear that
revelation of the evidence will permit deductions as to how the evidence was acquired
(methods) and by whom (sources), as well as the possibility that reviewers sympathetic
to the target might share the intelligence with the target. See Sara N. Scheideman,
Note, Standards of Proof in Forcible Responses to Terrorism, 50 SYRACUSE L. REv. 249, 255
(2000) (noting the dilemma inherent in balancing accountability with secrecy, but
distinguishing operational information that might compromise future operations and
evidence that might demonstrate culpability); see also Graham, supra note 62, at 10
(conceding that the release of classified information that an attack is coming is "one
truly difficult issue"); Wedgwood, supra note 80, at 567 ("In the midst of a. . . war, a
country defending its territory and nationals will rarely be able to disclose its intelli-
gence sources in a public forum."). Moreover, even after reviewing the evidence,
states unwilling on other grounds to approve a proposed exercise of anticipatory self-
defense are far less likely to concede that the proffered evidence is probative of the
existence of the requisite imminent threat. See Graham, supra note 62, at 7. Worse
yet, the inaccessibility of the target state to the state engaging in anticipatory self-
defense, coupled with the interest of target states in concealing relevant evidence of
WMD or terrorist training centers that would otherwise supply the "smoking gun"
justifying the act of anticipatory self-defense, creates difficulties in acquiring and as-
sembling all the evidence necessary to establish the factual predicate beyond a reason-
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ice is necessary to assess the state of the governing law-customary
and Charter-based-applicable to anticipatory self-defense.' 10
D. Anticipatory Self-Defense in Practice, 1945-Present
Analysts of the post-1945 history of anticipatory self-defense have
found state practice generally inconclusive in regard to the Charter
era validity of anticipatory self-defense, 11 in part because, although
post-Charter international relations have been no less sanguinary than
earlier historical epochs, there have been relatively few instances in
which states resorting to force have explicitly justified their actions
under the anticipatory sel-defense doctrine rather than by passing
reference to Article 51.112 Furthermore, no post-Nuremburg interna-
tional tribunal has issued an authoritative pronouncement on the law-
able doubt that would be required in a domestic criminal case. Yet, the most strident
critics of a particular exercise of anticipatory self-defense are likely to demand that
the acting state clear this evidentiary hurdle. See Romano, supra note 71, at 1039-40.
Even if the burden of proof were to be reduced to merely require a state to prove the
facts justifying an exception to the general prohibition against self-help by "sophisti-
cated pleading backed by relevant and highly probative evidence," as some suggest
should suffice, states will, in some instances, be hard-pressed to satisfy this lesser stan-
dard. See Franck, supra note 39, at 16.
110 The customary international law of treaties provides that, in interpreting a
treaty, resort is to be had to, inter alia, state practice to resolve ambiguities in the text
of the treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 35, art.
31(3)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
111 See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NoRms, AcrORS, PROCESS
842 (2002) (finding state practice inconclusive); Zedalis, supra note 48, at 105-06
(finding the significance of state practice "questionable" given the failure of the U.N.
General Assembly to offer direct support for the doctrine).
112 See AREND & BECK, supra note 56, at 74 (indicating, in 1993, that cases in which
the resort to force was justified or could have been justified as an act of anticipatory
self-defense included the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1967 Six-Day War, and the
1981 Israeli bombing of the Osiraq reactor, whereas the 1983 U.S. invasion of Gre-
nada and the 1986 airstrike on Libya were justified primarily on other grounds). Al-
though the use of force has been little justified under the anticipatory self-defense
doctrine, states have justified the resort to force largely under Article 51, claiming that
in particular circumstances the requisite "armed attack" under that article has in fact
occurred. See id. Many of these claims have been summarily rejected as entirely with-
out merit by the Security Council and General Assembly. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 487, U.N.
SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (1981) (rejecting Israeli de-
struction of Iraqi nuclear weapons facility); S.C. Res. 188, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess.,
I IlIth mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/188 (1964) (rejecting Portuguese claim of self-defense
under Article 51 in the shelling of Senegal); G.A. Res. 36/34, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, at 17-18, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981) (rejecting the Soviet Union's inva-
sion of Afghanistan). Although anticipatory self-defense has not been frequently
claimed in justification, force has been so prevalent in the Charter era that Arend and
Beck contend that a new legal regime, known as the "post-Charter self-help" para-
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fulness of anticipatory self-defense.1 13 Still, although few states have
openly embraced anticipatory self-defense as official policy,1 1 4 since
the 1960s the doctrine has become much contested terrain. A hand-
ful of cases, all of which involved the United States and Israel as de-
fending states, are generally regarded as instances in which an
arguably legitimate claim to anticipatory self-defense was either as-
serted or would have been the most defensible basis for the resort to
force had it been offered contemporaneously: the 1962 Cuban Missile
Crisis (United States), the 1967 Six-Day War (Israel), the 1981 destruc-
tion of the Tuwaitha reactor in Iraq (Israel), the 1986 air strikes
against Libya (United States), and the 1998 attacks on al Qaeda
targets in Afghanistan and Sudan (United States).115
digm, has replaced the Charter as the fundamental rule governing the use of force.
AREND & BECK, supra note 56, at 178-79.
113 The ICJ did not address this question directly in the Nicaragua case, holding
only that the definition of an "armed attack" included "not merely action by regular
armed forces across an international border," thus seeming to recognize a legal, albeit
narrow, basis for the claim of Article 51 self-defense in the absence of a traditional
transborder attack by national forces. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103 (June 27). For a discussion of the opinion, see generally
Richard Falk, The World Court's Achievement, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 106 (1987) (describing
the opinion as an extraordinary judicial achievement made in the face of very difficult
circumstances); Tom J. Farer, Drawing the Right Line, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 112 (1987)
(concluding that the decision "most effectively reconciles the international system's
preeminent interests: conflict containment and national sovereignty"); John Norton
Moore, The Nicaragua Case and the Deterioration of World Order, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 151
(1987) (describing the decision as a serious blow to the international system's ability
to deter covert, aggressive attack).
114 See W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12,333 and Assassination,
ARMY LAw., Dec. 1989, at 4, 7-8 (surveying U.S. policy with respect to anticipatory self-
defense generally and assassination specifically). The United States and Israel are
perhaps alone in the international community in their adherence to anticipatory self-
defense as official policy. For the United States, official support for anticipatory self-
defense is longstanding: during the Cold War, in the event of an imminent Soviet first
strike, standing doctrine called for counterforce weapons to have been employed in
exercise of the right to anticipatory self-defense. See Graham, supra note 62, at 2.
Nevertheless, many states may well tacitly support the doctrine, as the International
Court of Justice implied in 1986. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at
103 (raising but declining to decide the issue); see also AREND & BECK, supra note 56,
at 79 (suggesting that support for anticipatory self-defense may be growing); Con-
dron, supra note 55, at 139 (stating that "there is a large block of nations around the
globe which support the use of anticipatory self-defense under certain limited
conditions").
115 Other instances of the use of force have been characterized as anticipatory self-
defense, including the 1981 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the U.S.-led invasion of Gre-
nada in 1983, the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, and the U.S. attack on the Iraqi
intelligence headquarters after the discovery of an Iraqi plan to assassinate former
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Although domestic ratification debates reveal that U.S. member-
ship in the United Nations was predicated upon the explicit assertion
in the text of the Charter of an inherent right to self-defense,1 16 and
notwithstanding strong historical American support for anticipatory
self-defense,1 17 U.S. statements of official policy initially rejected the
doctrine as an "impossibility" in the nuclear age.'1 In 1962, the Cu-
ban Missile Crisis provided the first, and arguably most significant,
post-Charter test of the continued viability of customary law as an in-
dependent source of support for, as well as official U.S. policy in re-
gard to, anticipatory self-defense.
President Bush in 1993. However, most scholars consider each of these cases as hav-
ing failed to meet even the most permissive standards for justification as an act of
anticipatory self-defense, and would thus classify them as acts of reprisal, as interven-
tions in defense of nationals, or as illegal interventions. See Maxson, supra note 88, at
55 (considering, but ultimately rejecting, the claim that the attack on the Iraqi intelli-
gence headquarters was an act of self-defense); MarkJ. Yost, Note, Self-Defense or Presi-
dential Pretext? The Constitutionality of Unilateral Preemptive Military Action, 78 GEO. L.J.
415, 438-39 (1989) (noting that the Reagan administration characterized the inva-
sion of Grenada as a defense of U.S. nationals). Some scholars judge the March 2003
intervention in Iraq as an exercise of anticipatory self-defense, although perhaps not a
justified use, despite the fact that the United States and its allies justified the interven-
tion on other grounds. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 16, at 619-20 (considering the
intervention as anticipatory self-defense, and concluding that it was an unlawful attack
on the rule of law); Graham, supra note 62, at 13 (judging the intervention an unlaw-
ful exercise of anticipatory self-defense); Koh, supra note 74, at 1523-24 (anticipating
the March 2003 invasion, denying any possibility that it could be justified as anticipa-
tory self-defense, and concluding that it could not be justified by Iraqi violations of
Security Council resolutions); Sapiro, supra note 16, at 604 (considering the interven-
tion an extension of anticipatory self-defense beyond legitimate boundaries); Yoo,
supra note 14, at 574 (judging the intervention a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-
defense). Nevertheless, taxonomy is inherently subjective, and only time will reveal
the full truth; for purposes of this Article the justification offered by the Bush Admin-
istration for the March 2003 intervention in Iraq will be taken as true and the inter-
vention will be treated as a Chapter VII enforcement action.
116 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
117 See, e.g., Elihu Root, The Real Monroe Doctrine, Opening Address at the
Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 22, 1914),
in 8 AM.J. INT'L L. 427, 432 (1914) (stating official U.S. policy as the principle that a
state has the sovereign right to act in advance of an attack "to protect itself by prevent-
ing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself').
118 See McGEORGE BUNDY, DANGER AND SURVIVAL 252 (1988) (quoting from a 1954
press conference in which President Eisenhower argued that the destruction that
would follow an act of anticipatory self-defense in the nuclear age was so great that he
"wouldn't even listen to anyone seriously that came in and talked about such a
thing").
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1. Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
On October 20, 1962, the United States, four days after acquiring
credible intelligence that the Soviet Union was deploying medium-
range nuclear armed missiles ninety miles from U.S. shores in
Cuba,'1"9 demanded their removal and instituted a pacific naval block-
ade 120 to prevent further shipments. During a heated debate within
the Kennedy Administration, senior officials of the Departments of
Justice and State urged the United States to claim anticipatory self-
defense as the legal justification for the blockade and subsequent air
strikes, 121 and others, led by State Department Legal Adviser Abram
Chayes, counseled that to mount such an argument on the basis of the
119 ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
23, 107 (1969). The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, pro-
duced photographic and other documentary evidence establishing for the other
members of the Security Council the "smoking gun" that proved the presence of So-
viet missiles in Cuba, and established the factual predicate for U.S. actions during the
Cuban Missile Crisis. Id. at 75-76.
120 See Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms
Build-Up in Cuba, 1962 PUB. PAPERS 806, 807-08 (Oct. 22, 1962) (announcing the
blockade).
121 See Memorandum from Norbert A. Schlei, Assistant U.S. Attorney General, to
the U.S. Attorney General, Legality Under International Law of Remedial Action
Against Use of Cuba as a Missile Base by the Soviet Union (Aug. 30, 1962), reprinted in
ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF
LAw 108-09 (1974):
The concept of self-defense in international law of course justifies more than
activity designed merely to resist an armed attack which is already in pro-
gress. Under international law every state has, in the words of Elihu Root,
"the right... to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it
will be too late to protect itself."
Id. For many Administration officials, the presence of Soviet missiles a scant ninety
miles from the United States transformed the relative capability of the Soviet Union
so radically that this fact, standing alone, constituted a threat of such imminence that
any proportional exercise of force would have been a permissible act of anticipatory
self-defense under any legal standard. See BUNDY, supra note 118, at 399 (describing
the views of Secretary of State Acheson and others that the "intolerable" change in
"the level of nuclear threat" justified a military action to destroy the missiles as "an
entirely legitimate act of self-defense"). Interestingly, even those Administration offi-
cials who favored the blockade and air strikes, and who would have defended these
uses of force as legitimate acts of anticipatory self-defense, considered providing a
limited advance warning to allies as well as the target states in the belief that failure to
do so would cause the United States to be "marked as a reckless aggressor and this
Administration cursed forever as the force which opened the door to a world of catch-
as-catch-can violence." See Theodore Sorenson, Draft, Air Strike Scenario for October
19, 1962, reprinted in THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, at 138, 140 (Laurence Chang &
Peter Kornbluh eds., 2d ed. 1998). In other words, proponents of anticipatory self-
defense in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis recognized the obligation tojustify
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facts, which in their estimation could not support a claim that an
"armed attack" had occurred or that a threat to the United States was
imminent, would be to stretch the definition of anticipatory self-de-
fense beyond reasonable bounds and "trivialize the whole effort at le-
gal justification. 1 22 Although opponents of anticipatory self-defense
could not convince President Kennedy that the presence of missiles in
Cuba did not constitute an imminent threat to U.S. security as a mat-
ter of policy,1 23 they prevailed on the question of legal justification,
and the United States characterized the blockade not as an act of an-
ticipatory self-defense under Article 51 but rather as regional action
its application, lest failure to do so carry with it adverse legal and political
consequences.
122 CHAwis, supra note 121, at 65-66. For Chayes and others, including a number
of officials from the State Department, the Soviet deployment of missiles was not only
not an imminent threat, it was not illegal, and interpreting their deployment as an
armed attack to satisfy the requirements of Article 51 was simply unsustainable. See
JAMES G. BLIGHT & DAVID A. WELCH, ON THE BRINK: AMERICANS AND SOVIETS REEXAM-
INE THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 40 ("[ 0] ur legal problem was that their [the Soviets']
action wasn't illegal."). Thus, despite the retained legal utility of anticipatory self-
defense in the Charter era, to have asserted the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense-
under circumstances where not only could no objective imminent threat be openly
identified, but the action that would be claimed as having given rise to an imminent
threat was considered legal-would have been to withdraw entirely the use of force in
self-defense from the realm of international law and reinvest it in the realm of politi-
cal discretion.
No doubt the phrase "armed attack" must be construed broadly enough to
permit some anticipatory response. But it is a very different matter to ex-
pand it to include threatening deployments or demonstrations that do not
have imminent attack as their purpose or probable outcome. To accept that
reading is to make the occasion for forceful response essentially a question
for unilateral national decision that would not only be formally unreview-
able, but not subject to intelligent criticism, either .... Whenever a nation
believed that interests, which in the heat and pressure of a crisis it is pre-
pared to characterize as vital, were threatened, its use of force in response
would become permissible .... In this sense, I believe an Article 51 defence
would have signaled that the United States did not take the legal issues in-
volved very seriously, that in its view the situation was to be governed by
national discretion not international law.
CHAvEs, supra note 121, at 65-66.
123 SeeYoo, supra note 14, at 573 (noting that during the Cuban Missile Crisis the
near-consensus among senior U.S. officials was that the establishment of nuclear
armed missile bases in Cuba by the Soviet Union constituted an imminent threat to
U.S. security even in the absence of proof of an "imminent" threat under the Caroline
standard).
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authorized by the Organization of American States (O.A.S.)1 24 under
Articles 52 and 53 of the U.N. Charter.
125
In subsequent days the Security Council staged a parallel de-
bate-this one conducted along Cold War lines-over whether the
blockade could be justified as an act of anticipatory self-defense.
126
The expressed U.S. justification was largely ignored, reflecting the
broad understanding that anticipatory self-defense provided the more
legitimate, or even the sole defensible, position. A number of states
expressed strong opposition, alleging that the United States had ad-
duced insufficient proof that the missiles had been emplaced for of-
fensive purposes to meet the imminence threshold necessary to
permit the exercise of anticipatory self-defense 27 and that, as a conse-
quence, the blockade was an unlawful exercise of force in violation of
Article 2(4). Others reached the opposite conclusion, judging the
blockade a lawful act of anticipatory self-defense in response to an
imminent threat posed by offensive missiles. 128 Despite the intensity
of the debate, however, the Security Council took no action, 12 9 a fact
U.S. officials interpreted as implied authorization for U.S. actions in
124 The Organization of American States is a regional organization created in 1948
under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter. See Charter of the Organization of American
States, Apr. 30, 1948, arts. 1-2, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2417, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 50. On October
23, 1962, a resolution of the O.A.S. General Assembly authorized member states to
participate in the blockade of Cuba.
125 Sapiro, supra note 16, at 601. Article 52 recognizes the existence of regional
organizations with mandates for the maintenance of regional peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 52. Article 53 contemplates that Article 52 regional organizations
may take enforcement action with the authorization of the Security Council. Id. art.
53.
126 See AREND & BECK, supra note 56, at 75-76 (characterizing Security Council
debate over the U.S. blockade of Cuba as having been couched, implicitly, in terms of
anticipatory self-defense).
127 A bloc of states rejected the blockade as a violation of Article 2(4) not other-
wise permissible under Article 51 on the ground that, unless the United States could
prove an offensive purpose for the missiles, it could not demonstrate an imminent
threat against which the lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense could be main-
tained. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 17th Sess., 1024th mtg. at 18-19, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1024
(1962) (statement of Quaison-Sackey, delegate from Ghana, to the Security Council)
(arguing that there was insufficient proof to conclude that the missiles had been em-
placed for offensive purposes and that as a result the U.S. blockade was not in re-
sponse to an imminent threat and therefore not lawful); see also Condron, supra note
55, at 134-36 (noting that the Soviet Union, Ghana, Romania, and the United Arab
Republic opposed the U.S. blockade as an act of anticipatory self-defense).
128 AREND & BECK, supra note 56, at 75 (listing states in support of the blockade as
Chile, France, Ireland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela).
129 See A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD
WAR II 217 (1997).
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self-defense and for the resort to the O.A.S. 130 On October 28, the
Cuban Missile Crisis ended with a public concession by the Soviet
Union promising to withdraw all missiles from Cuba.1
3 1
Subsequent analysis has revealed a general agreement that the
mere presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba did not constitute an immi-
nent threat to the United States sufficient to satisfy the standard elabo-
rated in the Caroline case, 13 2 even though the U.S. response to the
Cuban Missile Crisis is "widely accepted as legitimate." 3 3 The reason
for the apparent gap between law and legitimacy may stem from the
fact that many scholars of the Cuban Missile Crisis read into the si-
lence of the Security Council on the question of the legitimacy of an-
ticipatory self-defense a widespread implicit endorsement, not only of
the U.S. naval blockade, but also of a more expansive legal basis for
U.S. military action in self-defense than is provided by Article 53.134
Because much of the debate in the Security Council centered not
upon law but upon whether the missiles were in fact offensive or de-
fensive (and therefore whether the missiles genuinely posed a threat
to the United States), and as the Security Council did not specifically
reject the continuing validity of anticipatory self-defense in the Char-
ter era, some suggest not only that anticipatory self-defense was the
more defensible legal justification for the U.S. blockade but also that
the real lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis is that anticipatory self-de-
fense survived the advent of the Charter and even evolved to reflect
130 See Abram Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 550, 556
(1963); see also Leonard C. Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L.
515, 522 (1963) (arguing that because the quarantine continued with the knowledge
of the Security Council, "authorization may be said to have been granted by the
course which the Council adopted").
131 See THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 121, at 391-92 (discussing the
resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis).
132 See Roberts, supra note 7, at 528-29 (stating that, arguably, the presence of
Soviet missiles in Cuba "did not per se constitute a threat against the United States
and the Western Hemisphere" although in conjunction with other examples of Soviet
brinksmanship, support for terrorism, and other acts of aggression the missiles may
have been adjudged a threat, whether imminent or not); Smith, supra note 55, at
488-90 (concluding that the "Soviets did not deploy missiles in Cuba in order to
launch a war against the United States" but rather to achieve parity with the United
States).
133 Wedgwood, supra note 14, at 584.
134 A number of commentators have criticized the resort to the O.A.S. specifically,
and the doctrine of implicit Security Council authorization of regional organizations
as enforcement mechanism, as inconsistent with the express terms of the U.N. Char-
ter. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 43, at 291-92.
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changed technological circumstances that transformed the functional
definition of imminence.
3 5
2. Six-Day War, 1967
In May 1967, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt (then the
United Arab Republic), after months of hostile public statements ex-
pressing an intent to destroy Israel, 136 evicted the U.N. Emergency
Force in the Sinai, 137 closed the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran
to Israeli shipping, 138 and deployed Egyptian forces in an offensive
posture and on maximum alert status near the Israeli border. Al-
though Egypt conceded that the closure of the waterways was a bellig-
erent act, Nasser justified the measure as legitimate on the grounds
that Israel and Egypt had continued in a state of war since 1948 and
that either party could engage in belligerency without altering the le-
gal status quo.' 39 In response, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
warned that Israel regarded the re-opening of the waterways as an act
of self-defense that Israel was prepared to undertake. 140 In turn,
Egypt rejected the Israeli claim as a diversion from the Palestinian
question and defended the closure as an act oriented toward ensuring
the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. 14 1 While
Israel dispatched emissaries to Western capitals seeking diplomatic as-
135 See AREND & BECK, supra note 56, at 75 (analyzing the Security Council debate
and concluding that most states implicitly approved anticipatory self-defense under
the proper circumstances); Smith, supra note 55, at 495 (concluding that the U.N.
debate on the Cuban Missile Crisis supports the proposition that even in the Charter
era "'certain steps' well short of an armed attack could trigger Article 51's right to
self-defense").
136 See NADAV SAFRAN, FROM WAR TO WAR: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION,
1948-1967, at 268 (1969) (recounting one such hostile statement).
137 See Report of the Secretary-General on the Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency
Force, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/6730/Add.3/Corr.1 (1967); Report of
the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Near East, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., Supp. for
Apr.-June 1967, at 111-13, U.N. Doc. S/7896 (1967).
138 Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Near East, U.N. SCOR, 22d
Sess., Supp. for Apr.-June 1967, at 122, U.N. Doc. S/7906 (1967) (discussing the
closing of the Straits of Tiran); SAFRAN, supra note 136, at 268-69 (documenting Nas-
ser's announcement of the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba).
139 See Robert H. Forward, Jr. et al., Comment, The Arab-Israeli War and Interna-
tional Law, 9 HARV. INT'L L.J. 232, 245-52 (1968) (recounting the Egyptian legal justi-
fication for the closure of the waterways).
140 See SAFRAN, supra note 136, at 269 (reporting Prime Minister Eshkol's state-
ment that "any interference with freedom of shipping in the Gulf and in the Strait
constitutes a gross violation of international law, a blow at the sovereign rights of
other nations, and an act of aggression against Israel").
141 As Egyptian President Nasser told the National Assembly,
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sistance to resolve the brewing crisis, 142 Egypt incorporated the armed
forces of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq under its unified command. 143 Fi-
nally, on June 5, 1967, Israel launched a decisive air campaign against
the air forces of the U.A.R. Unified Command, to which the Arab
states, despite suffering complete tactical surprise and the destruction
of their air support, responded by attacking with ground forces along
and across their borders with Israel. In subsequent days Israel de-
feated combined Arab ground forces and captured the entire Sinai
Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, and by June 10 all
parties had accepted a ceasefire.
4 4
In the aftermath of the brief but decisive conflict, Israel justified
its attack under Article 51 in part on the premise that the closure of
the Straits of Tiran constituted an "armed attack" justifying the Israeli
use of force in self-defense, 145 and in part on the basis that the pres-
ence of the troops of a hostile state on its southern border, coupled
with the clearly expressed intent of that state to destroy Israel and
convincing intelligence that an Egyptian attack was imminent, posed a
serious and imminent threat to its national security justifying the exer-
cise of anticipatory self-defense. 146 The ensuing debate within the Se-
[t]he issue today is not the question of Aqaba, or the Strait of Tiran, or
U.N.E.F. The issue is the rights of the people of Palestine, the aggression
against Palestine that took place in 1948, with the help of Britain and the
United States.... [Others] want to confine [the conflict] to the Strait of
Tiran, U.N.E.F., and the rights of passage. We say: We want the rights of the
people of Palestine-complete.
AL-AHRAM (CAIRO), May 30, 1967, quoted in SAERAN, supra note 136, at 270; see also
Gamal Abdel Nasser, Speech to the United Arab Republic Air Force Advanced Com-
mand: U.A.R. Statement on Withdrawal of U.N.E.F. and Closing of Strait of Tiran to
Israeli Ships (May 22, 1967), in 6 I.L.M. 573 (1967) (defending actions of the U.A.R.
on behalf of Palestinian people).
142 SAFRAN, supra note 136, at 269.
143 See id. at 269 (reporting that Algerian, Kuwaiti, Libyan, and Sudanese units
were also sent to Egypt).
144 For a detailed discussion of the Six-Day War, see GEORGE LENCZOWSKI, A CON-
CISE HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST (4th ed. 1995). For an examination of Israeli deci-
sionmaking, see generally MICHAEL BRECHER, DECISIONS IN CRISIS (1980) (comparing
Israeli decisionmaking before, during, and after the Six-Day War to Israeli decision-
making before, during, and after the Yom Kippur War of 1973).
145 Some commentators have suggested that the Israeli justification for the use of
force was that the closure of the Straits of Tiran constituted an "armed attack" for
purposes of self-defense under Article 51. See, e.g., Sapiro, supra note 16, at 601; see
also Condron, supra note 55, at 136-37 (concluding that the Israeli use of force consti-
tuted an exercise of anticipatory self-defense).
146 From the Israeli perspective, the Six-Day War was one of ein breaira ("no alter-
native"), as the survival of the state was in jeopardy had Israel not chosen to engage in
anticipatory self-defense. See AvRAHAM TAMIR, A SOLDIER IN SEARCH OF PEACE: AN IN-
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curity Council largely rejected the former argument and centered
upon the reasonableness of the Israeli attack, inquiring whether
under the circumstances the threat could have been considered suffi-
ciently imminent to dispatch with the requirement of an "armed at-
tack" as a condition precedent to self-defense.1 47 As might have been
expected during the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its
Arab clients steered the discussion away from the threat the U.A.R.
had posed to Israel and focused formalistically on the text of Article
51, defining the Israeli action as illegal aggression in violation of Arti-
cle 2(4) because Israel had been first to resort to the overt use of
force. 148 Predictably, the Russo-Arabic bloc categorically refused to
engage on the question of the availability of anticipatory self-de-
fense. 149 In contrast, although little serious consideration was paid to
the argument that the closure of the Straits of Tiran constituted an
"armed attack," the United States and other Western states defended
the Israeli position that the imminence and magnitude of the threat
justified the exercise of measures in self-defense, and this bloc
shielded Israel from adverse legal judgment. Although the Security
Council did not make an official pronouncement upon the legitimacy
of anticipatory self-defense in context, none of the three Security
Council resolutions that emerged from the aftermath of the Six-Day
War condemned Israeli actions1
50
Although the question whether the threat to Israel was suffi-
ciently imminent to justify anticipatory self-defense remains the sub-
ject of legal and political wrangling, most commentators now view the
Israeli belief that the threatjustified the response to be reasonable.
1 51
SIDE LOOK AT ISRAEL'S STRATEGY 171 (1988) (relating, from the perspective of a senior
Israeli military official, the Israeli perspective in the days before June 5, 1967).
147 See U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg. at 14-26, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1348 (1967).
148 See AREND & BECK, supra note 56, at 77 (noting that the Russo-Arabic position
was reducible to the argument that the first use of force was aggression regardless of
the circumstances prompting that use of force).
149 Id.
150 See S.C. Res. 233, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/
22/Rev.2 (1967); S.C. Res. 234, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/22/Rev.2 (1967); S.C. Res. 235, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg. at 3, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2 (1967). Moreover, a Soviet-sponsored draft resolution that
would have condemned Israel was defeated in the Security Council and the General
Assembly. See U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1360th mtg. at 18-19, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1360
(1967) (defeating condemnation of Israel); U.N. GAOR, 5th Emergency Special Sess.,
1548th mtg. at 171, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1548 (1967) (same).
151 See Polebaum, supra note 82, at 192 ("Most commentators concluded that
Israel's belief that it was about to be attacked on all its borders was reasonable."). For
a defense of the factual predicate giving rise to the Israeli claim of legal legitimacy,
see Amos Shapira, The Six-Day War and the Right of Self-Defense, 6 ISR. L. REv. 65, 73-76
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More importantly, commentators generally read into Security Council
silence on the legitimacy of the Israeli anticipatory self-defense argu-
ment implicit support for the proposition that the right to anticipa-
tory self-defense continues in force under the customary international




Despite what amounted to, arguably, tacit approval of Israeli acts
in preemption of the Arab threat in 1967, residual doubts over
whether anticipatory self-defense was a legally defensible doctrine may
well have contributed to Israeli failures to employ anticipatory self-
defense in 1973, when Israeli decisionmakers failed to correctly diag-
nose Syrian troop maneuvers and a host of other indicators as prepa-
rations for ajoint Syrian-Egyptian attack on October 6, 1973.153 The
lessons of the failure to correctly assess enemy intentions in 1973 may
have influenced future Israeli responses to yet another threat.
By Spring 1981, Iraq, with French assistance, was nearing comple-
tion of its Osiraq nuclear reactor facility, a project which, although the
Hussein government publicly claimed would be dedicated only to
(1971) (contending that Israel was faced with imminent attack). For a counterargu-
ment, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, The "Middle East": The Misunderstood Conflict, in THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 327, 347-50 (John Norton Moore ed., abr. & rev. ed. 1977)
(arguing that Israel committed aggression because it "started the shooting").
152 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 191 ("In the circumstances, as perceived in
June 1967, Israel did not have to wait idly by for the expected shattering blow .... );
Franck, supra note 39, at 12 ("In some circumstances, the Charter system has con-
doned a state's recourse to force to preempt an imminent attack on it; ... an example
is the Israeli war against Egypt."); Smith, supra note 55, at 483-84 (concluding that
Security Council and General Assembly refusal to condemn Israeli actions constitutes
implicit affirmation of the right to anticipatory self-defense). Those most critical of
the legality of the Israeli actions of June 5, 1967, generally contend either that the
facts did not support anticipatory self-defense under the particular circumstances or
that the failure of the Security Council to expressly condemn the actions cannot be
interpreted as condoning anticipatory self-defense. See O'Connell, supra note 19, at
453 (challenging the legitimacy of Israeli actions as based on "less than convincing
evidence" which did not indicate an imminent threat); see also Condron, supra note
55, at 136 (concluding that the failure of the United Nations to condemn Israel leaves
the question of the legality of anticipatory self-defense under the Charter as an "unset-
tled question").
153 See TAMIR, supra note 146, at 193-95 (describing Syrian and Egyptian troop
movements, the withdrawal of the families of Soviet military advisers from Syria, and
other ominous warning signals as evidence of an imminent attack that Israeli deci-
sionmakers interpreted as nonthreatening, in large measure due to overconfidence
and misperceptiveness).
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peaceful research, Israeli intelligence deemed to be a nuclear weap-
ons production facility. 154 When several months of Israeli efforts to
alert the international community to the brewing danger and to se-
cure condemnation of the Iraqi attempt to acquire WMD were unsuc-
cessful, Israel responded with military force. At sunset on June 7,
1981, eight Israeli F-16 aircraft accompanied by six F-15 escorts de-
stroyed the Osiraq nuclear reactor with twelve two thousand pound
bombs, shortly before it could become operational. -5 5 Israel de-
fended the destruction of Osiraq as an act of anticipatory self-defense,
justified on the grounds that if Iraq, a state committed to the destruc-
tion of Israel, were permitted to acquire a nuclear reactor capable of
producing weapons it would do so; that such weapons would certainly
be used against Israel at the earliest possible juncture;156 and that
therefore Israel, and in particular its civilian population, was subject
to an immediate and direct threat by the existence of an operational,
154 See Israeli and Iraqi Statements on Raid on Nuclear Plant, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981,
at A8 (indicating that Israel claimed to possess intelligence from "[s]ources of un-
questioned reliability" that the Osiraq reactor would be in production of nuclear
weapons within three months).
155 David K. Shipler, Israeli Jets Destroy Iraqi Atomic Reactor, N.Y. TIMES,June 9, 1981,
at Al. Most analysts believe the Osiraq reactor was either operational or nearly so.
For a discussion of the operational status of the Osiraq reactor, see Louis Ren6 Beres
& Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel's Destruction of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor,
9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 437, 437 (1995) (contending the reactor was very nearly
operational); George Russell, Attack-and Fallout, TIME, June 22, 1981, at 24, 26 (re-
porting that Israeli intelligence indicated that the reactor would soon be opera-
tional). But see Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Against the Osiraq Reactor: A
Retrospective, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 259, 261 (1996) (noting that the reactor was
not operational at the moment of the attack).
156 See Russell, supra note 155, at 30 (reporting statement from Israeli Prime Min-
ister Begin, claiming that after an Iranian aircraft had attempted unsuccessfully to
bomb Osiraq, Iraq had issued a statement to the Baghdad press stating that "[t]he
Iranian people should not fear the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which is not intended to be
used against Iran, but against the Zionist enemy"). The Iraqi government had re-
leased numerous statements calling upon Arab states to develop nuclear weapons for
the destruction of Israel. See, e.g., IRAQI NEWS AGENCY (Baghdad), Aug. 19, 1980,
quoted in The Israeli Air Strike: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th
Cong. 225, 226 (1981):
President Saddam Hussein has stressed that a decision better than boycott-
ing the states that move their embassies to Arab Jerusalem is to destroy Tel
Aviv with bombs. He added that until the possibility of responding to the
enemy with bombs becomes available, all available weapons must be used
with the help of the Arab brothers... The president concluded his speech
by stressing that when the time comes for Iraq to vent its anger on the Zion-
ist entity, it will do so.
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or nearly operational, reactor.1 57 Israel claimed further that even if
the reactor had not been fully operational, had Israel delayed until
such time as it was fully operational before destroying it more Iraqi
civilians would have been exposed to radiation leaking from the facil-
ity, a likelihood supporting the conclusion that the threat, even at the
moment of the attack, was already sufficiently imminent for purposes
of Israeli compliance with international law. 5s In other words, the
fact that the threat emanated from the proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons to an enemy state determined to use them against Israel dictated a
relaxed interpretation of imminence consistent with the magnitude
and seriousness of the particular threat profile as perceived by the
intended target of that threat.
Arab states swiftly and publicly condemned the attack,159 and the
Security Council, with U.S. and British support, 60 followed suit, unan-
157 See Israeli and Iraqi Statements on Raid on Nuclear Plant, supra note 154 ("We were
therefore forced to defend ourselves against the construction of an atomic bomb in
Iraq, which itself would not have hesitated to use it against Israel and its population
centers."); see also id. ("[The reactor was] intended ... for the production of atomic
bombs. The goal for these bombs was Israel.... After the Iranians slightly damaged
the reactor, Saddam Hussein remarked that it was pointless for the Iranians to attack
the reactor because it was being built against Israel alone.").
158 See David K Shipler, Begin Defends Raid, Pledges to Thwart a New "Holocaust, "N.Y.
TIMES,June 10, 1981, at Al. Israeli Prime Minister Begin argued that the threat posed
by the reactor was imminent due to the increased civilian casualties that were certain
to occur had Israel waited to strike, and stated that "[w]e faced a terrible dilemma....
Should we now be passive, and then lose the last opportunity, without those horrible
casualties amongst the Baghdad population, to destroy the hotbed of death?" Id. See
U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2280th mtg. at 57-60, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280 (1981) (state-
ment of the Permanent Representative of Israel) (arguing that had Israel failed to
strike immediately, the Iraqi civilian casualties would have been unacceptably high
and that as a consequence, the threat was imminent as a matter of law); Excerpts from
Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of June 15, 1981, in 20 I.L.M. 996
(1981) ("[In removing this terrible nuclear threat to its existence, Israel was only
exercising its legitimate right of self-defence within the meaning of this term in inter-
national law and as preserved also under the United Nations Charter."). In other
words, further delay would have rendered an otherwise discriminate and proportional
response to the Iraqi threat an indiscriminate, disproportional, and therefore unlaw-
ful, use of force. See Schmitt, supra note 48, at 532-33 (describing the Israeli strike on
Osiraq as a "surgical[ I] exterminat[ion]" of the threat due to its limited scope and
duration).
159 See Arabs Assail Raid as "Peak ofInternational Terrorism, "N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981,
at Al.
160 See Bruce Ackerman, But What's the Legal Case for Preemption?, WASH. POST, Aug.
18, 2002, at B2 ("Armed attack in such circumstances cannot be justified. It represents
a grave breach of international law.") (noting the remarks of British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher in response to the Israeli attack on Osiraq); Judith Miller, U.S.
Officials Say Iraq Had Ability To Make Nuclear Weapon in 1981, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981,
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imously "condemn [ing] the military attack by Israel in clear violation
of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international
conduct" and stating that Iraq was "entitled to appropriate redress for
the destruction it has suffered."'161 For most states, the facts that Israel
could not prove that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons that it intended
to use against Israel in the very near future, and that the Iraqi threat
was therefore not imminent enough to leave "no moment for deliber-
ation" and to create an immediate and overwhelming necessity to at-
tack the reactor-a determination subsequently reinforced by
evidence that Israel had initiated preparations and planning for the
destruction of the Osiraq reactor at least as early as March 1981 162l
vitiated, consistent with the Caroline standard, the Israeli claim that
they lawfully exercised anticipatory self-defense,1 63 and suggested to
the contrary that the strike was a premeditated act in violation of Arti-
cle 2(4) of the Charter. 164 Although the Security Council imposed no
at A9 (reporting U.S. condemnation of the Israeli strike and suspension of arms ship-
ments in response).
161 S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., Resolutions & Decisions, at 10, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/37 (1981). The General Assemblyjoined in condemning the Israeli strike. See
G.A. Res. 36/27, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/36/51
(1981).
162 See Smith, supra note 55, at 487 & n.181 (noting that Israeli Prime Minister
Begin conceded that Israeli preparations for the attack had commenced in March
1981, and noting further that Israel began developing intelligence about the reactor
as a potential target as early as 1979).
163 See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2282d mtg. at 106, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2282
(1981):
It has been argued that the Israeli attack was an act of self-defense. But it
was not a response to an armed attack on Israel by Iraq. There was no in-
stant or overwhelming necessity for self-defense. Nor can it be justified as a
forcible measure of self-protection. The Israeli intervention amounted to a
use of force which cannot find a place in international law or in the Charter
and which violated the sovereignty of Iraq.
Id. (statement of Sir Anthony Parsons, Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom).
164 See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2283d mtg. at 145, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2283
(1981) (statement of Mr. Koroma, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone) (evalu-
ating the Israeli strike as having failed to satisfy the absence of premeditation require-
ment of the Caroline rule of necessity). For many states, however, the unlawfulness of
the Israeli strike was the exclusive consequence of a lack of imminence of the threat-
had it been clear that Iraq would produce nuclear weapons and that those weapons
would be imminently used against Israel, the Israeli claim to anticipatory self-defense
might well have avoided condemnation. See Condron, supra note 55, at 137-39 (ana-
lyzing Security Council debates and concluding that had Israel been able to adduce
evidence in support of its factual predicate, the Israeli argument would not have been
perceived to be so attenuated and might well have avoided legal condemnation).
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sanctions, it rejected the Israeli claim to anticipatory self-defense in
these circumstances because the threat, viewed objectively rather than
subjectively and in light of the traditional rule rather than in terms of
the relaxed standard propounded by Israel, was deemed simply too
prospective to justify the use of force.
In the main, the contemporaneous judgment of the legal acad-
emy affirmed the Security Council assessment that the Israeli attack
could not be justified under the international law of self-defense on
the grounds that Israel had neither satisfied the imminence require-
ment 165 nor exhausted peaceful means of dispute resolution prior to
engaging in self-help. 166 At least one scholar drew the still broader
conclusion that even if anticipatory self-defense had survived the entry
into force of the Charter it could not be exercised except with the
prior approval of "some community of states."1 67 In other words, the
Israeli air strike in 1981 stood for the proposition that the unilateral
resort to force, however otherwise justified, was now incompatible
with the framework of the Charter.
However, with the benefit of two decades' hindsight some now
question whether the facts upon which the Security Council relied in
reaching its judgment were incomplete and whether, in light of the
revelation of new information regarding the extent of the Iraqi nu-
clear weapons program developed during the period from the Gulf
War to the present, the Israeli claim that the threat posed by Iraq was
imminent might have justified the Israeli attack on Osiraq as an act of
anticipatory self-defense despite the absence of an "armed attack." 168
165 See D'Amato, supra note 155, at 260 (evaluating scholarly reaction to the Is-
raeli attack on Osiraq).
166 Sapiro, supra note 16, at 601; Smith, supra note 55, at 486-87.
167 See Smith, supra note 55, at 495-96 ("The condemnation of Israel in 1981 fol-
lowing its raid on [Osiraq] suggests that the invocation of support from some commu-
nity of states is an essential prerequisite for the permissible exercise of coercive arms
control under the Charter.").
168 See Graham, supra note 62, at 10 (suggesting that the Israeli attack may well
have been justified as anticipatory self-defense on the ground that subsequent U.N.
weapons inspections revealed that the extent of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program
was far closer to the Israeli estimate than to the consensus of the international com-
munity, and that there was a great likelihood that Iraq would have developed weapons
that could have destroyed Israel); Koh, supra note 74, at 1516 (recognizing that
Israel's movement into the West Bank could also be "rationalized as preemptive self-
defense against future terrorist attacks"). Interestingly, although the United States
joined in the Security Council condemnation of Israel, as early as 1981 the U.S. gov-
ernment confirmed that an important element of the factual predicate upon which
Israel relied in destroying the Iraqi reactor-that Iraq had or would soon have nu-
clear weapons-was accurate. See Miller, supra note 160 (reporting that U.S. intelli-
gence officials "believed that Iraq had acquired enough enriched uranium and
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The most restrictivist scholars may not concede, as do a growing num-
ber of commentators, that "it was unquestionable that Israel was the
target of Iraqi nuclear weapons." 169 However, whether in light of evi-
dence unavailable or not credited as accurate at the time of the attack,
or out of a pragmatist commitment to anticipatory self-defense in
principle, a number of commentators now grant that the formalistic
evaluation of imminence is unsuited to an era replete with rogue
states armed with WMD that seek the destruction of their otherwise
helpless neighbors,17 0 and that the Israeli attack on Osiraq must there-
fore be reconceived not as an unlawful act of aggression but rather as
a "heroic and indispensable act of law enforcement.
17 1
4. U.S. Air Strikes on Libya, 1986
On April 5, 1986, one day after U.S. intelligence intercepted a
cable indicating Libyan terrorists would attack a target in Berlin the
next day, a bomb detonated in a West Berlin nightclub known to be
frequented by American military personnel, killing two U.S. nationals
and wounding fifty to sixty others. 172 Nine days later, on April 14, U.S.
F-ill fighter-bombers departed from bases in England and attacked
five military and regime targets in Libya.173 President Reagan indi-
cated that the United States possessed "clear evidence that Libya is
planning future attacks" and stated that the preemptive action was in-
tended to "preempt and discourage Libyan attacks on innocent civil-
ians in the future." 174 Although in subsequent statements Reagan
sensitive technology to make one nuclear weapon by the end of [1981] and several
bombs by the mid 1980's").
169 Magenis, supra note 45, at 430; see also Beres & Tsiddon-Chatto, supra note
155, at 437 ("Looking back at this event almost a decade and a half later, Israel's
defensive action looks very different. As is now well-known Saddam Hussein's plans to
build a French-supplied reactor . . .were designed to produce militarily significant
amounts of weapons .... ").
170 See Richard N. Gardner, Commentary on the Law of Self-Defense, in LAW AND FORCE
IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 80, at 49 (" [I)f anticipatory self-defense
cannot cover the Iraqi reactor case ...how are we going to deal with a Saddam
Hussein who may be preparing to use weapons of mass destruction against his
neighbors?").
171 Beres & Tsiddon-Chatto, supra note 155, at 440.
172 SeeJohn Tagliabue, 2 Killed, 155 Hurt in Bomb Explosion at Club in Berlin, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1986, at Al.
173 See Michael R. Gordon, Pentagon Details 2-Pronged Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
1986, at Al.
174 Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the United States
Air Strike Against Libya, 1 PUB. PAPERS 468 (Apr. 14, 1986). In his address to the
nation, President Reagan spoke in terms of "preemptive action" concerning the at-
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Administration officials made reference to other claims to legal justifi-
cation for the attack on Libya, including in reprisal for the terrorist
bombing of April 5 and as an exercise of self-defense against ongoing
attacks on U.S. nationals and embassies abroad, 175 the official legal
justification for the use of force against Libya posited that Libya was
actively planning future attacks against the United States; 176 that no
diplomatic resolution of the dispute was possible; that the U.S. action
constituted an exercise of the inherent right of anticipatory self-de-
fense to preempt these future attacks; and that the U.S. action was
taken consistent with Article 51 of the Charter.
177
Although the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and Denmark
joined the United States in preventing Security Council condemna-
tion of the U.S. attack on Libya, 178 many states judged the response to
have been an unlawful reprisal,17 9 as did the General Assembly.'
80
Furthermore, a great many states and commentators found the al-
leged facts concerning the imminence of attack insufficient to sup-
port the claim of self-defense,' 81 and still others concluded that the
magnitude of the response was disproportionate to the alleged
threat.182 Despite British support for the notion that the exercise of
tack on Libya. Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against Libya, 1
PUB. PAPERS 468, 469 (Apr. 15, 1986).
175 See, e.g., Statements of Ambassadors Okun and Walters before the U.N. Secur-
ity Council (April 14-15, 1986), reprinted in Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice
of the United States Relating to International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 612, 632-33 (1986);
Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Defends Raid Before U.N. Body, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1986, at A17.
176 See Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FoREIGN ArF. 901, 921 (1986)
(stating that the United States attacked Libya to prevent "some 30 possible impending
Libyan attacks on U.S. facilities and personnel throughout the world").
177 See President's Report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, United
States Air Strike Against Libya, on April 14, 1986, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc.
499-500 (Apr. 16, 1986) (contending that the attack on Libya, justified under Article
51 of the U.N. Charter as an act of anticipatory self-defense, was narrowly tailored to
preempt future Libyan attacks on U.S. interests).
178 Yoo, supra note 14, at 573 (citing U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2679th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/PV.2682 (1986)).
179 MCCORMACK, supra note 45, at 230-33.
180 See G.A. Res. 41/38, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/38 (1986)
(condemning the U.S. attack as an unlawful act).
181 See Romano, supra note 71, at 1041-44 (surveying international commentary
on the U.S. attack on Libya and concluding that "the international community, in
significant part, repudiated" the U.S. strike).
182 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 42, at 730-31 (arguing first, that the United States
introduced insufficient factual support for its assertion that future armed attacks on
the United States were imminent, and second, that even if such attacks were certain it
was not clear that U.S. action against Libyan military targets, rather than defensive
measures to protect the intended U.S. targets, was the more proportionate and direct
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the inherent right to self-defense "plainly includes the right to destroy
or weaken the capacity of one's assailant, reduce his resources, and
weaken his will so as to discourage and prevent future violence,
'" 183
the general conclusion within the international community was that
the U.S. attack on Libya was difficult to characterize as anything but a
reprisal and that, as such, the question of anticipatory self-defense had
not arisen.
5. U.S. Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 1998
On August 20, 1998, twelve days after the Qaeda terrorist group
attacked and destroyed the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, the
United States fired cruise missiles at several al Qaeda terrorist training
camps in Afghanistan and at the Shifa factory in Sudan, alleged to be
a production facility for chemical weapons intended for al Qaeda.
184
Although various Clinton Administration officials hinted that the ac-
tion had been undertaken in retaliation for the embassy bombings,
185
the United States invoked anticipatory self-defense as the predomi-
nant legal justification for its attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan, con-
tending that the application of military force had been necessary to
prevent specific imminent terrorist attacks about which it possessed
clear and credible intelligence.1 8
6
measure, or that attacking Libyan targets dedicated to long-term planning would bet-
ter and more directly tailor the response to reducing the threat than selecting more
specific and limited targets).
183 U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2679th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.2678 (1986) (statement of
the Representative of the United Kingdom).
184 James Bennett, U.S. Cruise Missiles Strike Sudan and Afghan Targets Tied to Terror-
ist Network, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al.
185 See, e.g., Bradley Graham, Bin Laden Was at Camp Just Before U.S. Attack, WASH.
POST, Aug. 29, 1998, at Al (quoting official statements that U.S. plans for strikes were
conceived as possible retaliatory measures to terrorist attacks before the embassy
bombings occurred); Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Remarks During Appear-
ance on This Week (Aug. 23, 1998), available at 1998 WL 6392416 (stating that the
embassy "bombings had a huge part" in prompting the attacks on Afghanistan and
Sudan).
186 See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 161, 162-63 (1999) (reporting that the United States
claimed the right to defend against imminent attacks by al Qaeda); Bennett, supra
note 184 (reporting that the Clinton Administration justified the strikes in Afghani-
stan and Sudan as anticipatory self-defense on the grounds that al Qaeda was respon-
sible for these and other acts of terrorism, al Qaeda had declared its intention to
conduct additional attacks, and "key terrorist leaders" were gathered at the headquar-
ters, establishing the imminence of a continuing threat to U.S. nationals); Clinton's
Words: "There Will Be No Sanctuay for Terrorists, " N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at A12
(claiming an inherent right to self-defense against future attacks under Article 51 of
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Some restrictivist scholars argued that the United States failed to
establish that the threat posed by al Qaeda was sufficiently imminent
for analysis under the Caroline standard, and that the action must con-
sequently be examined not as an exercise of anticipatory self-defense
but rather as an act of reprisal for the embassy bombings. 87 To some
degree, criticisms of the U.S. anticipatory self-defense justification
hinged on the sufficiency of the evidence offered in support of the
claim. Some commentators, otherwise supportive of the inherent
right of states to engage in anticipatory self-defense, questioned its
applicability given the absence of sufficient proof of imminence,
188
while others, although generally hostile to anticipatory self-defense,
evaluated the U.S. claim on its merits, concluding that the "questiona-
ble nature of some of [the U.S.] factual assertions, and the circum-
stances surrounding the strikes render the success of its legal
justification very unique."189 Reports indicated that the factory and
camp had been developed by U.S. intelligence and military officials as
potential targets many months before their destruction.190 Although
the Charter); "We Acted to Preempt Terrorist Acts, " WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1998, at A19
(quoting Secretary of State Madeleine Albright describing the strikes as efforts "to
preempt future terrorist acts and disrupt the activities of those planning for them.");
id. (quoting National Security Adviser Sandy Berger to the effect that the United
States "had very specific information about very specific threats with respect to very
specific targets.").
187 See Paust, supra note 12, at 536 (suggesting that, although the strikes may well
have been directed towards future unspecified but anticipated al Qaeda attacks
against the United States, the threats posed by such potentialities were not sufficient
to constitute imminence for purposes of evaluation as an act of anticipatory self-de-
fense); Michael Lacey, Self-Defense or Self-Denial: The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass De-
struction, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 293, 296-97 (2002) (contending that on the
evidence offered it is almost impossible for the United States to argue that the de-
struction of the U.S. embassies required an "instant, overwhelming" response against
the particular targets selected and that it had "no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation") (quoting the Caroline standard).
188 On the basis of the evidence made available for review it was difficult for many
commentators to comprehend precisely how the destruction of the Sudanese factory
in particular was necessary to prevent imminent terrorist attacks, for if the attacks
were in fact imminent it was unlikely that terrorists would receive weapons produced
by the factory in the near-term and that any imminent attacks would be conducted
•with weapons already in their possession. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 7, at 535 (ac-
cepting anticipatory self-defense in principle but rejecting its application to Afghani-
stan and Sudan on the ground that the United States had failed to "convincingly
explain that acquisition [of chemical weapons] and use.., was imminent"); Romano,
supra note 71, at 1041-44 (same).
189 Romano, supra note 71, at 1041.
190 See Vernon Loeb & Bradley Graham, Sudan Plant Was Probed Months Before At-
tack, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1998, at A14.
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the United States countered such reports by releasing some of the
intelligence upon which it had relied in reaching its decision to de-
stroy the sites,' 9 ' restrictivists seized upon these reports and other in-
dications that the factory may not have in fact been a chemical
weapons production facility, 192 as proof that the strikes were indefen-
sible inasmuch as any threats that had existed for months without ne-
cessitating a U.S. attack were not suddenly invested with imminence
by the destruction of the U.S. embassies.
Nevertheless, despite widespread dissatisfaction with the eviden-
tiary support for the U.S. strikes, " [t]he Security Council took no for-
mal action in response," 193 and neither the attacks nor their
justification confronted substantial opposition internationally.
194
Some commentators consider the muted international response to a
questionable American self-defense argument a reflection of the dis-
taste for al Qaeda and grudging tolerance of incomplete disclosure of
intelligence sources and means in the particular case at issue, rather
than an affirmation of a right to anticipatory self-defense.' 95 More
pragmatist commentators suggest, however, that the U.S. strikes on
Sudan and Afghanistan demonstrate that the right of states to engage
in anticipatory self-defense is, if not already a norm of customary in-
191 See Matthew Linkie, Note, The Defense Threat Reduction Agency: A Note on the
United States' Approach to the Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 16 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'y 531, 553 (2000) (discussing evidence that Iraq had been produc-
ing chemical precursors for VX nerve gas). For further discussion of the U.S. evi-
dence, see Tim Weiner, Pentagon and C.I.A. Defend Sudan Missile Attack, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 1998, at AS.
192 See David L. Marcus, Frank Criticizes Bombing of Plant in Sudan, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 25, 1998, at A9 (stating that newly released evidence suggested that the Suda-
nese factory was in fact either a pharmaceutical plant or an animal feed plant as
claimed by Sudan).
193 Yoo, supra note 14, at 573. In a letter to the President of the Security Council
justifying the U.S. attacks, the United States claimed to have acted only after repeated
warnings to Afghanistan and Sudan to "shut down terrorist activities and cease coop-
eration with the Bin Ladin Organization." U.N. DAuLY HIGHLIGHTS, Aug. 21, 1998.
194 See Douglas Jehl, U.S. Raids Provoke Fury in Muslim World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22,
1998, at A6 (discussing international reactions to 1998 strikes and reporting that most
of the hostility to the U.S. action was confined to Islamic states); Romano, supra note
71, at 1041 (noting that the justification of anticipatory self-defense was received "with
scant objection from the international community").
195 Romano, supra note 71, at 1041; see also id. at 1043 ("Perhaps the relatively
passive international response is best explained by the wealth of intelligence informa-
tion the United States had amassed linking Osama bin Laden's terrorist network to
the embassy bombings and other past terrorist plots.") (footnotes omitted).
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ternational law that predates and survives the Charter, emerging as lex
ferenda.1
96
6. Lessons from State Practice
Several conclusions may be drawn from the preceding analysis of
the five cases of anticipatory self-defense in the Charter era. First, as
the state-preserving benefits that might accrue from an act of anticipa-
tory self-defense are apt to degrade with the passage of time, states are
likely to engage in self-defense first, and legal legitimization second,
when they perceive their survival to be at stake by the acts of another
state or terrorist group. Second, where states cannot credibly claim to
have been the victim of an armed attack, they will claim the right to
anticipatory self-defense. Third, the division of the academy into
restrictivist and pragmatist camps maps neatly onto scholarly analyses
of states' claims to justification for the use of force: the most restric-
tivist commentators reject out of hand that a right to anticipatory self-
defense exists in the Charter era, whereas others focus on the evi-
dence for proof that the threat was sufficiently imminent, and
pragmatists tend to be much less critical of state claims in this regard.
Although debates persist, it is likely "impossible to prove the existence
of an authoritative and controlling norm prohibiting the use of force
for anticipatory self-defense."' 9 7 Fourth, reasonable minds can differ
as to whether, in a particular instance, an act of anticipatory self-de-
fense was justified, and in all likelihood the quested-after objective
standard that would permit quick and precise evaluation of the legiti-
macy of a particular act of preemption is but a chimera. 19 8 Fifth,
other states tend to adopt positions with respect to claims of anticipa-
tory self-defense that mirror their ideological commitments to much
broader issues in international relations. Sixth, international organi-
196 See, e.g., id. at 1040 (suggesting that the largely absent criticism of the U.S.
strikes may indicate the "growing acceptance" of anticipatory self-defense). The most
pragmatist scholars insist that, because anticipatory self-defense survives the Charter,
and the threat posed by terrorists seeking WMD requires a transformed standard of
imminence, the strikes were perfectly legitimate as an exercise of anticipatory self-
defense. See, e.g., Addicott, supra note 18, at 772.
197 AREND & BECK, supra note 56, at 79.
198 Many restrictivists would concede the legitimacy of self-defense only in those
circumstances where the factual predicate offered in justification meets an objective
or legitimate, nonpolitical standard of imminence as determined by the United Na-
tions. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 Am. J. INr,'L L. 259,
267-68 (1989). State practice, and U.N. assessment of that practice, calls into ques-
tion whether the evaluation of the use of force under international law could ever be
described in such terms. See supra text accompanying notes 39-51.
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zations, and in particular the Security Council, have steadfastly re-
fused to impose sanctions upon states asserting claimed rights to
anticipatory self-defense, and the extent of Security Council disappro-
bation is to some extent a function of the degree to which the acting
state has sought multilateral support (and is therefore a political de-
termination). Seventh, evaluations of the legal legitimacy of state de-
cisions to engage in anticipatory self-defense are often subject to
revision as the passage of time permits revelation of the intelligence
upon which acting states relied in reaching the decision to engage in
anticipatory self-defense. Eighth, the resort to anticipatory self-de-
fense remains rare: it has occurred fewer than once every decade.
Ninth, the legal significance of the debate over the right of states to
resort to anticipatory self-defense is increasing in a hyper-ideological
and hyper-weaponized era, in which the meaning of the term "immi-
nence" has assumed, or should assume, new understandings. Finally,
in every instance where states have resorted to anticipatory self-de-
fense in the Charter era, acting states made efforts at proving the fac-
tual predicate necessary to satisfy other states, at least formally, that
the threat presented was sufficiently imminent to justify the response.
In other words, while state evaluations of the concept of "imminence"
as applied to practice have varied and evolved in light of technological
transformations, the Caroline standard has remained the generally ac-
cepted restatement of the inherent right of states under customary
international law to engage in anticipatory self-defense. 199
199 The most authoritative "soft law" restatement of the lawfulness of anticipatory
self-defense under customary international law may well be Article 25 of the Interna-
tional Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility, now before the General Assembly
and due for debate in 2004, which supports anticipatory self-defense under the state
of necessity doctrine. See Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 194-206, U.N. Doc. A/56/10/Corr.1 (2001), reprinted inJAMES
CRAwFoRD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSIONS'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBIL-
rry 168-69, 178-86, 281-305 (2002). A "state of necessity" excuses conduct that
would otherwise be unlawful where a state's "sole means of safeguarding an essential
interest threatened by a grave and imminent peril is to adopt conduct not in conform-
ity with what is required of it by an international obligation . . . ." See U.N. Env't
Programme, International Cases, 1 COMPENDIUM JUD. DECISIONS ON MATTERS RELATED
TO ENV'T XV (1998). Although the Report does not necessarily constitute customary
international law, adoption would signal strong support for either the recognition of
anticipatory self-defense as a new norm or for the strengthening of an emerging norm
recited therein. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 103(2) (d) rptr. note 2 (1987) (noting that nearly all General Assem-
bly resolutions pertinent to Articles 10-11, 13-14, and Chapters VI and VII of the
U.N. Charter are, although nonbinding, important evidence of emerging customary
international law). Moreover, recent jurisprudence of the ICJ reinforces the argu-
ment that necessity precludes wrongfulness under customary international law. See
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Still, after September 11 it is not enough simply to draw lessons
from state practice and scholarly analysis to ascertain the international
law governing the resort to preemptive force. Indeed, a number of
commentators have approached the Bush Doctrine as essentially a for-
mal distillation and restatement of the emerging practice of states fac-
ing grave threats to their vital national interests in a world in which
terrorism and WMD are allied. 200 However, rather than simply ex-
tending the pattern of Charter era practice with regard to anticipatory
self-defense into the War on Terror, the Bush Doctrine, as the next
Part will demonstrate, proposes a paradigmatic shift toward a funda-
mentally new legal regime that radically alters the definition of immi-
nence and would permit, in effect, measures to prevent, rather than
merely to anticipate, attack.
II. BEYOND ANTICIPATION: THE BUSH DOCTRINE AS AN ASSERTION OF
THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN PREVENTWIVE WAR
The principal foundations that all states have, new ones as well as
old or mixed, are good laws where there are not good arms, and
where there are good arms there must be good laws ....
Niccol6 Machiavelli
20 1
Thrice is he armed that hath his quarreljust; And four times he who
gets his fist in fust.
Josh Billings
202
Whereas the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense justifies the re-
sort to force in anticipation of an imminent armed attack out of neces-
sity, where the threat is so great that no moment for deliberation is
possible, the use of force-in the absence of an imminent threat-
that is intended to destroy the potential that an enemy may pose a
future threat is termed "preventive war."20 3 The Bush Doctrine, ar-
Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7
(Sept. 25).
200 Very few scholars maintain that the Bush Doctrine is more than simply a robust
restatement of the right to anticipatory self-defense and that it represents something
much more contentious, i.e., the "public[ ] embrac[e]" of the right to engage in pre-
ventive war. Sapiro, supra note 16, at 599 n.4.
201 NIccoLo MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 48 (Harvey C. Mansfield trans., Univ. Chi.
Press 1985) (1513).
202 Josh Billings, GIGA Quotes by Author, at http://www.giga-usa.com/gigawebl/
quotes2/quautbillingsjoshxOO.htm (last visited May 6, 2004). Josh Billings is the
pseudonym of U.S. humorist Henry Wheeler Shaw (1818-1885).
203 Efraim Inbar, The "No Choice War" Debate in Israe, 12 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 22,
34-35 (1989); see also RICHARD N. HAAss, INTERVENTION: THE USE OF AMERICAN MILI-
TARY POWER IN THE POsT-COLD WAR WORLD 51-52 (1999) (distinguishing preventive
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ticulated in the National Security Strategy, 204 prominent presidential
addresses, and the statements of senior officials, 20 5 is effectively a uni-
lateral U.S. assertion of the right to engage in preventive war. Al-
though "[iut has taken almost a decade for [the United States] to
comprehend the true nature of th[e] new threat"20 6 posed by the
proliferation of WMD to irrational enemies endowed with the "capa-
bility to blackmail US," 2 0 7 and the "catastrophic power" to emerge
from concealment to inflict "wanton destruction" without warning, 208
the Bush Doctrine contends that the United States is compelled, in
light of the capabilities and intentions of their adversaries-a threat
matrix even more hazardous than that posed by the Soviet Union 2 9 -
to abandon their traditional "reactive posture" and replace outmoded
standards for evaluating the lawfulness of self-defense with a contem-
porary doctrine adapted to the "capabilities and objectives of today's
adversaries."21 0 Therefore, the Bush Doctrine warns that the United
States will no longer "wait for threats to fully materialize," but will take
"preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to de-
fend our lives" 211 and "deter and defend against the threat before it is
use of force, which is intended to "stop another state ... from developing a military
capability before it becomes threatening or to hobble or destroy it thereafter," from
anticipatory self-defense (otherwise termed "preemption"), which refers to the use of
force "against a backdrop of tactical intelligence or warning indicating imminent mili-
tary action by an adversary"). For an official definition of "preventive war," see U.S.
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 419 (2001), availa-
ble at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict (defining "preventive war" as a "war
initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that
to delay would involve greater risk").
204 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
205 See Addicott, supra note 18, at 780 ("'Our approach has been to aim at preven-
tion and not merely punishment. We are at war. Self-defense requires prevention
.. '") (quoting Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz).
206 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 15.
207 President George W. Bush, Remarks at Graduation Exercise of the United
States Military Academy, West Point, N.Y. (June 1, 2002), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html [hereinafter West Point
Address].
208 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 13, 15.
209 See id. at 13 (stating that the possession of WMD by terrorists, coupled with the
"greater likelihood that they will use [WMD] against us [as compared to the likeli-
hood that the Soviet Union would have done so], make today's security environment
more complex and dangerous").
210 Id. at 15.
211 West Point Address, supra note 207; see also NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra
note 8, at 15 (warning that the United States will "act preemptively" to deter and
defeat terrorists).
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unleashed." 2 12 Although the United States "will not use force in all
cases to preempt emerging threats," and although the United States
does not intend that the Bush Doctrine be employed by other states as
a "pretext for aggression," 21 3 the Bush Doctrine proclaims that the
United States will "not hesitate to ... exercise our right of self-defense
by acting preemptively, '" 214 even if "uncertainty remains as to the time and
place of the enemy's attack."
2 15
Thus, although the United States references traditional support
at customary international law for anticipatory self-defense to justify
the Bush Doctrine as simply an adaptation of longstanding U.S. sup-
port for the doctrine,2 16 and although the United States employs the
language of "anticipatory action" 2 17 and "preemptive options,"2 18 in
purporting to dispense with any obligation to support the exercise of
212 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 6.
213 Id. at 16.
214 Id. at 6.
215 Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
216 See id. ("For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suf-
fer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces
that present an imminent danger of attack."). Senior Bush Administration officials
suggest further that the Bush Doctrine is nothing more than a restatement of the U.S.
position on anticipatory self-defense that is largely consistent with the policies of prior
administrations, including those of President Clinton. See, e.g., Office of the White
House Press Secretary, Dr. Condoleeza Rice Discusses President'.s National Security
Strategy (Oct. 1, 2002), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/
20021001-6.html (suggesting that the Bush Doctrine states a policy with regard to
anticipatory self-defense that is identical to the policy adopted by the Clinton Admin-
istration, affirming the right of the U.S. to resort to anticipatory self-defense in the
1994 crisis with North Korea). Analysis of the statements of Clinton Administration
officials lends credence to the claim that the United States subscribed to the doctrine
of preventive war long before the advent of the Bush Doctrine. See The Administra-
tion's Missile Defense Program and the ABM Treaty: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. 88 (2001) (statement of Secretary of Defense William J.
Perry) (proposing that, in conjunction with a ballistic missile defense system, the
United States establish the policy "that we will attack the launch sites of any nation
that threatens to attack the U.S. with nuclear or biological weapons"). In fact, the
earliest embrace of the doctrine of preventive war as a pillar of U.S. defense policy
may well reach back nearly two decades to the Reagan Administration, when Secretary
of State Shultz advocated the "use [of] force to prevent or preempt future attacks," to
"retaliate" against prior attacks, and to defeat "those states that support, train or har-
bor terrorists ...." George Schultz, Address to the National Defense University, Low-
Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity (Jan. 15, 1986), in 25 I.L.M. 204, 206
(1986).
217 See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 15 ( "The greater the threat,
the greater is the risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking antic-
ipatory action to defend ourselves . ).
218 Id. at 16.
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force in self-defense with evidence demonstrating the imminence of
an armed attack, the Bush Doctrine invites application to circum-
stances where threats are neither operational, nor at all certain to
ripen into attacks on the United States, nor otherwise amenable to
proof by objective evidence in a manner sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirements of even a relaxed Caroline standard. As such it would be
disingenuous to cast the Bush Doctrine as a variant of anticipatory
self-defense; rather, it must be understood as an assertion of the right
to engage in preventive war predicated upon the policy judgment that
war with terrorists and rogue states is inevitable or at least probable,
219
that delay redounds to the benefit of terrorists and to the detriment of
innocent civilians, and that failure to act preventively may mean the
loss of the last best chance to prevent tremendous destruction on a
scale not heretofore witnessed. Although the Bush Administration
has not yet been forced to defend the specific question whether the
Bush Doctrine and its exposition of the doctrine of preventive war are
consistent with international legal obligations under the Charter, the
March 2003 intervention in Iraq sparked academic debate as to
whether preventive war, rather than the proclaimed enforcement of
Security Council resolutions, was the legal basis upon which the
United States had undertaken military operations. 220 Even if it is un-
clear that the future application of the Bush Doctrine will "stand the
Charter on its head,"221 the public pronouncement that U.S. strategy
is constructed upon a theoretical foundation that trumpets the doc-
trine of preventive war is indeed a "militant and highly transformative
assertion" 222 that dramatically transcends the parameters of anticipa-
tory self-defense,. and therefore demands legal justification indepen-
dent of this latter doctrine. Natural law, as the next Part
demonstrates, supports the proposition that under limited circum-
stances preventive war, and thus the Bush Doctrine, is consistent with
international legal obligations even in the Charter era, inasmuch as
the Bush Doctrine restates a general principle of law immune from
derogation even by the Charter.
219 See Franck, supra note 16, at 619 (describing the Bush Doctrine as having sub-
stituted an imminence requirement for a "balancing of reasonable probabilities").
220 See supra note 16.
221 Franck, supra note 16, at 619.
222 Id.; see also Patrick McLain, Note, Settling the Score with Saddam: Resolution 1441
and Parallel Justifications for the Use of Force Against Iraq, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
233, 278 (2003) (condemning the Bush Doctrine as a "dramatic departure[ ] from
the existing international law that governs the use of force").
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III. NATURAL LAW AND THE DOCTRINE OF PREVENTIVE WAR
For if a man finds his enemy, will he let him go well away?
1 Samuel 24:19223
A. Introduction
For millennia, philosophers have propounded and defended the
notion that there exists a set of absolute and universal rules or
precepts that, although ascertainable or discoverable by the deductive
exercise of human reason, binds mankind and the political communi-
ties instituted to govern the affairs of men on earth, trumping any
inconsistent rules by virtue of its intrinsic moral merit.224 Natural
law, 225 an immediate and eternal expression of the principles of rights
and justice that, though gleaned from observation of the natural uni-
verse and referenced as the "ultimate origin of law" and the "begin-
ning of moral life proper,"226 long antedates the origin of man,22 7 and
is effectively "super-law." By the contrivance of man-made institutions,
natural law is forced into conflict with positive sources of regulation
that are out of harmony with natural reason or that represent the "ar-
bitrary construction of opinion"228 or base assertions of power. Natu-
223 1 Samuel 24:19.
224 See Beres, supra note 84, at 328 n.31 (tracing the development of natural law
from ancient Hebraic philosophers through the Greeks and Romans to the present).
225 The term lex aeterna is sometimes used to refer to natural law, although the
latter is better understood as a subset of the former inasmuch as the lex aeterna in-
cludes universal principles of "cosmic reason" that human reason has yet to discover.
See Louis Ren6 Beres, The Oslo Agreements in International Law, Natural Law, and World
Politics, 14 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 715, 728 (1997). Despite its ancient lineage,
natural law, for reasons discussed below, is "almost as foreign to American legal con-
sciousness of the twenty-first century as honor," and thus the term requires some elab-
oration. See Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95
AM.J. INT'L L. 313, 326 (2001).
226 A.P. D'ENTRVES, NATURAL LAw 122 (1951).
227 See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 5 (1955) ("[Natural law] principles were made by no human hands"
and either "antedate deity itself" or else "so express its nature as to bind and control
it."); Louis Ren6 Beres, International Law, Personhood and the Prevention of Genocide, 11
LOYOLA L.A. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 25, 34 (1989) ("[Natural justice's] applicability is
therefore timeless. 'Not of today or yesterday its force ... It springs eternal; No man
knows its birth."') (quoting Sophocles's Antigone). Although natural legal philosophy
has a branch positing that the origin of natural law stems from the expressed will of a
divine creator, another branch contends that, even in the absence of a divinity, the
authority of natural law is rooted in the objective analysis of the natural order of the
universe, from which generalizations can be drawn, and that the origin of this natural
order is not relevant for purposes of establishing the authority of natural law.
228 Beres, supra note 227, at 35.
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ral law not only prevails over the "will of human governors" but rejects
utterly the notion that such contrary statements of obligation have the
force of law.229 Put very simply, natural legal philosophy, the supreme
source of normative guidance for and judgment of human conduct,
demarcates the legal universe, affirmatively prescribes rights and du-
ties,230 and defines the limits of our legal reach in insisting that
"[o] nly good laws are laws. And for a law to be good, it must be based,
in one way or another, upon natural law. 'If a human law is at vari-
ance with natural law it is no longer legal.'
231
B. Intellectual History
The natural law tradition found its earliest expression among the
ancient Israelites, for whom the Torah, as the literal word of God,
stood as the sole and unambiguous basis of legal obligations. 232 To
the extent religious scholars imputed to the Torah obligations not evi-
dent from the words themselves, Jewish law treated these scholarly
analyses not as new sources of law but as revelations of law "already
given to Moses on Mount Sinai. '233 For the ancient Greeks natural
law was the universal font of all human laws, 234 and human laws con-
trary to natural law were of no legal force. 235 In ancient Rome natural
law prescribed universal rules of right and wrong, and positive laws,
known as lex scripta, at variance with the "true" law were not to be
regarded as law. 236 To preserve the conformity of Roman law to natu-
ral reason, the Roman lex scripta incorporated saving clauses to the
effect that statutory enactments were not intended to abrogate jus
229 See CORWIN, supra note 227, at 5 (insisting that only those "human laws" cre-
ated through the faithful "discovery and declaration" of natural law and codified as a
.record or transcript" of the same deserve recognition as law).
230 Natural law creates both negative and positive rights and duties. See Christian
Thomasius, Fundamenta Iuris Naturae et Gentium, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (W. Has-
tie trans., 1887) (distinguishing natural law as a source of affirmative and negative
obligations and rights). For a discussion of affirmative natural legal duties in the
context of self-defense under international law, see infra Part IV.
231 D'ENTREVES, supra note 226, at 81-82 (citation omitted).
232 See generally AARON M. SCHREVER, JEqSH LAw AND DECISION-MAKING (1979)
(discussing ancient Jewish law).
233 Beres, supra note 225, at 727 n.52 (citing Talmud Megillah 74d).
234 See id. at 727 ("For all human laws are nourished by one, which is divine.")
(citing HERMANN DIELS & WALTHER KRANz, DIE FRAGMENTE DER VORSOKRATIKER
(Weidmann ed., 1966).
235 See 3 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 11 (B. Jowett trans., 4th ed. 1953) (arguing
that, from the perspective of Plato, laws contrary to natural law were not worthy of
being obeyed)
236 CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, DE LEGiUS 385 (Clinton Walker Keyes trans., 1948).
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naturale (natural law) ,237 and Roman lawyers drew upon such clauses
to defend jus naturale against legislative assaults upon its
supremacy.
23 8
Christian scholars elaborated a strong association between natu-
ral law and universal moral principles:23 9 positive laws or customs that
did not mirror the substantive justice and morality of the eternal or
divine law were not true law2 40 and were denied any legal effect.
24 1
The first principle of natural law was very simply "to do good and to
avoid evil." 242 For Christian natural legal theorists, the duty of obedi-
ence to secular authority extended only insofar as the "order ofjustice
require [d] ,"and Christians were obliged to abandon allegiance to rul-
ers who "command[ed] things to be done which are unjust. ' 2 43 In
turn, Enlightenment scholars developed a theory of natural law pre-
mised upon the argument that the exercise of natural reason led ine-
luctably to the conclusion that Creation 24 4 had invested each
individual with an equal body of inalienable rights and liberties and
237 CORWIN, supra note 227, at 12.
238 The Roman Senator and lawyer Marcus Tullius Cicero offered the quintessen-
tial assertion of the imperviousness of jus naturale to positive law and of the duty of
legislators not to attempt to derogate from this supreme source of law: "It is a sin to
try to alter [natural] law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is
impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or
people . . . " CICERO, supra note 236, at 211.
239 Christian natural legal theorists posited that certain universal moral principles
were superior to and not abrogable by the parochial customs and laws of princes and
secular rules. SeeJOHN DICKINSON, THE STATEMAN'S BOOK OF JOHN OF SALISBURY 33
(1927) (" [T] here are certain precepts of law which have perpetual necessity, having
the force of law among all nations and which absolutely cannot be broken with impu-
nity.") (quoting John of Salisbury); see generally JEAN BODIN, THE Six BooKEs OF A
COMMONWEALE (Kenneth Douglas McRae ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1962) (1577) (con-
ceding that natural law imposes moral limits on the expression of state sovereignty).
240 ST. AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL 8-12 (Thomas Williams trans.,
1993) (setting forth the concept that people are only obliged to follow that law which
is derived from the eternal law).
241 D'ENTRjVES, supra note 226, at 34 ("Natural law absolutely prevails in dignity
over customs and constitutions. Whatever has been recognized by usage, or laid down
in writing, if it contradicts natural law, must be considered null and void.").
242 o'ENTRtvEs, supra note 226, at 80-81.
243 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. 2, Q. 91, arts. 1-2, at 996-97 (Fa-
thers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947) (1258).
244 Natural legal philosophers of the eighteenth century developed a somewhat
secularized theory of natural law that allowed agnostics to substitute Nature in the
stead of a divinity as the source of order, justice, and human obligation without dis-
turbing the central precepts of the theory. See Beres & Tsiddon-Chatto, supra note
155, at 498 n.30 (discussing the parallel development of a secular theory of natural
law).
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obligated every other person in the "state of nature," and by extension
each state, to accord reciprocal respect to these rights and liberties.
245
Those who trespassed against this fundamental law of nature declared
themselves beyond "that measure God has set to the actions of
men,"2 46 and the inevitable attempts to abrogate these divinely or-
dained rights and liberties by legislative or executive action, whether
at the level of the state or by agreement between states, inevitably
foundered upon the immutable shoals of natural legal command.
247
The natural legal concepts that positive law is subject to and lim-
ited by a superior source of law, and that individuals are not obligated
to obey commands of sovereigns that transgress rules and principles
revealed by reasoned study of a divine or natural purpose, exerted
potent influence upon the subsequent development of the positive
legal frameworks of a number of leading states, as well as of the
emerging positive international legal order, beginning in the late sev-
enteenth century.2 48 To underscore the depth of natural legal hostil-
245 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 93 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1991) (1651) ("And therefore there be some Rights, which no man can be under-
stood by any words, or other signes to have abandoned, or transferred."); JOHN
LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 271 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690) ("The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges
every one: and Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it,
that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life,
Health, Liberty, or Possessions.").
246 LocKE, supra note 245, at 272.
247 In the words of eighteenth century Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel:
Since, therefore, the necessary Law of Nations consists in applying the
natural law to States, and since the natural law is not subject to change, be-
ing founded on the nature of things and particularly upon the nature of
man, it follows that the necessary Law of Nations is not subject to change.
Since this law is not subject to change and the obligations which it im-
poses are necessary and indispensable, Nations cannot alter it by agreement,
nor individually or mutually release themselves from it.
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAw OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATuRAL LAw 4
(photo. reprint 1995) (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916).
248 The work of eighteenth century British jurists and social scientists suggests that
the English common law regarded international law as a species of natural law-and
therefore a part of the domestic law-that bound all individuals and states consistent
with the principle that natural law resided at the apex of the hierarchy of sources of
law both domestic and international. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66,
73 (stating that international law was "deducible by natural reason," and that each
state is expected "to aid and enforce the law of nations, as part of the common law; by
inflicting an adequate punishment upon offenses against that universal law"); ADAM
SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 340-41 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. MacFie eds.,
Clarendon Press 1976) (1759) ("Every system of positive law may be regarded as a
more or less imperfect attempt towards a system of natural jurisprudence ...."). In
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ity to pure positivism, one need only reference the Nazi Nuremburg
laws and the concentration camps, monstrosities which were "legal" in
the positivist, but not even remotely so in the naturalist, sense of the
word.
C. Self-Defense Under Natural Law
The question of the right to undertake preventive measures in
self-defense has garnered much analysis within the natural law canon.
The Torah exonerates the potential victim of a robbery who responds
by killing the would-be attacker prior to the commission of the
planned crime. 249 The Roman jurist Cicero, although addressing the
question in the context of the individual right to self-defense, 250 in-
sisted that under natural law "every means of securing our safety is
honourable" if "our life be in danger from plots, or of open violence,
or from the weapons of robbers or enemies," including preventive
measures. 251 For English philosopher Thomas Hobbes it was incon-
ceivable that it could be "against the dictates of true reason for a man
the United States, the Declaration of Independence reflected a commitment to the
natural legal principle, also recognized as a principle of international law known as
self-determination, that a people possess the right of revolution whenever a sovereign
becomes destructive of inalienable ights invested in them by the "Laws of Nature and
of Nature's God...." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). More-
over, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution reflects commitment to the Lock-
ean notion that a transcendent body of international law forms part of the nation's
law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI ("[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding."). For a discussion of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the U.S. Constitution as having established a natural legal framework
for the United States, see generally CORWIN, supra note 227. For an exposition of the
relationship of natural law to international law as well as domestic law, see infra Part
V.
249 See Exodus 22:2 ("If a thief be found breaking up, and be smitten that he die,
there shall no blood be shed for him."). Rabbinical commentaries on this passage
state further that "if a man comes to slay you, forestall by slaying him!" Beres, supra
note 31, at 264 (quoting Talmud Sanhedrin 72a).
250 Contemporary scholars suggest that Cicero's argument in favor of preventive
self-defense applies by extension to states on the theory that if "individuals have such
great latitude in protecting their personal lives, how much greater is the latitude of a
state in preserving its collective 'life?'" Louis Rena Beres, On International Law and
Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 31 n.60 (1994).
251 In The Speech of M.T7 Cicero In Defence of Titus Annius Milo, in 3 ORATIONS OF
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 394 (C. D. Yonge trans., 1911), Cicero offered the following
words in defense of his client against the charge of murder:
But if there be any occasion on which it is proper to slay a man,-and
there are many such,-surely that occasion is not only a just one, but even a
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to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his Body, and the
Members thereof from death,"2 52 as men did not have the freedom to
voluntarily surrender their divinely granted natural rights to life and
liberty. Thus, although the first "Fundamentall Law of Nature" re-
quired men to "seek Peace, and follow it," the "Second, the summe of
the Right of Nature," permitted men "[b]y all means we can, to de-
fend our selves." 253 Where presented with a choice between evils-
death or the use of force to prevent death-"man by nature chooseth
the lesser evil." 254 John Locke further elaborated the Hobbesian rec-
ognition of a "State of War" triggering the natural right to use preven-
tive force against a "setled Design, upon another Mans Life."
255
Moreover, for Locke the natural right to self-defense, including the
right to engage in preventive force in self-preservation, extended be-
yond the intended victim to all others who would join in the defense
of the innocent: "a criminal, who having renounced Reason. . . hath
* . . declared War against all Mankind ... ,"256 By their very designs
that ran counter to the restraints imposed by natural law, aggressors
necessary one, when violence is offered, and can only be repelled by vio-
lence ....
What is the meaning of our retinues, what of our swords? Surely it
would never be permitted to us to have them if we might never use them.
This, therefore, is a law, 0 judges, not written, but born with us,-which we
have not learnt, or received by tradition, or read, but which we have taken
and sucked in and imbibed from nature herself; a law which we were not
taught, but to which we were made,-which we were not trained in, but
which is ingrained in us,-namely, that if our life be in danger from plots, or
from open violence, or from the weapons of robbers or enemies, every
means of securing our safety is honourable. For laws are silent when arms
are raised, and do not expect themselves to be waited for, when he who waits
will have to suffer an undeserved penalty before he can exact a merited
punishment.
Id.
252 THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIvE 47 (Howard Warrender ed., 1983) (1651)
253 HOBBES, supra note 245, at 91-92.
254 Id. at 98.
255 LocKE, supra note 245, at 278.
256 Id. at 274. In other words, the right to exercise preventive force against a
planned attack is both an individual and a group right.
[When a party declares] by Word or Action, not a passionate and hasty, but a
sedate settled Design, upon another Mans Life, [he] puts him[self] in a
State of War with him against whom he has declared such an Intention, and
so has exposed his Life to the others Power to be taken away by him, or any
one thatjoyns with him in his Defence, and espouses his Quarrel: it being
reasonable and just I should have a Right to destroy that which threatens me
with Destruction. For by the Fundamental Law of Nature, Man being to be
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forfeited their right to life and liberty and merited destruction just as
did other "Beasts of Prey."25 7 The current domestic laws of many
states regarding the right of individual self-defense continue to reflect
the influence of natural law in their tolerance for the exercise of mea-
sures of preventive force against potential aggressors even in the ab-
sence of an objective, imminent threat.
258
preserved, as much as possible, when all cannot be preserv'd, the safety of
the Innocent is to be preferred ....
Id. at 278-79.
257 Id. at 279:
[O]ne may destroy a Man who makes War upon him, or has discovered an
Enmity to his being, for the same Reason, that he may kill a Wolf or a Lyon;
because such Men are not under the ties of the Common Law of Reason,
have no other Rule, but that of Force and Violence, and so may be treated as
Beasts of Prey ....
258 The principle that an individual may defend himself against an unlawful attack
so long as the force is necessary, in response to an imminent attack, and proportional
to the threatened force, has traditionally been a feature of the domestic jurispru-
dence of almost all states. See supra note 107; see also Martin E. Veinsreideris, Note,
The Prospective Effects of Modifying Existing Law to Accommodate Preemptive Self-Defense by
Battered Women, 149 U. PENN. L. REv. 613 (2000) (analyzing the elements of an individ-
ual self-defense claim under the laws of U.S. jurisdictions). The question of whether
individuals may exercise preventive force to defend against the possibility, or
probability, of future violence from a known aggressor has been much debated, often
on natural legal grounds, in recent decades. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, A Unified Ex-
cuse of Preemptive Self-Protection, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1475, 1477 (1999) (analogizing
the individual right of preventive self-defense to the right of states to anticipatory self-
defense). Battered women and children have found some success in defending
against homicide charges by asserting that "battered woman syndrome," a psychologi-
cal condition diminishing capacity caused by the chronic abuse meted out by the
batterer, constitutes a defense to an otherwise unlawful exercise of preventive force.
See Lauren E. Goldman, Note, Nonconfrontational Killings and the Appropriate Use of Bat-
tered Child Syndrome Testimony: The Hazards of Subjective Self-Defense and the Merits of Par-
tial Excuse, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 185, 188-89 (1994) (surveying this trend).
Nevertheless, the right of individual preventive self-defense, particularly as applied to
the question of the domestic abuse of women or culturally based defenses to homi-
cide, along with the canons of interpretation of elements such as imminence and
proportionality, remains much contested in the U.S. legal academy and in U.S. courts.
See generally ROBERT F. SCHOPP, JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES ANDJUST CONVICTIONS (1998);
Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liber-
als' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1996) (discussing cultural defenses to homi-
cide); Loraine Patricia Eber, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or to Be Killed, 32
HAsTINGs L.J. 895 (1981) (surveying sociological studies of battered women). Some
commentators reject the lawfulness of the preventive use of force by individuals in
terms similar to restrictivists on the subject of anticipatory self-defense, holding that
in the absence of a "visible manifestation of aggression" preventive strikes are
"grounded in a prediction of how the feared enemy is likely to behave in the future,"
a standard rife with possibilities for abuse. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-
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The founders of the modern international legal regime paid
homage to natural law generally, 259 and specifically with regard to
their analyses regarding the right of states to self-defense. Hugo Gro-
tius made direct reference to the self-defense arguments developed by
Cicero 260 and ancient Greek authors when articulating a natural law
exception to the general proposition that a declaration must precede
the initiation of war:
[As] Cicero explains, this Uustification for extra-legal warfare] exists
whenever he who chooses to wait [for legal authorization] will be
obliged to pay an unjust penalty before he can exact a just penalty;
and in a general sense, it exists whenever matters do not admit of
delay.... For-as Aelian says, citing Plato as his authority-any war
undertaken for the necessary repulsion of injury, is proclaimed not
by a crier nor by a herald but by the voice of Nature herself.26 1
In so doing, Grotius implied the fundamental right of state self-
defense at natural law to undertake not only what might be under-
stood presently as measures of anticipatory self-defense but also pre-
ventive measures designed "to kill him who is making ready to kill." 262
Leading lights of international law such as Alberico Gentili, 263 Em-
merich de Vattel, 264 and Samuel von Pufendorf recognized that states
were not obligated to "receive the first blow, or merely avoid and parry
those aimed at [them]" but were rather entitled, at natural law, to
DEFENSE: BERNLARD GOETZ AND THE LAw ON TRIAL 20 (1988). For an excellent discus-
sion of the relationship of natural law to the contemporary law of individual self-
defense in the U.S., see Alexander, supra.
259 See HUGo GROTIUs, DE JuRE BELLI AC PAcIs LIBRI TRES 39 (Francis W. Kelsey
trans., 1925) (1625):
The law of nature is a dictate of right reason, which points out that an act,
according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a
quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and that, in consequence, such
an act is either forbidden or enjoined by the author of nature, God.
260 See supra note 238.
261 HUGO GROTIUs, DE JURE PRAEDE COMMENTARIUS, reprinted in 22 THE CLASSICS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 96 (James Brown Scott ed., 1950) (1604).
262 GROTIUS, supa note 259, at 176.
263 See ALBERICO GENTILI, DE IuRE BELLI LIBRi TRES, reprinted in 16 THE CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 261, at 58 (1612) (commenting that natural law per-
mitted a defensive attack by a threatened state).
264 According to eighteenth century Swiss scholar Vattel,
[t]he safest plan is to prevent evil, where that is possible. A Nation has the
right to resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and to use force...
against the aggressor. It may even anticipate the other's design, being care-
ful, however, not to act upon vague and doubtful suspicions, lest it run the
risk of becoming itself the aggressor.
VAT-rEL, supra note 247, at 130.
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engage in preventive war "even though [an enemy] has not yet fully
revealed his intentions ".... 265 The sole limitations these commenta-
tors recognized upon the natural right of states to engage in preven-
tive war in self-defense provided that peaceful remedies be either
exhausted, fruitless, or likely to compromise effective defense by ap-
prising the aggressor of preventive efforts underway.2 66
Subsequent scholars carried forward and incorporated the natu-
ral law doctrine of preventive war into the domestic jurisprudence of
their respective states. Thomas Jefferson, one of the principal legal
architects of the United States, held that the natural law of self-de-
fense "control [led] the written laws," 2 6 7 and thus irrespective of any
domestic or international laws governing the resort to force and
whatever treaty obligations the United States had incurred, 268 the
United States bore not merely the right but the "[m]oral dut[y]" and
265 2 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE OFFICIO HOMINIS ET CMis JUXTA LEGEM
NATURALEM LIBRI Duo [ON THE Dun' OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO THE NATU-
RAL LAW] 32 (Frank Gardner trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1927) (1682). According to
Pufendorf,
where it is quite clear that the other is already planning an attack upon me,
even though he has not yet fully revealed his intentions, it will be permitted
at once to begin forcible self-defense, and to anticipate him who is preparing
mischief.... [T]he excuse of self-defense will be his, who by quickness shall
overpower his slower assailant.
Id.
266 See, e.g., id. (requiring exhaustion of peaceful remedies prior to exercise of the
right to anticipatory self-defense unless "there be no hope that, when admonished in
a friendly spirit, [the enemy] may put off his hostile temper; or if such admonition be
likely to injure our cause").
267 Letter from Thomas Jefferson, toJ.B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 607 (Adrienne Kock & William Peden eds.,
1944).
268 Although "[clompacts ... between nation & nation are obligatory on them by
the same moral law which obliges individuals to observe their compacts," and al-
though treaties created the same "[m] oral duties" between states that existed between
individuals under natural law, for Jefferson there were "circumstances . . . which
sometimes excuse[d] the non-performance of contracts . . . between nation & na-
tion." THOMASJEFFERSON, Opinion on the French Treaties, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF
THOMASJEFFERSON 113-14 (Merril D. Peterson ed., 1993). Where performance was
rendered impossible or "self-destructive to [a] party, the law of self-preservation over-
rules the laws of obligation to others." Id. at 114. It would thus appear self-evident
that for Jefferson the obligation to defend the United States would prevail in a con-
flict with a treaty or other domestic law. In his own words, "a treaty pernicious to the
state is null, & not at all obligatory; no governor of a nation having power to engage
things capable of destroying the state, for the safety of which the empire is trusted to
him." Id. at 115.
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"indispensable obligation" to engage in preventive war where neces-
sary to ensure "its preservation and safety."
269
D. Erosion of Natural Law by Legal Positivism
1. Generally
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the legal philosophy
of positivism began to emerge as the regnant paradigm in interna-
tional law, incrementally banishing the natural legal principle that
manmade laws inconsistent with the dictates of reason deduced from
observation of the divinely orchestrated natural world were of no legal
force. Positivism substituted the manifested will of sovereign states as
the exclusive source and form of international legal norms. 270 For the
positivist, law is not a rough attempt to codify reason or justice, but is
rather the "command of the sovereign" backed by the threat of sanc-
tions in the absence of compliance: 271 positivism supplants reason as
the source of legal obligation with "fear; fear of violence, fear of lost
liberty, advantage or amenity, or fear of social disapproval. '" 272 With
the origins of positivism and the displacement of natural law from
atop the hierarchy of sources of norms, the invocation of higher prin-
ciples of reason and justice as authoritative sources no longer reliably
restrained the political preferences of states in their international rela-
tions, and by the turn of the twentieth century the maturation of posi-
tivism had "bled the law white" by rendering state consent the sole
criterion for adjudging the validity of norms in international rela-
tions.273 In its mildest forms, positivism is merely agnostic to the no-
tion that specific enactments are intended as vehicles for the
expression of moral content;274 in its more extreme versions, positiv-
269 JEFFERSON, supra note 268, at 114-15 ("The nation itself, bound necessarily to
whatever it's preservation & safety require, cannot enter into engagements contrary to
it's indispensable obligations.").
270 See generally Stephen Hall, The Persistent Spectre: Natural Law, International Order
and the Limits of Legal Positivism, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 269 (2001) (defining and distin-
guishing positivism from natural law in the development of international law).
271 SeeJOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 27 (Wilfrid E.
Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832) (elaborating the command theory
of positivism, which holds that law is but the command of the sovereign rather than a
statement of morality or a pathway to justice).
272 Hall, supra note 270, at 279.
273 CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW Vii
(P.E. Corbett trans., 1968).
274 Some commentators suggest that so great is positivism's adherence to the prin-
ciple of state sovereignty and its neglect of other bases for normative judgment that
for positivists the very act of asserting state sovereignty through domestic legislative
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ism eschews entirely the proposition that law and morality ought to be
drawn into any relationship whatsoever, 275 and proceeds to assert as
lawful the pursuit of state objectives with utter indifference to the nat-
ural justice, or absence thereof, appurtenant to state practice. 276 For
the most committed positivists, the self-defense of states is at best a
limited right, rather than a duty, and as such it is susceptible to qualifi-
cation and regulation.
277
2. The Positivist Attack on Natural Law in International Relations,
and the Natural Law Response
The philosophical changing of the guard from the justice-cen-
tered approach of natural law to sovereignty-centered positivism in
the discipline of international law and the practice of states over the
course of the last two centuries278 has not passed without remark.
Critics of positivism more generally have assailed the "undue respect
for law" it demands, particularly where positive laws have been suscep-
tible to challenge on justice grounds;279 others have registered
pointed objections to the renunciation of natural legal formulations
enactment or by treaty, without regard to the substantive content of the law or inter-
national agreement itself, is by definition intrinsically just. See, e.g., Beres, supra note
225, at 727-29 (describing the extreme sovereigntist bias of positivism).
275 See D'ENTRvEs, supra note 226, at 111 (stating that, in its pure form, positivism
is a "pernicious doctrine that there is no law but positive law, or that might equals
right, since for all practical purposes the two propositions are perfectly equivalent").
276 "[H]umankind has not only been indifferent to Higher Law, but has often
coupled this indifference with adherence to undiscovered 'laws' that reject justice."
Louis Rene Beres, Pollard and Arafat: An Ironic Inversion ofJustice, MACCABEAN-ONLINE,
Mar. 1997, at http://www.freeman.org/m-online/beres.htm.
277 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 162-63 ("Although the statement [that self-
defense is a duty] may reflect morality or theology, it does not comport with interna-
tional law."); M. Jaroslav Zouerek, La Notion de Legitime Defense en Droit Internationa4 56
ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUTE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1, 51 (1975) (describing self-de-
fense as optional under international law).
278 The seventeenth century French philosopher Blaise Pascal may have presaged
the rise of positivism by more than a century in commenting that "[i]t is a singular
thing to consider that there are people in the world who, having renounced all the
laws of God and nature, have made laws for themselves which they strictly obey...."
BLAISE PASCAL, THOUGHTS § 393, at 131 (Charles W. Eliot ed., W.F. Trotter trans.,
Collier Press 1910) (1660). However, positivism did not displace natural law from its
theoretical dominance in international law until the nineteenth century. See FREDER-
ICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN THE LAW 63 (1922) (noting that "all authorities down to the
end of the eighteenth century ... have treated [international law] as a body of doc-
trine derived from and justified by the Law of Nature").
279 See, e.g., HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND CML DISOBEDIENCE 225 (Owen
Thomas ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1966) (1849).
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and the unquestioning devotion adherents of positivism grant to "un-
discovered 'laws' that reject justice. '" 28 0 Critics of the erosion of natu-
ral law as the philosophical basis for international legal theory have
excoriated the turn, wrought by positivism, away from the exercise of
human reason and the participation of individuals possessed of ina-
lienable rights in the (re)discovery of principles of eternal and immu-
table justice.
28 l
Natural law jurisprudence has enjoyed a revival of sorts towards
the end of the twentieth century as a number of scholars, particularly
in the fields of human rights and international relations theory, have
demanded that international law be reintroduced to justice and mo-
rality and reconfigured to provide a more secure legal foundation for
the expression and protection of inalienable rights-known alterna-
tively as "natural rights" or "human rights." 2 2 For "new natural law"
theorists, there are limits to lawmaking: states, although sovereign and
the authors of domestic law, are no more free to "transform a moral
wrong into a human right" than they are to criminalize the exercise of
human rights, and considerations of justice, along with the applica-
tion of practical reason to collective social problems by "free, rational
and moral ... beings," will require the restructuring of legal relation-
ships between individuals, between individuals and states, and be-
tween states. 283  Nevertheless, although the pendulum of
international legal theory may be once again swinging in the direction
of natural legal philosophy, positivism is ascendant, and international
law is arid terrain for the assertion and defense of norms, principles,
and rules derived from the exercise of human reason and informed by
considerations of universal justice and morality.
28 4
E. General Principles of International Law: Repository for Natural Legal
Principles in the Contemporary International Legal Regime
Although the Charter, acting as a collective sovereign, elaborates
on behalf of the international community a series of textual proscrip-
280 Beres, supra note 276.
281 See, e.g., SHERSTON BAKER, FIRST STEPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 16 (Boston, Lit-
tIe, Brown & Co. 1899);JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-15 (2d ed. 1910).
282 For an excellent analysis of scholarship in what has come to be known as "new
natural law" theory, see, for example, ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW
(1999); and JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
283 For a discussion of the invigoration of natural legal philosophy in the field of
human rights, see Hall, supra note 270, at 301-07 (explaining that the "new natural
law" school challenges the theoretical foundations of the power of states to "hinder[ ]
or prevent[ ] the enjoyment of ... natural rights").
284 See generally id.
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tions and prescriptions often seemingly devoid of natural legal con-
tent, it is not at all evident that Articles 2(4) and 51 either create or
recognize an absolute and authoritative prohibition on the resort of
states to preventive measures of force, including preventive war.
There is, at the very least, a fluid and vigorous debate whether the
right of states at customary international law to engage in measures of
force in anticipation of an imminent threat survives into the Charter
era. Although the doctrine of preventive war, which is predicated not
upon an imminent threat but rather authorizes the use of force to end
an incipient threat that has not yet matured into an imminent attack,
requires a basis of legal legitimization broader than that supporting
the narrower doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, natural law, as the
preceding analysis demonstrates,justifies force in self-defense even ab-
sent perfect information as to an enemy's intention, and authorizes
the destruction of those who are merely preparing for a future attack
at a date and time uncertain and with whom negotiation would be
pointless. While the Charter framework is on its face a positivist in-
strument, the Statute of the International Court ofJustice elaborates a
more pluralist theoretical foundation: Article 38 recognizes, in addi-
tion to treaties and customary international law, that "general princi-
ples of law recognized by civilized nations" are cognizable as sources




General principles of law provide "a reservoir from which appar-
ent gaps in the corpus of international law may be filled," and "rein-
force the view that international law should properly be regarded as a
'complete system,' i.e., that every international situation is capable of
being determined as a matter of law." 286 Their purpose is not limited
to gap-filling, however. The argument that these "general principles,"
which number among them, inter alia, the denial of legal liability in
the absence of fault, the defense of estoppel, the "clean hands" doc-
trine, the freedom to contract, a concept of due process that includes
the right to be heard, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the
principle that no party ought to be a judge in his own case, 287 are
derived from, and reflect the influence of, natural legal theory has
285 Statute of the International Court ofJustice, supra note 30, art. 38, 59 Stat. at
1060, 3 Bevans at 1187.
286 Hall, supra note 270, at 296-97.
287 FINNIS, supra note 282, at 288-89 (listing general principles of international
law); see also ADVIsoRY COMM. OF JURISTS, PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUS-
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gained adherents in recent years.288 At least one scholar contends
that the "very existence of general principles as a source of law indi-
cates that treaty and custom do not provide an exhaustive source of
legal norms in international law," suggesting further that the general
principles of international law referenced in the Statute of the ICJ are
in fact principles and norms of natural law.28 9 No less authoritative a
forum than the International Court ofJustice has offered validation to
the notion that these general principles are indeed norms and rules
of natural law for which positivism must make room; as Justice Kotaro
Tanaka stated in the Southwest Africa Cases:
[I]t is undeniable that in Article 38, paragraph 1(c), some natural
law elements are inherent. It extends the concept of the source of
international law beyond the limit of legal positivism according to
which, the States being bound only by their own will, international
law is nothing but the law of the consent and auto-limitation of the
State. But this viewpoint, we believe, was clearly overruled by Article
38, paragraph 1(c) .... 290
2. Preventive War as a General Principle of International Law
The U.N. Charter does not explicitly prohibit the resort to pre-
ventive war. Articles 2(4) and 51 are susceptible to restrictivist and
pragmatist interpretations, just as they are in respect to the doctrine
of anticipatory self-defense. 291 Similarly, the question whether the
lawfulness of preventive war under traditional customary international
law29 2 has survived into the Charter era has been left open by diver-
gent state practice and by diverging scholarly opinion. The orthodox
methodology of international legal analysis permits the resolution of a
legal question by resort to general principles of international law
where analysis of relevant treaties and customary sources is not dispos-
TICE, PROCES-VERBAUX OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE, JUNE 16-JULY 24,
1920, at 335 (1920) (enumerating general principles).
288 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 270, at 292-97; Magenis, supra note 45, at 433-34;
Polebaum, supra note 82, at 195.
289 Hall, supra note 270, at 292.
290 Southwest Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Aft.), 1966 I.CJ. 6, 298 (July
18) (Tanaka, J., dissenting).
291 See supra Part I.B.
292 See id. Prior to the twentieth century, resort to war was largely unregulated by
law and left to the sovereign discretion of states. See supra Part I.A. The question
whether states, in the post-Charter era, may resort to force in the absence of an armed
attack is discussed extensively in Part I.B, and is answered by restrictivists in the nega-
tive without distinction as between anticipatory self-defense and preventive war, even
though the two doctrines rest upon different evidentiary standards.
2004] 1439
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
itive of the issue. The preceding discussion suggests that it is at the
very least arguable that the right of states under natural law to take all
such measures as they should deem necessary to reduce incipient
threats posed by avowed enemies to their existence, even where no
such threats are objectively imminent, continues as a general princi-
ple of international law that functions to fill the gap in the Charter era
international law governing the use of force in self-defense, and justi-
fies preventive war under some circumstances. If the Bush Doctrine is
thus merely the assertion of the natural legal right of the United
States to engage in preventive war, it ought to be received as nothing
more than a restatement of a general principle of international law
rather than as a unilateral gambit to subvert the international legal
order to American purpose. 293
The next Part will build upon the argument that the Bush Doc-
trine is a lawful assertion of the natural legal right of states to engage
in preventive force by positing that, under the U.S. Constitution and
the domestic common law, the President of the United States is im-
pressed with a duty, independent of any international legal considera-
tions, to engage in preventive war where and when he deems it
necessary to defend the nation and its people from existential threats.
IV. THE PRESIDENTIAL DUTY TO ENGAGE IN PREVENTIVE WAR: A
NATURAL LAw DEFENSE OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE
When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he
has struck before you crush him.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt 294
A. Presidential War Powers Under the U.S. Constitution
1. The Constitutional Text
Under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, the President "shall be
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and
of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service
of the United States. ''295 The President is also vested with "the execu-
tive Power"296 and charged with the duty to "take Care that the Laws
293 See supra note 216 (describing the Bush Doctrine in these terms).
294 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Fireside Chat (Sept. 11, 1941), quoted in
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND NAVAL QUOTATIONS 247 (Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. ed.,
1966).
295 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
296 Id. art. II, § 1.
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be faithfully executed,"297 and upon assuming office is required to
"solemnly swear (or affirm) that [he] will faithfully execute the office
of President of the United States, and will to the best of [his] ability,
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States."298 Despite these several textual commitments, the precise
contours of the powers and duties of the President in regard to the
use of military force have been contested since the origin of the
United States as an independent nation.
299
Advocates of legislative supremacy, fixing upon the textual com-
mitment of the power to "Declare War" to Congress under Article 1,300
have accused Presidents, particularly in the twentieth century, of wag-
ing undeclared and thus "unconstitutional wars, '30 1 and have sought
to restrain presidential independence and initiative in warmaking
through legislation; 30 2 proponents of a strong and independent exec-
297 Id. art. II, § 3.
298 Id. art. II, § 1.
299 For a discussion of this history, see generally John C. Yoo, The Continuation of
Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167
(1996).
300 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
301 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY. CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3 (1993) (contending that "all wars, big or small, 'de-
clared' in so many words or not... ha[ve] to be legislatively authorized" to be consti-
tutional); Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 26
(1990) ("The President's designation as Commander in Chief ... appears to have
implied no substantive authority to use the armed forces, whether for war (unless the
United States were suddenly attacked) or for peacetime purposes, except as Congress
directed."); Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and Responsi-
bility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1364,
1369-75 (1994) (listing sources).
302 In passing the War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2, 87 Stat. 555, 555
(1973), Congress declared its intent to
fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and
insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President
will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities,
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indi-
cated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostil-
ities or in such situations.
Id. Congress declared further that
the constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to intro-
duce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the
United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.
Id. § 2(c).
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utive have defended "energy in the executive" as "essential to the pro-
tection of the [nation] against foreign attacks. '30 3 Although the
interbranch battle over the distribution of the war powers continues
to be waged within the legal academy, two centuries of practice,
marked by the presidential employment of U.S. military forces more
than 125 times,30 4 suggests that the President and the Congress have
approximated the sort of system for the shared exercise of the power
to employ the armed forces of the United States that analyses of the
original understandings of the constitutional design indicate the
Framers intended: the President is encouraged to exercise initiative in
the use of force but Congress is granted the ultimate power to check
executive action through its powers of appropriation, statutory author-
ization, and impeachment.30 5 Moreover, the judicial branch has
largely abstained from the interbranch war power fray on political
question grounds, 30 6 recognizing that the President is entitled to the
widest margin of discretion in the exercise of his constitutionally com-
mitted and functionally essential power as the "sole organ of the na-
tion in its external relations" 30 7 and as "Commander in Chief.
'30 8
303 THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
304 See FRANcIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR:
THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 143-49 (1986) (listing instances of
what the authors term "presidential acts of war").
305 See W. Michael Reisman, War Powers: The Operational Code of Competence, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 777, 783 (1989) (describing as an "operational code of competence" the
system in which the President assumes the primary role in the initial decision to exer-
cise the war powers, Congress accepts a subordinate role in authorizing and appropri-
ating funds for military operations, and the judiciary abstains from interbranch
conflicts); Yoo, supra note 299, at 295 (advancing a similar theory of the Framers'
original intent regarding the practical exercise of the constitutional allocation of war
powers). Not all scholars describe the practical exercise of the war powers approv-
ingly. See id. at 188-89 (noting that some constitutional scholars fault the established
system as overly prone to congressional "acquiescence" in presidential faits
d'accompli).
306 For a discussion and analysis of the political question doctrine, see Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (holding thatjudicial abstention from the resolution of
a dispute is obligatory where a case presents a "textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment" of an issue to a "coordinate political department," a "lack ofjudicially
discoverable and manageable standards" to resolve the issue, an "impossibility of de-
ciding without an initial policy determination" reserved for nonjudicial decisions, an
impossibility of deciding "without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government," an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a politi-
cal decision already made," or the "potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments").
307 The seminal judicial pronouncement upon executive power, primacy, and dis-
cretion in international relations provides as follows:
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2. The Relationship with Congress: A Model of Presidential
Primacy
That the President is endowed with initiative in the employment
of the U.S. armed forces and discretion in the conduct of interna-
tional relations does not deny Congress a role in the war powers. The
War Powers Resolution signifies the congressional intent that the "col-
lective judgment of both the Congress and the President" will be
brought to bear on the question of the exercise of the war powers,
30 9
and the Supreme Court has superimposed a conceptual framework
upon the political branches that, without intruding into the arena re-
served to political questions, recognizes that presidential prerogatives
are subject to the "express or implied will of Congress," and that the
President, although the Commander in Chief, is not absolutely auton-
omous in this realm.310 Nevertheless, although the power to repel im-
Not only . . .is the federal power over external affairs in origin and
essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation
in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast external
realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation ....
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing... [with] the
very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international relations ....
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
308 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring)
(holding that Congress may not direct the conduct of campaigns, a function constitu-
tionally committed to the President under the Commander in Chief grant of power);
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863) (holding that the question of
whether and how the President employs military force as Commander in Chief "is a
question to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed by the decisions and
acts of the political department of the Government to which this power was en-
trusted"); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644-45
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that the President has the exclusive role in
commanding the military "at least when turned against the outside world for the se-
curity of our society"). For a discussion of the scope of presidential powers under the
Commander in Chief Clause, and an argument that the executive was granted mo-
nopoly power over the tactical and operational command of the U.S. armed forces,
see George K. Walker, United States National Security Law and United Nations Peacekeep-
ing or Peacemaking Operations, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 435, 472-78 (1994); for a discus-
sion of the intellectual history surrounding the question of the commitment of the
power of tactical command over the armed forces, see Yoo, supra note 299, at
198-204.
309 War Powers Resoluton, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2, 87 Stat. 555, 555 (1973).
310 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring) (analyzing presi-
dential war powers not textually conferred by the Constitution and determining that
2004] 1443
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
minent attacks or to otherwise act in defense of the United States is
not explicitly mentioned in Article II, analysis of the Framers' original
intent, a sustained pattern of executive practice and congressional ac-
quiescence, and judicial interpretation of the textual allocation of
powers conjoin in support of the argument that the President pos-
sesses a significant and exclusive measure of power to employ military
force, even absent any congressional declaration of war or statutory
authorization, where necessary to protect and defend the United
States against foreign enemies.
3 11
Read in isolation, the Commander in Chief and Executive Power
Clauses might be read narrowly to authorize the President to employ
the armed forces in defense of the United States, even during emer-
gencies, only subsequent to congressional authorization. 3 12 However,
when read in conjunction with the Take Care Clause,313 with Article
IV, Section 4, guaranteeing the states protection against invasion,
3 1 4
and Article I, Section 10, Clause 3, providing that states may engage in
war if "in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay, '315 the
(1) when the President acts consistent with the will of Congress his power is at a
zenith; (2) when the President acts in the face of congressional silence, the constitu-
tionality of his actions is in an uncertain "zone of twilight"; and (3) when the Presi-
dent acts in opposition "to the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at
its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter"); see also Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S.
(9 How.) 603, 615 (1850) ("As commander-in-chief, [the President] is authorized to
direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command,
and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and con-
quer and subdue the enemy.").
311 The roots of executive powers to act in case of emergency "according to discre-
tion for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even
against it," extend even further back in time through state constitutions, English com-
mon law, and eventually to the writings of John Locke. See Yoo, supra note 299, at
199-200 (conducting an extensive intellectual historical analysis and exposition of
common law executive prerogative in the areas of war powers and in particular the
defense of the polity during emergencies).
312 See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 303, at 418 (Alexander Hamilton) (reas-
suring critics of the proposed Constitution that even subsequent to congressional authori-
zation the President would have "nothing more than the supreme command and
direction of the military and naval forces" and not, as did the English King, the power
of declaring of war); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 38 (1993) (suggesting that congressional notification and authori-
zation is a condition subsequent to the exercise of presidential emergency powers).
313 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
314 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (providing in part that "[t]he United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall
protect each of them against Invasion").
315 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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Commander in Chief and Executive Power Clauses lead many to con-
clude that the Framers intended, in part out of efficiency considera-
tions316 and in part out of a desire to continue to accord to the
executive common law powers that had traditionally been within the
province of the branch responsible for the conduct of martial opera-
tions,3 17 that the President rather than Congress initiate military ac-
tion to fulfill this obligation.3 18 Moreover, a close textual exegesis of
the language in Article I conferring upon Congress the power to "de-
clare" rather than to "make" war represents for generations of schol-
ars a conscious and deliberate election to allocate to the President
residual emergency power to respond to foreign threats without obli-
gating him to wait, perhaps disastrously, for legislative recognition of
the de facto state of hostility.3 19 In short, it is exceedingly difficult to
conceive of the Constitution as having created a model of legislative
316 See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 303, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) ("En-
ergy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is
essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks .... "); id. at 424
("Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings
of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater
number . . ").
317 See Yoo, supra note 299, at 202-03 (suggesting that the Framers were influ-
enced by the views developed by Blackstone and Locke to the effect that the executive
should be endowed with a "broad catalogue of executive power and duties" regarding
the use of force, to include the "discretionary power of acting for the public good")
(quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 248, at *244).
318 See, e.g., W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS
39 (1981) (arguing that, after significant debate at the Constitutional Convention, the
Framers intended that the Constitution preserve in the President the power to
"respon [d] to sudden foreign attack"); Walker, supra note 308, at 478 n.288 (arguing
that the Framers intended the president to have the power to repel sudden attacks or
act in situations of imminent danger); see alsoJordan J. Paust, U.N. Peace and Security
Powers and Related Presidential Powers, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 15, 19-21 (1996)
(suggesting that the Take Care Clause would require the President, if necessary, to
employ military force to execute treaties and customary international law, which are
laws of the United States, where Congress was unwilling to act in enforcement).
319 See, e.g., ABRAHAm D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER: THE ORIGINS 31-32 (1976) (arguing that the choice of "declare" rather than
"make" reflects the decision to preserve presidential initiative in defending the nation
from attack); WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 304, at 18 (summarizing the linguistic
debate over the choice of the word "declare" rather than "make" in connection with
the war power under Article I); Charles A. Lofgren, War Making Under the Constitution:
The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 675-77 (1972) (contending that many of
the delegates in Philadelphia were of the view that the final draft of the Constitution
retained on behalf of the President the power to repel attacks); Yoo, supra note 299,
at 246-48 (examining constitutional debates and contemporaneous scholarly com-
mentary and suggesting that the use of the word "declare" connoted the largely cere-
monial act of recognition, rather than the authorization, of a state of war to the mind
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supremacy that grants the President only that warmaking power neces-
sary to execute legislative declarations of war and withholds the means
and power to respond to attack or the threat thereof without reading
the precise language chosen by the Framers out of the document.
320
3. War Powers in Practice: Congressional Acquiescence in and
Judicial Recognition of a Presidential Power to Engage in
Anticipatory Self-Defense
Moreover, presidential practice, congressional acquiescence in
that practice, and judicial review of the concord established by the
political branches has lent additional force to the argument that the
Constitution drapes the President with the power to respond unilater-
ally, at least where Congress has not acted, to defend the United States
against the threat of attack. During the Civil War, President Lincoln
ordered the blockade of Southern ports as a measure designed to pre-
vent and otherwise hinder attack on the United States and its interests
by the Confederate States of America. In the Prize Cases, the Supreme
Court upheld the seizure and condemnation of vessels in pursuit of
the blockade order against a challenge alleging that the President did
not have the inherent power to defend the United States in the ab-
sence of express congressional authorization. The Court held that the
President was not only inherently authorized but duty-bound to de-
fend the United States against attack: "If a war be made by invasion of
a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to
resist force by force. He ... is bound to accept the challenge without
waiting for any special legislative authority."3 21 The Court went on to
note that the President, in fulfilling his duty as Commander in Chief,
was the sole entity competent to determine the degree of force neces-
sary to suppress an insurrection or repel a foreign invasion. 322
of the reasonable person at the time of the framing of the Constitution, a fact that
reinforces the significance of granting Congress only this lesser power).
320 In arguing that Congress must be granted the power to maintain a standing
army in order that the President have available troops to command, Hamilton foresaw
that future threats would obligate the President to swiftly and preemptively employ
the means "by which nations anticipate distant danger and meet the gathering storm"
in order to preserve the new nation. THE FEDERALIST No. 25, supra note 303, at 165
(Alexander Hamilton). Madison, in support of the Federalist position, asserted that
the President would require the instruments necessary to make war to protect the
United States and warned the Framers against erecting "constitutional barriers to the
impulse of self-preservation." THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 303, at 257 (James
Madison).
321 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863).
322 Id. at 670.
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In a second Civil War era case, Durand v. Hollins,323 a similarly
broad construction was given to the Executive Power Clause, in re-
sponse to the question whether following lawful orders to attack a gov-
ernment threatening U.S. nationals and interests, issued by the
President to a naval officer, gives the defendant naval officer a defense
to a civil action for damages in connection with injuries arising from
the execution of the orders. 3 24 In upholding the proffered defense,
the court not only upheld executive power to engage in unauthorized
self-defense but recognized a presidential duty to afford U.S. nationals
protection for their persons and property by the prudential exercise
of measures in self-defense:
As the executive head of the nation, the president is made the only
legitimate organ of the general government .... It is to him [that]
the citizens abroad must look for protection of person and of prop-
erty, and for the faithful execution of the laws existing and intended
for their protection ....
... Acts of lawless violence, or of threatened violence to the
citizen or his property, cannot be anticipated and provided for; and
the protection, to be effectual or of any avail, may, not unfrequently
[sic], require the most prompt and decided action. Under our sys-
tem of government, the citizen abroad is as much entitled to protec-
tion as the citizen at home. The great object and duty of
government is the protection of the lives, liberty, and property of
the people composing it, whether abroad or at home; and any gov-
ernment failing in the accomplishment of the object, or the per-
formance of the duty, is not worth preserving.
32 5
Subsequent practice throughout the twentieth century, stretching
from the Korean War to the Gulf, adds additional layers of gloss upon
the constitutionality of the presidential power to act with alacrity and
firmness to protect vital U.S. interests overseas, in order to preserve
U.S. national security and afford Congress the opportunity for mean-
ingful participation.
3 26
Although the Supreme Court has never directly decided the ques-
tion of whether anticipatory self-defense is constitutional, 327 most
323 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186).
324 Id. at 111-12
325 Id.
326 See Yoo, supra note 299, at 296-98 (examining presidential practice in cases of
national emergency).
327 See Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 80, at 748 (noting that, although the
question of the constitutionality of anticipatory self-defense is 'Just starting to receive
the attention it deserves," the Supreme Court has never decided the issue). Legisla-
tive proposals to ground anticipatory self-defense on sound constitutional footing,
either by amendment to the War Powers Resolution or in other forms, have been the
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scholars concur that the Prize Cases, congressional acquiescence in
subsequent executive practice, and the practical exigencies of the con-
temporary threat environment 328 clearly support the constitutional in-
terpretation that, in the event of an invasion or other imminent harm
against U.S. citizens or property, inherent presidential powers of self-
defense-for the exercise of which the President need neither seek
nor receive congressional authorization-are triggered,3 29 even if the
President remains obligated to make a subsequent request for con-
gressional authorization of his course of action.330 In other words, the
President has the unambiguous authority, substantially equivalent to
an executive "necessary and proper" power,331 to employ military
force to defend the United States against attack or the threat thereof,
and relevant case law suggests that resort to the doctrine of anticipa-
tory self-defense is within the scope of lawful presidential authority
under such circumstances. 332 Moreover, a determination by the Presi-
occasional subject of academic, but not serious political, consideration. See, e.g., Jo-
seph R. Biden,Jr. &John B. Ritch III, The WarPower at a Constitutional Impasse: A "Joint
Decision" Solution, 77 GEO. L.J. 367, 398 (1988) (proposing to create a "joint decision
framework" that would "confirm" presidential inherent authority to use force even
absent legislative participation to, inter alia, "respond to a foreign military threat that
severely and directly jeopardizes the supreme national interests of the United States
under extraordinary emergency conditions" and "to forestall an imminent act of in-
ternational terrorism known to be directed against citizens or nationals of the United
States").
328 See Bobbitt, supra note 301, at 1382 ("In a world in which many foreign states
have the power to attack U.S. forces-and some even the U.S. mainland-almost in-
stantly, it is impractical to require the President to seek advance authorization to use
force.").
329 See Yost, supra note 115, at 429 & nn.74-76 (surveying relevant literature). A
minority of scholars read the Prize Cases more narrowly for the proposition that unilat-
eral presidential warmaking authority is limited to invasions of the United States or an
attack on U.S. interests, thereby rejecting entirely the argument that the Constitution
grants the President the power to engage in anticipatory self-defense absent congres-
sional authorization. See, e.g., WORMUTH & FiRMAGE, supra note 304, at 34 (making
this argument); see also Paust, supra note 12, at 533, 556-57 (suggesting that presiden-
tial authority to engage in anticipatory self-defense under the Constitution is limited
by international law, which prohibits anticipatory self-defense).
330 See Bobbitt, supra note 301, at 1369 (indicating that even a great number of
scholars chary of presidential authority in respect of the war powers accept that, in the
event of an imminent invasion of the United States, the President, provided he sought
post hoc congressional ratification of his actions, could defend the United States with-
out waiting for congressional authorization).
331 See Monaghan, supra note 312, at 42 (describing presidential emergency pow-
ers as having evolved through practice to the point where they are now akin to con-
gressional powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
18).
332 See supra note 329 and accompanying text (discussing the Prize Cases).
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dent that the resort to anticipatory self-defense is imperative is within
his sole discretion, and any challenges to the lawfulness of acts or-
dered by the President pursuant to the doctrine of anticipatory self-
defense present nonjusticiable political questions. 333
B. A Presidential Duty to Defend
However, Durand not only accords judicial legitimacy to the exer-
cise of the executive power to "make" war in instances requiring the
protection of U.S. nationals and interests against invasion or threat of
harm; rather, it identifies a presidential duty to do so. A "duty" is dis-
tinct from a power: whereas the latter can be described as a state en-
forced capacity to act in a given fashion, the former is better
understood as the obligation to act in a given fashion that runs to the
benefit of bearer(s) of a legal right.33 4 In other words, by explicitly
recognizing that threats to the United States "cannot be anticipated
and provided for" and that responses in self-defense "require the most
prompt and decided action," the Durand opinion arguably establishes
judicial recognition of a presidential duty to, where necessary, employ
military force to prevent "[a] cts of violence, or of threatened violence
to the citizen or his property. . . ."35 Although the opinion did not
elaborate a reasoned basis for its recognition of a presidential duty to
prevent injury to the United States, its nationals, and its interests, the
roots of such an obligation reach back in time, antedating the concept
333 See infra notes 377-83 and accompanying text (discussing why presidential de-
cisions to engage in anticipatory self-defense are nonjusticiable and protected by the
political question doctrine).
334 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-32 (1913) (constructing an early theory of the
distinctions between rights and duties under the law). Duties and rights exist in a
correlative relationship: to possess a right implies that others bear duties toward the
right-holder to act or refrain from action by virtue of the existence of the right, and to
this extent duties arise whenever rights are recognized. See Albert Kocourek, Various
Definitions ofJuralRelation, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 394, 395 n.7, 412 (1920) (building upon
the Hohfeldian dichotomies). Moreover, the existence of a duty implies that in the
event of a breach of that duty, a transgression against the bearer of the correlative
right occurs which exposes the incumbent to liability and entities the right-holder to a
remedy. SeeJuLIus STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCrION OF LAW 98-99 (1950) (link-
ing breaches of duties with liability to the bearers of correlative rights). Although a
discussion of "rights" is more generally accessible to the modern reader than is a
discussion of "duties," the latter analytical concept has a "more strategic explanatory
role than the concept of rights" in a broader discussion of natural law and the notion
of moral obligation upon which its rests. FINNIS, supra note 282, at 210. Accordingly,
it is to duties that this Article turns in developing and testing its natural law defense of
the Bush Doctrine.
335 Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186).
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of sovereignty and drawing nourishment from principles of natural
law that, woven together, nurture the theory of social contract.
3 36
1. Protection as the First Duty of the State: Origins in Natural Law
a. Allegiance Based Theories
The argument that the state is brought into existence solely to
protect its nationals against harm and to preserve the tranquilitas
ordinis (public peace), and that the state has a moral and legal duty to
use force where necessary to accord this protection, dates at least to
ancient Greece. 337 In exchange for service from its citizens, the state
was obligated not merely to refrain from causing its citizens injury but
to affirmatively discover and defeat any threat to the polis.
338 Al-
though by the Middle Ages the democratic basis for the organization
of the state had given way to more hierarchical forms that restricted
political participation, the symbiotic relationship between state and
nationals, in which protection was exchanged for service, had so con-
ditioned understandings of the meaning of sovereignty that the king
was judged to be entitled to obedience and loyalty only insofar as he
afforded justice and a reasonable assurance of protection to his sub-
jects.3 39 Doing justice and protecting his subjects was, in effect, con-
336 In this Article, the description of a presidential duty to defend against
threatened harm is limited to threats emanating from abroad and does not take up
the potentially more complex question of a presidential duty to defend against do-
mestic threats. For a thorough analysis of this latter issue, see Monaghan, supra note
312.
337 See Lacey, supra note 187, at 310 (locating the ancient Greek origins of the
theory of protection of nationals as the raison d'gtat). Some commentators might lo-
cate the earliest example of an affirmative state duty of protection in ancient Israel.
See Addicott, supra note 18, at 761-62 (describing Mosaic law as "centering on the
duty of the state to protect its citizens" both internally against criminal behavior and
externally against enemies).
338 See ROBERT H. MuRRAY, THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE FROM PLATO TO THE
PRESENT 1-2 (1926) (presenting the Platonic theory of the perfect state and noting its
incorporation of affirmative state duties); see also id. at 12 ("The action of the state
may be positive or preventive. It may stimulate the good life or it may remove hin-
drances to it.").
339 By the traditional English doctrine of allegiance, every loyal subject was enti-
fled to the protection of the king. ANTHONY FITZ-HERBERT, THE NEW NATURA BREVIUM
29 (London, W. Rawlins 1534). However, allegiance was conditional upon the provi-
sion of that protection. See CORWIN, supra note 227, at 27-29 (summarizing the writ-
ings of the thirteenth century English jurist Bracton on the theoretical basis for the
relationship between medieval sovereigns and their subjects).
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In the Age of Enlightenment, sovereignty came to be understood
as derivative of the duty of protection owed to subjects by their sover-
eign; individuals contracted out of a state of nature to enhance their
security, relinquishing their natural liberty for the safety bestowed by
the sovereign, who, by virtue of this bargain, was impressed by a duty
to defeat any threats to his subjects. 341 The supreme duty of the state
was the protection of rights to life, liberty, and property owed under
natural law to its nationals, who gave up their natural capacity to act in
their own self-preservation to the state. 342 To discharge this duty, the
state was therefore obliged to "punish the transgressors of that law to
such a degree, as it may hinder its violation. '3 4 3 Failure to engage or
conquer threats to those within his protection stripped the sovereign
of his entitlement to obedience and fidelity and invalidated this social
contract, and thus for Locke "[t] he obligation of subjects to the sover-
eign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power las-
teth by which he is able to protect them."3 44 Moreover, should the
state neglect its first duty to provide the requisite degree of protec-
tion, its government is dissolved and the people regain the natural
legal entitlement to establish a new government that will more faith-
fully discharge its obligation.3 45 In short, protection implied subjec-
tion, yet subjection implied protection.
346
340 See BODIN, supra note 239, at 500.
341 HOBBES, supra note 245, at 227.
342 LOCKE, supra note 245, at 353.
343 Id. at 271.
344 Id. at 353 (theorizing that because the state is established to protect the com-
munity, it is "obliged" to secure the life, liberty, and property of every individual).
345 Id. at 367 ("[T]he Community perpetually retains a Supream Power of saving
themselves from the attempts and designs of any Body, even of their Legislators,
whenever they shall be so foolish, or so wicked, as to lay and carry on designs against
the Liberties and Properties of the Subject."); see also 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 248, at
*233-36 (approving as part of the English common legal heritage the Lockean doc-
trine that the failure of a sovereign to afford protection terminated the duty of obedi-
ence and justified the replacement of the sovereign).
346 See Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 382 (K.B. 1608) (defining the relationship
between sovereign and subject with the maxim protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio
protectionem-protection implies subjection, and subjection protection), cited in 2
BLACKSTONE, supra note 248, at *233.
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c. Common Law Theories
The "common right and reason"3 47 at the core of the natural law,
conditionally exchanging protection for allegiance, was conveyed for-
ward through the efforts of prominent Whigs and the rhetoric of colo-
nial politicians,3 48 ultimately finding expression in the constituent
documents of the several American states349 as well as of the United
States. The generation that affixed their hands to the Declaration of
Independence justified violent separation from the United Kingdom
by the "opinions of mankind," on the ground that their king had "ab-
dicated Government .. .by declaring us out of his Protection and
waging War against us."13 50 The failure of King George III to protect
the "unalienable Rights" with which his American subjects had been
"endowed by their Creator" violated the "Laws of Nature and of Na-
ture's God," and not only "entitle [d]" them to "alter or abolish" Brit-
ish rule in North America but imposed upon them a "duty to throw
off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future se-
curity." 351 The Constitution of this new government launched the na-
tion on a natural law course, reflecting its Framers'
deep-seated conviction that [it] is an expression of the Higher Law,
that it is in fact imperfect man's most perfect rendering of... "the
eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator him-
self in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled
human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the con-
duct of human actions."
35 2
In the judgment of the Framers, that positive law should ever be
invoked to interfere with the provision of the protection owed to the
people was a proposition utterly inimical to reason and to the
347 Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (KB. 1610).
348 See C.H. Van Tyne, Influence of the Clergy, and of Religious and Sectarian Forces, on
the American Revolution, 19 Am. HIsT. REv. 44, 49 (1913) ("'[G]overnment is a condi-
tional compact between king and people . . . [and] a violation of the covenant by
either party discharges the other from obligation.'") (quoting Patrick Henry).
349 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X (1780), reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DocU-
MENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 94 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975) ("[E]ach
individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life,
liberty, and property, according to standing laws."); PA. CONST. art. VIII (1776), re-
printed in 8 id. at 278 ("[E]very member of society hath a right to be protected in the
enjoyment of life, liberty and property ....").
350 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 25 (U.S. 1776).
351 Id. para. 1-2.
352 CORWIN, supra note 227, at vi (citation omitted). For a thorough defense of
the position that the Constitution is a natural law document, see RANDY BARNETT, THE
IMPERATIVE OF NATURAL RIGHTS IN TODAY'S WORLD 1-8 (forthcoming 2004).
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survivability of the fledgling United States. In the words of Thomas
Jefferson:
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high
duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of neces-
sity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are
of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adher-
ence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty,
property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly
sacrificing the end to the means.
353
That the nascent U.S. government was charged with the moral
and legal obligation to defend its citizens and its interests was a largely
uncontested proposition throughout the first century of national in-
dependence, despite the waxing influence of legal positivism. 354 Re-
construction era legislative debates sparked declarations to the effect
that "the first duty of the Government is to afford protection to its
citizens," 3 5 and that "American citizenship would be little worth if it
did not carry protection with it.' ' 56 At least one contemporary scholar
posits that, should the United States cease to afford its nationals pro-
tection, this failure would "void the very foundations for its
existence."
357
2. The Duty to Defend: Incumbent Upon the Executive Under
Natural Law
a. Constitutional Analysis
Investment of primary responsibility for the protective function
of government in the executive branch was an uncontroversial incor-
poration of the English common law doctrine of "conservation of the
peace," which ensured to all law abiding subjects not merely the arrest
and prosecution of offenders, but affirmative state action oriented to-
ward the prevention of violence.3 58 At common law, executive branch
353 Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 268, at 162.
354 Positivist commentators regarded the state, rather than a divinity or a process
of natural reason, as the source of legal entitlements and corresponding state duties
of protection. See, e.g.,J.K. BLUNTSCHLI, THE THEORY OF THE STATE 2 (Oxford, Claren-
don Press 1885) ("[T]he individual requires the state to give him a legal existence:
apart from the state he has neither safety or freedom.").
355 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 101 (1867) (statement of Rep.
Farnsworth).
356 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong, 1st Sess. 1757 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
357 Lacey, supra note 187, at 313.
358 See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 248, at *265-70, 349-54 (discussing the "conser-
vation of the peace" doctrine and expressly characterizing its enforcement by execu-
tive branch officials as a "duty"); 2 id. at *353-54 (observing that, at common law, the
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officers who breached or neglected their duty to protect the polity
against violence were subject to civil and even criminal sanctions, -3 59
and in South v. Maryland,360 the Supreme Court held that this "public
duty doctrine," although it immunized public officials against civil lia-
bility, permitted their criminal prosecution in the event of neglect or
breach of their duty to protect the public. 361 More than three de-
cades later in the case of In re Neagle, the Court, in determining
whether the President was empowered to afford protection to a Su-
preme Court justice, read the Take Care Clause as having not merely
vested a power in the President but rather as having imposed upon
him a duty to enforce not merely the "express terms" of acts of Con-
gress and the Constitution, but all the "rights, duties and obligations
growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and
all the protection implied by the nature of the government under the
Constitution."362 Without directly referencing the public duty doc-
trine or identifying any available sanctions for a breach of presidential
duties, and without extending its holding to impose a corresponding
duty upon the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,3 63 the Nea-
gle Court implied that the origin of the presidential duty to protect is
to be found in extra-constitutional and decidedly nonpositivist sources
power and duty of conservators of the peace included "suppressing riots and affrays,
... taking securities for the peace, and ... apprehending and committing felons and
other criminals"); 2JJAMEs KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *15 ("[E]very per-
son is also entitled to the preventive arm of the magistrate, as a further protection
from threatened or impending danger.").
359 See 5 BLACKSTONE, supra note 248, at *140 (indicating generally that negligence
of public officials was a misdemeanor at common law, and more specifically that con-
servators of the peace who failed to discharge their duties were subject to criminal
prosecution).
360 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1856).
361 Id. at 402-03 (holding, in the case of a conservator of the peace who failed to
provide requested protection to a plaintiff against persons who had threatened his
life, that criminal, but not civil, liability resulted from breach of a discretionary duty).
362 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890).
363 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195
(1989) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment "cannot fairly be extended to im-
pose an affirmative obligation on the State" to protect life, liberty, or property
"against invasion by private actors"). The specific question whether States are duty-
bound to protect citizens against "invasion" by foreign "public actors" has never been
presented to the Supreme Court, although the Court has held, in dictum, that "[a]s a
general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services
for those within its border." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982). Argua-
bly, because the President is the "sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations," it is to the President alone that citizens must look for the
performance of the protective function against external threats. See United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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of obligation-i.e., the common law, and therefore, ultimately, natu-
ral law.
364
b. Extra-Constitutional Sources of Obligation
Although the public duty doctrine and additional positive sources
expressly impose upon officers in the U.S. armed forces a legally-en-
forceable duty to exhibit courage and initiative in the defense of the
United States against foreign and domestic threats,3 65 no constitu-
tional provision or statutory enactment expressly imposes upon the
President a general duty to defend against foreign threats.3 66 Absent
364 Subsequent opinions of inferior courts reinforced Neagle in holding that the
duty of the state to protect arises from extra-constitutional sources, on the ground
that the Constitution is "a charter of negative rather than positive liberties." SeeJack-
son v. City ofJoliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).
365 The oath of office administered to personnel upon enlistment or commission-
ing into the U.S. armed forces obligates the enlistee or officer to "support and defend
the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic." See
U.S. Dep't of the Army, Oath of Office-Military Personnel (1999), available at http:/
/www.army.mil/usapa/eforms/pdf/A71.pdf. For failure to faithfully and coura-
geously discharge this duty, domestic law imposes penalties as serious as death. The
Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 99, 10 U.S.C. § 899 (2000), provides that:
Any member of the armed forces who before or in the presence of the en-
emy-(1) runs away; (2) shamefully abandons, surrenders, or delivers up
any command, unit, place, or military property which it is his duty to defend;
(3) through disobedience, neglect, or intentional misconduct endangers the
safety of any such command, unit, place, or military property; ... (5) is guilty
of cowardly conduct; . . . (8) willfully fails to do his utmost to encounter,
engage, capture, or destroy any enemy troops, combatants, vessels, aircraft,
or any other thing, which it is his duty so to encounter, engage, capture, or
destroy; or (9) does not afford all practicable relief and assistance to any
troops, combatants, vessels, or aircraft of the armed forces belonging to the
United States or their allies when engaged in battle; shall be punished by
death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.
Id. Individual commanders are also obligated to undertake necessary measures to
protect the forces under their commands as well as "U.S. citizens, their property,
[and] U.S. commercial assets." See U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruc-
tion 3121.01A: Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces A-5 (2000) ("A com-
mander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to
take all appropriate actions to defend that commander's unit and other US forces in
the vicinity from a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent."); id. (defining "hos-
tile act" and "hostile intent" as an attack or threat of imminent use of force by a
foreign force or terrorist unit "against the United States, US forces, and in certain
circumstances, US nationals, their property, [and] US commercial assets").
366 Some commentators argue that the Oath of Office implies a constitutional
duty to defend. See, e.g., Bobbitt, supra note 301, at 1396-97 (arguing that the Oath
of Office imposes upon the President the obligation to act in the face of "imminent
danger" to protect the United States, its nationals, and its interests, and that the Presi-
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any authoritative statutory command obligating presidential action in
response to a specific threat, if the President is duty-bound to defend
the United States, the source of such a duty must necessarily arise as
the logical corollary to the natural rights, and in particular the rights
to life and liberty, possessed by U.S. citizens. Accordingly, in charging
presidents with the "solemn responsibility"367 to safeguard the nation
and its population against the threat or use of force, scholars, presi-
dents, and sitting heads of state have drawn heavily upon the language
and ethos of natural legal theory.
Contractarian theorists hold the state to its bargain, demanding
protection of life and liberty from officials specifically entrusted with
the duty to defend;368 just war and Catholic theorists insist not only
dent can be compelled to engage in war even against his judgment); see also Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257 (2004).
Were Congress to pass specific statutory authorization requiring the President to take
particular measures in respect to a particular threat, the President would incur the
duty under the Take Care Clause to faithfully execute its particular provisions, pro-
vided its terms did not otherwise intrude upon his inherent powers. See U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 3. In the wake of September 11, Congress passed ajoint resolution authoriz-
ing the President to "take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism
against the United States" and to use
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terror-
ist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organiza-
tions or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
Commentators disagree as to whether this resolution or the October 2002 resolution
authorizing intervention in Iraq authorized the President to engage in acts of preven-
tive war. See Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 80, at 736-37 (arguing that both
did); Schmitt, supra note 48, at 522-29 (same). But see Paust, supra note 12, at 553-55
(arguing that it did not). The questions whether, if Congress did authorize the Presi-
dent to engage in preventive war with either resolution, the Congress purported to
grant the President power he already possessed, and whether, in the absence of such a
legislative authorization, the President was nonetheless obligated to engage in preven-
tive war if necessary, have not yet been the subject of discussion or analysis as best this
Author can determine.
367 Glennon, supra note 56, at 552.
368 See, e.g., VATELL, supra note 247, at 246 ("Self-defense against an unjust attack
is not only a right which every Nation has, but it is a duty, and one of its most sacred
duties."); Lacey, supra note 187, at 308 (describing an "affirmative responsibility to
protect its citizens both at home and abroad from lethal force" and characterizing this
duty as the corollary of a juris ad vitae, or right to life); George Schedler, Responsibility
for and Estimation of the Damages of American Slavery, 33 U. MEM. L. RIv. 307, 345-47
(2003) (suggesting that the United States had a legally-enforceable duty to defend
African-American slaves against slavery even prior to the Thirteenth Amendment).
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that human beings are collectively obligated to protect and defend life
"even if it means occasionally using arms," but that state leaders and
other "key actors" bear moral obligations to protect and defend the
innocent from grave evil. 369 President Truman, in justifying his
seizure of steel mills needed to produce war materiel during the Ko-
rean War, emphasized that "the President, under the Constitution,
must use his powers to safeguard the nation."370 During the height of
the Cold War, President Eisenhower feared that the Soviet threat was
so great, the United States "'would be forced to consider whether or
not our duty to future generations did not require us to initiate war at
the most propitious moment that we could designate."' 371 In order-
ing the blockade of Cuba in 1962-arguably an act of war 372-Presi-
dent Kennedy expressed his understanding that had he failed to
undertake an act tantamount to preventive war, he would have been
impeached for breach of a fundamental duty.3 73 Former Israeli Prime
Minister Shimon Peres considered it his moral duty to his state and its
people to "meet [war] under the least dangerous conditions" and
therefore, if necessary, to act preventively;3 74 current Australian Prime
MinisterJohn Howard describes the refusal of any leader to engage in
preventive war where necessary to defend his state and its people as
the failure of "the most basic test of office."3 75 Perhaps the boldest
assertion of a presidential duty to defend the United States against
external threats issued from President Theodore Roosevelt in his the-
ory of presidential stewardship:
[The President is] bound actively and affirmatively to do all he
[can] for the people .... [I]t is not only his right but his duty to do
369 Maryann Cusimano Love, Globalization, Ethics, and the Wai' on Terrorism, 16
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 65, 71-72 (2002). The U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops "acknowledge [s] ... the right and duty of a nation and the interna-
tional community to use military force if necessary to defend the common good by
protecting the innocent against mass terrorism." U.S. Conference of Catholic Bish-
ops, A Pastoral Message: Living With Faith and Hope After September 11 th (Nov. 14,
2001), available at http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/septl l.htm.
370 2 HARRY S. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS: YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE 478 (1956).
371 BUNDY, supra note 118, at 251 (quoting a memorandum to John Foster Dulles,
Sept. 1953).
372 See supra note 122.
373 BUNDY, supra note 118, at 394.
374 SHIMON PERES, FROM THESE MEN: SEVEN FOUNDERS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 55
(Philip Simpson trans., 1979).
375 John Shaw, Startling His Neighbors, Australian Leader Favors First Strikes, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2002, at All.
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anything that the needs of the Nation demanded, unless such ac-
tion [is] forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws.
3 76
Again, however, notwithstanding the cogency of the various argu-
ments on behalf of a natural legal obligation requiring the President
to engage in preventive war where necessary to defend the United
States, its nationals, and its interests against threats to life and liberty,
neither the Constitution nor any provision of statutory or common
law imposes any legal sanction for dereliction of this duty. Whether
exigent circumstances have arisen in the realm of international rela-
tions necessitating presidential action is, although a factual question,
entirely left to presidential discretion. 377 Moreover, even if the politi-
cal question doctrine did not render any presidential decision to re-
frain from engaging in preventive war nonjusticiable and thus
immune from judicial review,378 the President arguably enjoys immu-
nity from criminal prosecution 379 as well as from civil liability for his
official acts and omissions while in office.38 0 In sum, the only sanction
to which the President may theoretically expose himself through neg-
lect or breach of his duty to defend is impeachment 3 8 ' and removal
376 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT : AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 357 (1914).
377 See Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827) (holding that "the au-
thority to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the Presi-
dent, and ... his decision is conclusive upon all other persons").
378 As Chief Justice Marshall noted more than two centuries ago in establishing
the constitutional basis for the political question doctrine,
[b]y the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with cer-
tain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own
discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character,
and to his own conscience. . . .The subjects are political . . .and being
intrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive....
Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and
laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-70 (1803).
379 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-14, at 269 (2d ed.
1988) (stating that "[t]he question must be regarded as an open one"); see also Eric.
M. Freedman, The Law as King and the King as Law: Is a President Immune from Criminal
Prosecution Before Impeachment?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 7, 39-68 (1992) (discussing,
but ultimately rejecting, the view that the President is necessarily immune from crimi-
nal prosecution prior to impeachment).
380 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 696, 705-06 (1997) (holding that although
the President is liable for his "purely private acts," he is cloaked in civil immunity with
respect to acts taken in his "public character").
381 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (providing that the President "shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
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from office, 38 2 a remedy inherently political rather than legal in
nature.
C. Positivist Critiques of a Presidential Duty to Defend, and
Responses to Positivists
For positivists, rights and duties are the "creation of Law, or
arise[ ] from the Command of the Sovereign in a given independent
society. '38 3 It is axiomatic for positivists that "where there is a legal
right, there is also a legal remedy, . . . whenever that right is in-
vaded. '384 In the absence of a positive law creating a right and provid-
ing a sanction for the violation of that right, positivism therefore
denies the existence of the right.3 85 Where there is no legally enforce-
able right, there can be no duty, and thus whatever else can be said of
the President in terms of his powers and obligations the notion that
he has a duty to defend the United States, its nationals, or its interests
is limited to the province of judicial dictum. For positivists, natural
law is nothing more than "a brooding omnipresence in the sky"38 6 and
the attempt to identify and enforce such a duty by grafting indetermi-
nate sources of obligation on to a positive legal framework is an exer-
cise anathema to constitutional government.
However, it is not entirely clear that the absence of a legal remedy
is to be read into the constitutional silence on the matter in connec-
tion with rights recognized therein. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,387 the Supreme Court rejected
this argument and held to the contrary that "'where federally pro-
tected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the begin-
ning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the
necessary relief." 388 In other words, the absence of an explicit rem-
edy for the breach of a constitutionally protected right neither ne-
gates the existence of that right nor the duty to protect that right. Put
slightly differently, the failure of the Framers to expressly provide a
positive remedy for the breach of a right inferable from the text and
historical subtext of the Constitution is not fatal to a theory of rights
and duties that maintains its relative independence from positive law
382 Id. art. I, § 3 (providing for removal from office upon impeachment).
383 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 61 (Burt Franklin 1970) (1861).
384 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 248, at *23.
385 3 Id.; see alsoJEtRvmy BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 309-11 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789) (crit-
icizing attempts to codify laws that contradict other laws).
386 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
387 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971).
388 Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
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and claims in its stead a natural law genealogy. Because the presiden-
tial obligation to protect the United States, its nationals, and its inter-
ests does not arise from the command of a sovereign, the failure of
the positive legal order to provide a remedy to parties injured by
breach or neglect of this duty is not determinative of whether U.S.
citizens bear the right to preventive defense against foreign threats or
whether it is nevertheless incumbent upon the President, as the em-
bodiment of the state whose reason for being is the preservation of
the life and liberty of its nationals, to engage in preventive war where
necessary. Just as the judicial interpretation of the Constitution ad-
mits of extra-constitutional sources of presidential power,389 our un-
derstandings of presidential duties must be similarly informed and
tolerant of the notion that, although our Constitution is a positive law
document the President, as the embodiment of U.S. sovereignty in its
international relations, possesses powers and bears duties not entirely
tethered to or limited by its provisions. In short, under the constitu-
tional framework establishing a republican form of government,
neither presidential powers nor presidential duties can be adequately
described or understood in purely formal terms.
D. Conclusions
There should be scant surprise that in practice Presidents have
acknowledged and embraced the "great object and duty" with which
natural law charged them to defend U.S. "lives, liberty, and property"
through "prompt and decided action. '390 Viewed in this light, the
Bush Doctrine, notwithstanding its proclamation of the unilateral
right to engage in preventive war, is revealed as nothing more than a
renewed commitment to the natural law duty to defend, which is at
once wholly consistent with the letter and spirit of international law as
well as with the object and purpose of the Framers of the U.S. Consti-
tution.391 That a President should interpret his aggregated powers
against the backdrop of natural legal history, and with an eye toward
the practical exigencies of the struggle against international terrorists
armed with WMD, to reach the conclusion that he has not merely the
capacity but the solemn obligation to defend the United States, its
389 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (ana-
lyzing the locus of sovereignty in a chain from Great Britain to the states to the United
States and concluding that "[i]t results that the investment of the federal government
with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of
the Constitution")
390 Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186).
391 See supra notes 316-17, 350.
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nationals, and its interests would, standing alone, present no question
of international law. That a President should assert that the faithful
discharge of this duty may require him to engage in preventive war is
another matter entirely if one does not accept the argument that pre-
ventive war is, under delineated circumstances, consistent with obliga-
tions under the U.N. Charter, particularly Article 51, as a permissible
exercise of the natural legal right of self-defense. The potential looms
large that the United States might engage in a use of force justified by
the Bush Doctrine-which unabashedly asserts that the duty to de-
fend encompasses preventive war-that might be challenged as a vio-
lation of a conflicting legal duty to refrain from acts of aggression
under customary international law as well as under Article 2(4) of the
Charter. With the advent of the International Criminal Court, it be-
comes imperative to develop a mechanism for adjudicating between
contending claims derivative of these conflicting duties, lest good-
faith measures of self-defense be criminalized to the detriment of
global peace and order. The next Part proposes that it is possible and
desirable to harmonize 92 the domestic duty to defend as articulated
in the Bush Doctrine with the international duty to refrain from acts
of aggression.
V. HARMONIZING THE BUSH DOCTRINE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A NEW CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE




The law will never make men free; it is men who have got to make
the law free.
Henry David Thoreau3 94
A. Toward International Legal Recognition of a Domestic Duty to Defend
That the Bush Doctrine and the categorical prohibition of aggres-
sion under international law395 must be drawn ineluctably into con-
392 "Harmonization" is a term that refers to the iterative process whereby a com-
mon view of law emerges through the ongoing comparison and gradual revision of
divergent laws and legal systems until convergence is achieved.
393 This often repeated quotation is popularly attributed to Edmund Burke, how-
ever, as discussed in PAUL F. BOLLER, THEY NEVER SAID IT 10-11 (1989), the phrase is
of unknown origin.
394 4 HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Slavery in Massachusetts, in THE WRITINGS OF HENRY
DAVID THOREAU 396 (1968).
395 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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flict is by no means preordained. The recent Report of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Re-
port), which recognizes that sovereignty "implies responsibility ... for
the protection of [the] people [within] the state,"396 offers strong sup-
port for the arguments that it is incumbent upon states to protect
their nationals not only against domestic threats but from foreign
threats as well, and that the Bush Doctrine is simply an expression of
the acceptance of this international legal duty.3 9 7 If the Report re-
flects a reconceptualization of the meaning of sovereignty under inter-
national law that takes seriously not merely the powers and rights of
states but also their duties, then in future instances where a President
perceives a potential existential threat to the United States it need not
be inevitable that the Security Council authorize the United States
and other member states to intervene forcibly to check rogue states or
terrorists,3 98 nor need the Security Council, having failed to authorize
intervention, characterize the U.S. resort to arms as unlawful.
396 INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT Xi (2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/pdf/Com
mission-Report.pdf.
397 As Posteraro notes in evaluating the Report,
[i]nternational law has, for too long, regarded self-defense as a right of sov-
ereigns rather than a responsibility. But, sovereignty carries with it a respon-
sibility to protect citizens from preventable harm from both within and
without state borders.... The responsibility of states to prevent mass mur-
der of their citizens is just as imperative against foreign enemies as from
homegrown threats .... The relationship between individuals and govern-
ments that this reconceptualization of sovereignty produces demands that
states act decisively to uphold their responsibility to protect their people.
Posteraro, supra note 90, at 201-02. Others scholars have referenced the Report as an
excellent distillation of the supreme duty of states to intervene in defense of the right
to life, not only of their own citizens, but also of other peoples whose states of nation-
ality have failed, through incapacity or unwillingness, to defend them. See, e.g., Henry
Shue, Limiting Sovereignty, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS 12, 17-18 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004).
398 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan concedes that the Security Council may
need to move far more swiftly to authorize member states to use force against devel-
oping threats to their security:
The Council needs to consider how it will deal with the possibility that indi-
vidual states may use force preemptively against perceived threats. Its mem-
bers may need to begin a discussion on the criteria for an early authorization
of coercive measures to address certain types of threats, for instance, terror-
ist groups armed with weapons of mass destruction.
Annan, supra note 18. Where the Security Council authorizes preventive war, any
controversy as to its lawfulness is, at the very least, greatly mitigated. See Taft & Buch-
wald, supra note 14, at 563 (arguing that consistency with the resolutions of the Secur-
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Although the United Nations has proven a rather unreliable col-
lective security system, its failures are generally attributed not to the
structural insufficiencies that bedeviled the League of Nations, but
rather to the political nature of the enterprise. It is thus not impossi-
ble that the United Nations might in the future shuffle off its dysfunc-
tion and engage in the sort of credible and aggressive policing
necessary to support multilateral deterrence and the preservation of
individual and collective security.3 99 In recent years, the United Na-
tions has exhibited greatly reduced deference to the territorial sover-
eignty of states engaged in genocide and systematic violations of
human rights, and whether this incipient tendency towards interven-
tionism might translate into political support for U.S.-led efforts to
internalize the costs imposed upon the international system by rogue
states and terrorists groups remains to be determined.
B. A Duty to Defend, and a Corresponding Duty Not to Obstruct Self-
Defense: General Principles of International Law
In the alternative, the exercise of preventive war under the Bush
Doctrine to defend the United States against brewing threats may
come to be viewed by relevant actors as a general principle of interna-
tional law and therefore, by definition, consistent with international
legal obligations40 0 and deservedly immune from obstruction in the
Security Council.40 1 Similarly, under the increasing weight of future
ity Council is one of two considerations in determining whether preemptive use of
force is lawful).
399 Still, there is reason to believe that even if the Security Council could commit
to this mandate, in theory it would be handicapped by its institutional and procedural
incapacity to make the sort of "speedy and objective" decisions necessary to collective
security and to influence member states to make the troop contributions necessary to
enable this function. Franck, supra note 45, at 52 (warning against over-optimism on
this score). For an evaluation and comparison of the League of Nations and the
United Nations as dysfunctional collective security systems, and for prescriptions for
reform, see Michael D. Ramsey, Reinventing the Security Council: The U.N. as a Lockean
System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1529 (2004).
400 See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (describing the doctrine of pre-
ventive war in self-defense as a general principle of international law).
401 The Independent Commission on Kosovo, in summarizing the lessons to be
learned from that conflict, recommended, inter alia, that the permanent members of
the U.N. Security Council consider committing to the principle that they will not cast
adverse votes in the setting of humanitarian interventions to prevent impending and
grave threats to human life. See INDEPENDENT INT'L COMM'N ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo
REPORT: CONFLIcr, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 185-98 (2002) [here-
inafter Kosovo REPORT]. Had such a principle been in effect in 1998, Russia and
China would not have obstructed the U.N. process, the NATO-led intervention in
Kosovo would have borne the U.N. imprimatur and would thus not be susceptible to
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state practice consistent with a belief that it is lawful to engage in pre-
ventive war to defend the state, its nationals, and its interests, the
United States might credibly claim that the gates of customary interna-
tional law must open to admit preventive war into its domain 4 2 -
where intrepid states go in pursuit of policy objectives, international
law must follow. 40 3 In other words, ongoing social processes coexist
with and animate the meaning of the U.N. Charter, an instrument
which is, just as is the U.S. Constitution, a living, breathing document
intentionally designed by its framers with sufficient malleability to
adapt to and resolve previously unforeseen threats to peace and secur-
the characterization offered by the Commission of "illegal, yet legitimate." Id. at 186.
Closure of the "legality/legitimacy gap" by securing a commitment to this principle
would potentially prevent the erosion of U.N. credibility in cases of future threats to
peace and security, including those that might otherwise give rise to unilateral U.S.
interventions that some commentators, focusing on the absence of U.N. authorization
rather than upon the nature of the threat, might characterize as illegal. See Falk,
supra note 16, at 591 (proposing adoption of the recommendation of the Kosovo
Commission as a strategic move to buttress the authority of the United Nations and
the legitimacy of future U.S. actions).
402 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969
I.CJ. 3, 28 (Feb. 20) (restating the elements of customary international law as practice
coupled with opiniojuris, and indicating that no specific minimum time period is re-
quired to establish the requisite degree of practice); RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. c (1987) (indicating that
international law can be constituted solely by state practice followed as a matter of
legal obligation).
403 See Romano, supra note 71, at 1056 (making the narrower claim that, even if
anticipatory self-defense is not presently lawful under international law, contemporary
state declarations in favor of the doctrine as customary law may "possibly lay the foun-
dation for its proper invocation in the future"); see also Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law
and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 38-39
(Louis Henkin et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991) (noting that the question whether the custom-
ary international law of self-defense survived the adoption of the Charter remains a
source of debate). The same process would arguably be available to states asserting a
right to preventive war or to other aspects of state practice inconsistent with the Char-
ter. See Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in
Paradigms, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 45-46 (1990) (contending that the Charter cannot
be interpreted as an authoritative statement of the international law on the use of
force because state practice reveals a contrary understanding); W. Michael Reisman,
Article 2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary International Law, in 78 PROc. AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. 74, 75 (1984) (same). That state interests should be "an integral part of that
decision making process which we call international law" is unobjectionable to the
extent that one accepts that in the absence of a sovereign, lawmaking and enforce-
ment are essentially political endeavors. Roberts, supra note 7, at 516 (citing Rosalyn
Higgins, Integration of Authority and Control: Trends in the Literature of International Law
and Relations, in TOWARDS WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY (Burns Weston &
Michael Reisman eds., 1976)). For a discussion whether the customary international
law regarding the use of force survived adoption of the Charter, see supra Part I.A.
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ity. If, as the Report intimates, the authority of the Charter is a func-
tion of the degree to which it does not impede collective action even
where there is normative controversy over a bedrock legal principle,
then, in the face of what generally law abiding states in good faith
deem threats to their security,404 it behooves unaffected member
states to abstain from actions that might hamper an interpretation of
the Charter that would harmonize that document with the comple-
mentary sources of law invoked by states seeking authorization for the
use of force. 40 5 There is support in the travaux prparatoires for the
404 A state's determination that it was obligated to resort to anticipatory self-de-
fense or other measures of prevention is generally "accord[ed] great and perhaps
conclusive weight, even if later events proved that judgment mistaken." 19 TRIAL OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 34, at 422 (statement of Chief Prosecutor Rob-
ertJackson). Although the international law governing the resort to force is manipu-
lable by states bent on sheltering their actions from charges of unlawful aggression,
the duty of good faith is a general principle of international law incumbent upon all
states at all times. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (enumerating general
principles of international law and describing their application as sources of interna-
tional law). Although heads of state may not be repositories of perfect political wis-
dom and judgment, there is an important distinction between legitimate differences
in opinion as to the nature and severity of a particular threat on the one hand, and
deliberate attempts to exploit ambiguity to serve interests other than self-defense on
the other, which international law can and must preserve and accommodate. One of
the primary challenges for international law and institutions in the coming years will
be the development of more consistent and well reasoned rules and procedures to
differentiate between good-faith judgments and malicious claims when evaluating
rights and responsibilities regarding the use of force in international relations. The
most difficult aspect of this task will likely be constructing mechanisms for the sharing
of sensitive intelligence between states, a function necessary for the establishment of
the factual predicate underlying lawful exercises of force in anticipation of threats.
Several scholars suggest that this function can presently be performed by the Security
Council, the ICJ, or "various international bodies and public opinion." Roberts, supra
note 7, at 516; see also Franck, supra note 39, at 14-19 (describing the evaluation of
the factual predicate underlying a request for authorization of anticipatory self-de-
fense or prevention as an international "jurying function"). There is reason to doubt
whether these fora are sufficiently protective of information so as to allay the concern
of intelligence-rich states.
405 See Kosovo REPORT, supra note 401, at 186 (pointing out that "recourse to
force [by NATO or concerned states] without proper UN authorization tends to
weaken the authority of, and respect for, the United Nations, especially the UNSC, in
the domain of international peace and security," and that failure of the Security
Council to discharge its responsibility to protect in humanitarian crises may lead indi-
vidual states to such resort to "illegal, yet legitimate" force). For over two decades,
scholars have pegged the legitimacy of the United Nations to its willingness and ca-
pacity to intervene to restore peace and security in cases of gross and systematic viola-
tions of human rights and serious threats to state survival. See, e.g., Polebaum, supra
note 82, at 228 (concluding that when it fails to authorize state actions vital to the
prevention of grave harm to state survival and to its nationals, international law is
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assertion that the framers conceived the Charter in precisely this flexi-
ble and functionalist spirit:
[I]nstead of trying to govern the actions of the members and the
organs of the United Nations by precise and intricate codes of pro-
cedure, we have preferred to lay down purposes and principles
under which they are to act. And by that means, we hope to insure
that they act in conformity with the express desires of the nations
assembled here, while, at the same time, we give them freedom to
accommodate their actions to circumstances which today no man
can foresee.
We all want our Organization to have life .... We want it to be
free to deal with all the situations that may arise in international
relations. We do not want to lay down rules which may, in the fu-
ture, be the signpost for the guilty and a trap for the innocent.40 6
C. The Moral Obligation to Authorize Preventive War in the Age of Terror
Although he has withheld his blessing from what some are calling
a "post-Charter self-help paradigm,"40 7 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, in registering his preference that the rules of international law
be made more responsive to contemporary problems in international
relations without compromising the textual and normative constraints
imposed by the Charter on the use of force, seems to have invested,
however tacitly, his considerable social capital in each of these propos-
als.40 8 The notion that the black letter of the Charter should be the
subject of evolutionary processes that conform law to practice as well
as practice to law, and that law serves a functional role in the mainte-
revealed as an impotent and counterproductive instrument); W. Michael Reisman,
Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (1973)
(warning that "insistence on non-violence and deference to all established institutions
in a global system with many injustices can be tantamount to confirmation and rein-
forcement of those injustices," and that for international law to refuse to recognize
that the use of force is permissible in defense of state survival would have delegitimiz-
ing effects); Zedalis, supra note 48, at 98 (doubting whether laws governing the use of
force that compel certain behavior in the face of longstanding contrary practice can
be described as legitimate). For a more general discussion of the relationship be-
tween law and legitimacy in the context of collective action problems, see W. Bradley
Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
406 Verbatim Minutes of First Meeting of Commission l, June 14, in THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 529, 537 (U.S.
Dep't of State ed., 1946) (statement of Lord Halifax).
407 AREND & BECK, supra note 56, at 178.
408 See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 54th
Sess., 4th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 10, at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.4 (1999); see also
Annan, supra note 18 (admitting that in future crises it may be necessary that the
Security Council grant "an early authorization of coercive measures").
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nance of systemic order, is for pragmatists a matter of "moral neces-
sity"40 9 and one to which even restrictivists subscribe. 4 0 Functionalist
jurisprudes maintain that the relevance of law requires that it be con-
strued in the context in which it is to be applied, and much ink has
been spilled in recent years urging that, in light of the dramatic trans-
formations in threats and capabilities wrought by terrorist groups and
rogue states, international law must be adapted if it is to remain suita-
ble to its teleological purpose: the maintenance of international
peace.
4 11
For several eminent scholars, the international legal justifications
for the use of force captured by the U.N. Charter bear the stamp of a
historical era marked by "fascist dictators, dueling superpowers, and
... warring bands of militiamen on a colonial frontier," and because
these anachronistic doctrines are simply an inadequate defense
against lawless predators such as WMD armed terrorists, existing inter-
national law must be revisited and reengineered. 41 2 In short, the
Charter need not and should not be an "obstacle to doing what needs
to be done,"4 13 and a half-century of experience teaches that it is suffi-
ciently flexible to withstand reinterpretation where necessary to suit
fundamentally changed circumstances. Responsibility thus falls
squarely upon the present generation to draw legitimacy and legal-
ity-concepts inherently related but gradually drifting apart-into a
closer relationship.
41 4
409 Wedgwood, supra note 14, at 578; see also id. at 584 ("The United Nations Char-
ter is appropriately read, even now, as an attempt to overcome the failures of Wood-
row Wilson's League of Nations and its covenant of inaction .... This should inform
the reading of [the Charter].").
410 See Franck, supra note 39, at 11 (describing the text of the Charter as having
"become more tensile, evolving in accordance with functional criteria and procedures
in response to new and unforeseen circumstances").
411 See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 67, at 1 ("Inevitably, international law responds to,
and is shaped by, the political and economic forces that dominate the system.");
Franck, supra note 39, at 8 ("[T] he meaning of the Charter does evolve as it is applied
to practical situations."); Wedgwood, supra note 14, at 577 (explaining that
"[p] rocedural dynamism is an underlying feature of the Charter-a willingness, some-
times after lamentation and sometimes quietly, to allow alternative methods of deci-
sion making")
412 Posteraro, supra note 90, at 200; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Fork in the
Road, ASIL NEWSLETTER, Sept./Oct. 2003, at 4 (calling on U.N. member states to eval-
uate the adequacy and effectiveness of the rules of international law and to undertake
a "collective compromise" that results in their revision in light of lessons learned with
the recent intervention in Iraq).
413 Franck, supra note 39, at 18.
414 See Wedgwood, supra note 14, at 581 (suggesting that the reconnection of in-
ternational law and legitimacy may require consideration, on a case-by-case basis, of
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If one accepts the assertion that the Charter itself presents no
impediment to the defeat of WMD armed international terrorists, one
must conclude, by the same process of logic, that preventive war, if
justifiable on nonpositivist legal grounds as essential to victory over
these malignant foes, need not threaten the Charter. Proceeding fur-
ther down this neofunctionalist and utilitarian 415 path, some scholars
champion preventive war as a "law-enforcing" doctrine in a world
without an executive able and willing to enforce law and order and in
which threats abound. 416 Although some scholars might criticize the
foregoing as an unduly consequentialist approach that trivializes the
rule of law, 4 17 when a terrorist group or rogue state armed with WMD
threatens to wreak death and destruction upon millions of innocents,
a preventive war precisely tailored toward the elimination of terrorist
infrastructures and their weapons, although it may cause the unin-
tended deaths of innocent civilians in the proximity of legitimate
targets, may be likely, and even virtually certain, to produce outcomes
significantly more preservative of human life and thus manifestly pref-
erable to all other alternatives.
4 18
In other words, although preventive war may always catalyze polit-
ical controversy, in no small measure by virtue of the fact that judg-
ments concerning the immediacy of anticipated aggression require
speculation and are prone to distortions by motivated biases, its legiti-
macy should not be determined solely or even primarily by way of a
crabbed reading of the text of the U.N. Charter, but rather by evaluat-
ing whether the use of force tends toward the reinforcement of "the
basic and enduring values of contemporary world public order and
degrees of legality rather than an all-or-nothing approach to the determination of the
lawfulness of a particular resort to force).
415 Utilitarianism is the philosophical school that judges the moral virtues of
human action almost exclusively in light of its consequences. See BENTHAM, supra
note 385, at 11 (describing utilitarianism as a consequentialist moral and legal
theory).
416 See Louis Ren(e Beres, The Newly Expanded American Doctrine of Preemption: Can It
Include Assassination?, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 177 (2002) (asserting that
preemptive measures "may sometimes offer the best available remedy to aggression
and terrorism in world law" due to the absence of any central executive enforcement
capability).
417 See Sapiro, supra note 16, at 603-04 (querying whether Iraq was "a case where
the ends justify the means, irrespective of legality").
418 See Jeremy Waldron, Self-Defense: Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Accounts, 88
CAL. L. REV. 711, 716 (2000) (offering this consequentialist standard, drawn from a
reading of Hobbes and Locke, as the basis for judging the moral legitimacy of an act
of self-defense).
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human dignity. '419 As with all treaty-based undertakings, the U.N. en-
terprise, although infused with politics, rests upon a legal quid pro
quo: if states are bound to a solemn duty of prudence restraining
them from injudicious or malicious exercises of the sovereign prerog-
ative to use force contrary to law and to justice, the Security Council
must, in the face of threats to peace or other fundamental and univer-
sal values, accept and adhere to a corresponding duty to either carry
out its contractual responsibilities and authorize collective interven-
tion or, failing that, absolve states of legal and moral opprobrium
when they resort to self-help.
420
D. When the Security Council Fails: The Return to the State of Nature,
and the Duty of Individual Self-Defense
The question of state responsibilities in the event that the Secur-
ity Council fails to grant the requested authorization, while doing lit-
tle to quell the impression that subsequent acts of self-defense against
the alleged threat would lack the requisite quantum of legal legiti-
macy, is precisely the issue presented in the case of Iraq in March
2003. Although states generally tailor their conduct to conform to
419 Reisman, supra note 56, at 285. Reisman elaborates this test, explaining that
for consequentialists
[t]he critical question, in a decentralized international security system such
as ours, is not whether coercion has been applied but whether it has been
applied in support of or against community order and basic policies, and
whether it has been applied in ways whose net consequences include in-
creased congruence with community goals and minimum order.
Id. at 234.
420 At least one scholar argues that the Security Council is boundjust as are mem-
ber states, by a duty of good faith and is therefore obliged to grant authorization for
the use of force to requesting member states save where no credible argument can be
made in support of the request. See Elias Davidsson, The U.N. Security Council's Obliga-
tions of GoodFaith, 15 FLA.J. INT'L L. 541 (2003). That the Security Council might one
day fail to discharge its responsibilities in good faith or to otherwise fail in its responsi-
bilities for the maintenance of international peace and security was very much within
the contemplation of its framers, who "proposed 'an independent body of eminent
men . . . known for their integrity ... who should be available to pronounce [on] a
decision of the Security Council ... solely from the point of view of whether [it] is in
keeping with.., moral principles.'" Franck, supra note 39, at 9 (quoting Suggestions
Presented by the Netherlands Government Concerning the Proposals for the Mainte-
nance of Peace and Security Agreed on at the Four Power Conference of Dumbarton
Oaks as Published on Oct. 9, 1945, at 313). However, no such supervisory organ was
created, and thus formal oversight of the Security Council is unavailable. Id. Thus,
where states take exception to an act or omission of the Security Council, their most
effective recourse may well be to resort to self-help.
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principles of international law, 421 where they perceive, rightly or
wrongly, an emergent threat to their survival or their vital interests
their propensity is to react without regard to legal ramifications or the
potential for condemnation by the international community.422
Scrupulous adherence to the restraints indirectly imposed by a scle-
rotic Security Council might well be tantamount to national suicide, a
pact into which states are understandably loathe venture. A commit-
ment to self-preservation trumps all other obligations; in the words of
former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, " [t]he survival of states
is not a matter of law."4 23 Should the Security Council-a quintessen-
tially political organism despite its legal mandate-passively default
upon its responsibilities for collective security in the face of danger,
states may conclude that they are released from their obligations
under the Charter and are free to act beyond the purview of a U.N.
system slouching towards irrelevance. 424 If so, the resulting standard
of review for acts of preemption and prevention may devolve still fur-
ther from the objective and impartial ideal laid down at
Nuremburg. 425 In the place of the current pluralistic political process
421 The famous aphorism penned by Louis Henkin reminds us that "almost all
nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obli-
gations almost all of the time." HENKIN, supra note 43, at 47.
422 See supra Part I.D.6 (analyzing state practice); see also Maxson, supra note 88, at
61 ("As a practical matter, each party-the Security Council and the defending
state-must make its own determination of the effectiveness of the UN measures.
Should the individual state reach a conclusion different from the Security Council, it
will continue its military response as it deems appropriate."); Zedalis, supra note 48, at
114-15 (stating that in circumstances of grave danger "the only significant restraint
on the use of preemptive force is the possibility that it might not succeed . . .no
matter how the international community views anticipatory force").
423 Dean Acheson, Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson (Apr. 25, 1963), in 57
PROC. Am. Soc'v INT'L L. 13, 14 (1963) (discussing the Cuban Quarantine). Others
have analogized to the example of living organisms to conclude that the instinct of
states to self-preservation is far more powerful than the compliance pull of the laws
governing the resort to force. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 43, at 143-44 (recognizing
that preventive uses of force against an attack that threatens to extinguish the state or
devastate its population is in all likelihood beyond the realm of law); 1 O'CONNELL,
supra note 25, at 339 (stating that the instinct of self preservation is so strong that "if
the law is ineffective the primordial right of self-defence must reassert itself").
424 See Brunson MacChesney, Some Comments on the "Quarantine" of Cuba, 57 Am. J.
INT'L L. 592, 597 (1963) (reminding critics of anticipatory self-defense that states de-
nied authorization to use force in self-defense will be forced to act "either outside or
above the law").
425 The Nuremburg Tribunal, while recognizing the entitlement to anticipatory
self-defense, reserved for the international community of states, sitting ostensibly as
an impartial jury and applying objective standards, the right to determine the legal
legitimacy of a particular exercise of the doctrine; as a general principle of interna-
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ripe for abuse-yet nonetheless garbed, however loosely, in the lan-
guage and trappings of law-states will substitute a baldly auto-inter-
pretive regime where each resort to force is judged in the first and last
instance by none other than its author.426
Worse still is the sobering prospect that the Security Council will
revert to a paralytic condition akin to that which prevailed during the
Cold War, wherein permanent members actively veto requests for au-
thorization despite objective evidence that rogue states or terrorists
are scheming to inflict grievous harm on member states. 427 Based
upon highly credible yet very sensitive intelligence from well placed
human agents, the United States may determine that the gathering
tional law, states were emphatically prohibited from sitting as judges in their own
cases. In the words of Hartley Shawcross, Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom,
[n]either the Pact of Paris nor any other treaty was intended to-or could-
take away the right of self-defense. Nor did it deprive its signatories of the
right to determine, in the first instance, whether there was any danger in
delay and whether immediate action to defend themselves was imperative;
and that only is the meaning of the express proviso that each state judges
whether action in self-defense is necessary. But that does not mean that the
state thus acting is the ultimate judge of the propriety and of the legality of
its conduct. It acts at its peril. Just as the individual is answerable for the
exercise of his common law right of defense, so the state is answerable if it
abuses its discretion . . . if it twists the natural right of self-defense into a
weapon of predatory aggrandizement and lust. The ultimate decision as to
the lawfulness of action claimed to be taken in self-defense does not lie with
the state concerned ....
19 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 34, at 461-62.
426 The power of states to self-determine their compliance with the international
law governing the use of force-an unattractive facet of sovereignty, particularly when
abused-is a persistent feature of the international system. See Franck, supra note 56,
at 818 ("Unfortunately, there is nothing in the U.N. Charter or in the machinery of
the international system which limits the nation's right to determine for itself when
an act of aggression has occurred .... "). Although it is generally held in reserve and
used sparingly, the self-determination of compliance is likely to rush into the adjudi-
catory vacuum left by a disengaged or unresponsive Security Council.
427 Some commentators have argued that the Security Council never succeeded in
transporting states out of the relative state of nature in which they had existed prior to
the formation of the U.N. framework. See, e.g.,Jean Combacau, The Exception of Self-
Defense in U.N. Practice, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 32
(Antonio Cassese ed., 1986) ("But whatever the official pretence, and perhaps the
legal situation, the international community is in fact back where it was before 1945:
in the state of nature .... "). Others simply opine that a narrow window of opportu-
nity in which to engineer a more law-governed and peaceful pattern of international
relations that opened with the fall of the Berlin Wall has been closed by the failure of
the Council to impose sanctions upon lawbreakers and that as a consequence the
Charter is nearly defunct. See Ramsey, supra note 399, at 1556-61; Michael J. Glen-
non, Editorial, How War Left the Law Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at A37.
20041
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
threat posed by the government of North Korea, a criminally irrespon-
sible regime that deliberately and unabashedly violates its interna-
tional obligations by actively pursuing acquisition of WMD 428 and
openly supporting terrorist groups in their quest for nuclear weap-
ons, 4 2 9 has surpassed a tolerable threshold and can no longer be
abided. 43 0 Should a vote in the Security Council be defeated by a Chi-
nese veto and the United States be expressly denied authorization
under Article 42 to forcibly reduce the North Korean threat, the
United States would face the stark choice between potentially fatal in-
action or intervention sure to be condemned by a host of states as
criminal aggression in violation of Article 2(4). Under this set of cir-
cumstances two ostensibly conflicting duties would seem to bracket
the range of options available to U.S. decisionmakers: while the U.N.
Charter, a treaty of the United States, imposes a duty under interna-
tional and domestic law to refrain from the use of force "against the
territorial integrity or political independence" 431 of North Korea, nat-
428 In 1994, North Korea entered into a treaty with the United States pledging not
to pursue nuclear weapons in exchange for assistance with the development of peace-
ful nuclear power. See Agreed Framework to Negotiate Resolution of the Nuclear
Issue on the Korean Peninsula, Oct. 21, 1994, U.S.-N. Korea, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 603
(1995).
429 In early 2003, North Korea admitted that it had deliberately breached its obli-
gations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its 1994 treaty with the
United States and shortly thereafter announced that it possessed two nuclear devices
for sale to any bidder. See Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, North Korea Hides New
Nuclear Site, Evidence Suggests, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2003, at Al.
430 Iran, another member of the so-called Axis of Evil, represents another poten-
tial near-term application of the Bush Doctrine in justification of preventive war. See
Karl Vick, Iranian Hard-Liners Wary of Nuclear Deal, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2003, at A28
(chronicling the steadily growing Iranian threat and reporting Bush Administration
claims of a connection between Iran and proliferation of WMD to terrorists).
431 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. Because of the dualist nature of the U.S. legal
system, the analysis of U.S. legal obligations under domestic law arising from member-
ship in the U.N. Charter is more complex than is a similar analysis of international
legal obligations. See Patrick Del Duca, The Rule of Law: Mexico's Approach to Expropria-
tion Disputes in the Face of Investment Globalization, 51 UCLA L. REv. 35, 116 (2003)
(contrasting monist and dualist approaches to incorporation of international law in
domestic legal systems). The U.N. Charter is a treaty of the United States, and thus
part of domestic law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. VI (providing that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land"). However, under U.S. domestic law the Charter, as a treaty, is subject to prin-
ciples of construction in U.S.jurisprudence. Thus, as between the Charter or a Secur-
ity Council resolution passed thereunder on the one hand, and a later congressional
enactment or a controlling statement of the legislative or executive branches as to
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ural law directs the President and his delegees to defend the United
States, its nationals, and its interests by whatever means necessary.
432
Viewed from the natural legal perspective, there need be no an-
tinomy between a natural legal duty to defend and an obligation, how-
ever absolute, under the positive law of the U.N. Charter. The central
tenet of natural legal jurisprudence is the commitment to the princi-
ple that all law is subordinate to divine inspiration and human reason,
and therefore positive law can only be considered legally binding to
the extent that it reinforces natural law-the superior expression of
rationality in relation to which all other sources of law are
subordinate. 433 As any interpretation of the Charter that would ob-
struct or prevent the discharge of a natural legal duty carries no legal
force, either such an interpretation is to be avoided if at all possible
434
or the Charter must be reconceived as a limited expression of the
rights and duties of states, confined in its application to those circum-
stances that do not implicate state survival or the defense of vital inter-
customary international law on the other, the "last in time" rule provides that the
federal statute or interpretation will prevail if there is a clear conflict. See, e.g., The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708-14 (1900) (noting that a controlling statement of
the executive or legislative branches overrides customary international law or treaty
obligation); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465-67 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citing conflict
with a Security Council resolution). Although there is a presumption against invalida-
tion of treaty obligations by later federal legislation or executive practice, Congress
and the President are empowered under the dualist U.S. legal system to abrogate
treaties and interpret or violate customary international law. See Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. at 708-14. If the President should interpret his natural legal duty to require
violation of the Charter or a Security Council resolution passed under the authority of
the Charter, or if Congress should direct him to execute a law under his powers
granted in the Take Care Clause, the President would, as a matter of U.S. law, have
the clear authority to act in a manner inconsistent with the Charter or the resolution
even if to do so would arguably violate international law. See United States v. Palestine
Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1464-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1) (1987).
432 See supra Part IV.
433 See supra Part III.A.
434 Although under the dualist system of U.S. law a combination of limiting doc-
trines (e.g., the "last in time" rule and the presumption against the self-execution of
treaties) suggest that international law does not automatically trump domestic obliga-
tions, international law is part of the law of the United States, and an important canon
of statutory interpretation provides that "an act of Congress ought never to be con-
strued to violate [international law] if any other possible construction remains . ... "
Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6. U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). An analogous principle
of international law would require adjudicative bodies to resist the impulse to find a
conflict between a domestic law or duty and an international legal obligation and to
attempt to harmonize the two.
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ests against existential threats, and overridden by the transcendent
duties imposed by natural law.
Much of the international legal academy may deem it a heretical
capitulation to power, violative of law's majesty, to suggest that the
latter canon of construction be applied to legitimize preventive war.
435
Moreover, that an individual state in a conundrum created by the
clash of conflicting duties should be permitted to self-judge whether
the Charter applies to its intended use of force as a means to relieve
legal pressure will strike many commentators as an abject abandon-
ment of law altogether. Under orthodox positivist precepts, conflicts
between international and domestic obligations are to be resolved in
favor of the international legal duty,4 3 6 and many moral philosophers
contend that where duties conflict prioritization is to be accorded to
negative duties over positive duties437-i.e., the duty to refrain from
the use of force in contravention of the Charter framework, a negative
duty, trumps the duty to use force to defend the state, a positive duty.
Nevertheless, if the Security Council, by a negative authorization
vote, returns a state to the state of nature-forcing it to select either
pious resignation to its own devastation as an affirmative duty, or uni-
lateral measures consistent with a positive duty under natural law,
however much at odds with a restrictivist interpretation of the Char-
ter-the inevitable election of self-help cannot seriously be labeled a
435 See Beres, supra note 227, at 37 (cautioning that "it is probably unreasonable to
claim that we have returned to the classical/medieval idea of natural law's preemi-
nence over all human institutions").
436 See United States v. von Leeb, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREM-
BERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 462, 508 (1950)
[hereinafter TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10] ("International com-
mon law must be superior to and, where it conflicts with, take precedence over na-
tional law or directives issued by any national governmental authority."). Conflicts
between the domestic laws of states are generally resolved in favor of the territorial
principle ofjurisdiction. See COUNCIL OF EUR., EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL JURISDIC-
TION (1990), reprinted in 3 CRIM. L.F. 441, 463-68 (1992) (advocating the principle of
territorial primacy in conflicts between domestic laws of multiple jurisdictions). How-
ever, in conflicts between a domestic law and international law, positivism privileges
the international obligation. See von Leeb, 11 TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAW No. 10, supra, at 508.
437 For Kant, the preferred means whereby to determine which of two conflicting
duties deserved priority was the preference of the negative to the positive. See ROGER
J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY 73-74 (1989) ("Negative and strict du-
ties as a rule thus carry more weight than positive duties ...."). Many modern schol-
ars accord Kant's solution considerable deference in their own work. See Russell L.
Christopher, The Prosecutor's Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
93, 159-60 (2003) (describing contemporary formulations of the problem of conflict-
ing duties).
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voluntary act. Furthermore, under natural law each state is not
merely authorized to independently deduce those principles of right
reason that govern behavior and to position duties in a relative hierar-
chy; rather, it is obliged to do so, 438 and the duty to defend is the
ultimate responsibility of the state. Although under Articles 24 and 25
U.N. member states accept the primacy of the Security Council in mat-
ters of international peace and security, any interpretation of the bare
fact of their membership as a standing writ to suspend their natural
rights to self-defense and strip their nationals of their entitlement to
protection in the event of Security Council refusal to ratfiy a particular
use of force is inconsistent with the natural legal principle that no
individual or state may undertake to renounce self-defense or to per-
form any other act destructive or pernicious to survival. 43 9 States' ac-
cession to membership was not purchased at the price of the
renunciation of the right to self-defense or the entitlement of individ-
uals to protection, by preventive war if necessary, and no state would
have struck such a bargain if offered. 440 In sum, positive duties follow
upon the "monopolization of a particular path of relief' 441 as a matter
438 CICERO, supra note 236, at 23 (describing natural law as self-interpreting).
439 In contrast to positivism's subordination of individuals and states to the bind-
ing force of written law, natural law considers that individuals and states are "mecha-
nisms programmed to resist the immediate evils of death and bodily debilitation."
HOBBES, supra note 245, at xiv. Thus "[a] covenant not to defend myself from force,
by force, is always void." Id. Accordingly, a treaty that requires a state to subordinate
its security and survival is, if no other interpretation is possible, "null, and not at all
obligatory, as no conductor of a nation has the power to enter into engagements to
do such things as are capable of destroying the state." VATrEL, supra note 247, at 195;
see also id. at 198:
If the assistance and offices that are due by virtue of such a treaty should on
any occasion prove incompatible with the duties a nation owes to herself...
the case is tacitly and necessarily excepted in the treaty. Neither the nation
nor the sovereign could enter into an engagement to neglect the care of
their own safety ....
440 Contractarians analyzing the individual right to self-defense under domestic
law reach the conclusion that, unless the protection enjoyed by individuals under the
social contract is greater than that in the state of nature, the social contract cannot
abate the individual right to self-defense. See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH, Respect for Life
and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE
CRIMINAL LAw 109, 122-23 (1987).
441 Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 187, 207 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Theories of positive rights duties have not acquired much purchase
upon Western legal systems, due to the influence of positivism. Yet the proposition
that in exchange for the grant of authority a sovereign incurs positive duties to its
subjects to provide for basic necessities, including protection, has clear foundations in
natural law and has been cited favorably in the supreme courts of several states as well
as in a number of international instruments. See, e.g., International Covenant on Eco-
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of international law, and if the Security Council-the organ primarily
responsible under the Charter for the maintenance of international
peace and security-fails in its duty to defend against threatened vio-
lence, even the most restrictive positivists cannot in good conscience
strenuously object to the proposition that in such cases "the law of
nature" makes the individual state its "own protector."44
2
E. Heightening the Stakes: The International Criminal Court and the
Prospect for Criminalization of Political Differences
over Preventive War
Whatever one makes of the foregoing analysis, if it were not for
the possibility that the recently created International Criminal Court
(ICC) 4 4 3 might enter the fray and criminalize a future exercise of pre-
ventive war as an unlawful act of aggression, the controversy over the
lawfulness of the use of force in the absence of Security Council au-
thorization would become little more than the stuff of contentious
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 2, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 ("Each State
Party . . . undertakes to take steps, . . . especially economic and technical, to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means
442 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 248, at *30. The principle that the absence of an
effective international sovereign precludes derogation from the natural right of states
to self-determine their legal obligations with regard to the use of force, just as individ-
uals are wont to do in the state of nature, is central to the argument dating at least to
the Enlightenment that the failure of international institutions to approximate effec-
tive enforcement releases states from any contractual obligations they assume to re-
frain from the use of force in self-defense.
The independent societies of men, called States, acknowledge no common
arbiter or judge, except such as are constituted by special compact. The law
by which they are governed, or profess to be governed, is deficient in those
positive sanctions which are annexed to the municipal code of each distinct
society. Every State has therefore a right to resort to force, as the only means
of redress for injuries inflicted upon it by others, in the same manner as
individuals would be entitled to that remedy were they not subject to the
laws of civil society. Each State is also entitled to judge for itself, what are the
nature and extent of the injuries which will justify such a means of redress.
HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 290 (George Grafton Wilson
ed., Hein 1995) (1866).
443 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The In-
ternational Criminal Court came into being upon the sixtieth ratification of the Rome
Statute inJuly 2002. For a list of the Rome Statute signatories, see U.N. Treaty Collec-
tion, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, at http://untreaty.un.org/
ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXVIII/treatyl0.asp (last visited
May 29, 2004) (listing ratifications, declarations, and reservations).
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political debates in international institutional contexts44 4 and eventual
fodder for the engine of academe. However, it is not inconceivable
that the eventual exercise of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of "ag-
gression" as it comes to be defined 445 could result in an attempt to
hale U.S. personnel-civilian and military-who execute the Bush
Doctrine to the Hague to answer criminal charges, on the theory that
preventive war is a per se violation of an international legal prohibi-
tion on aggressive war. Where one duty commands conduct prohib-
ited on pain of criminal sanction by a second duty with which it is
inextricably in conflict, the domestic courts of the United States are
instructed to "proceed with greater precision" lest they subject to the
rigor of criminal punishment an individual lacking any viable legal
alternative but to violate one of two duties.446 In United States v.
Kirby,447 the Supreme Court reviewed the claim of a state official who
halted a steamboat to detain a federal mail carrier on a murder war-
444 See Sapiro, supra note 16, at 606 (reminding that state practice over the past
half-century teaches that "as a practical matter, a state always has the option of using
forceful measures to protect what it deems to be vital interests, and then face the
consequences if world opinion disagrees").
445 A long quasi-legislative history precedes attempts to define the crime of "ag-
gression" at international law. SeeJonathan A. Bush, "The Supreme... Crime" and its
Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. REv.
2324 (2002) (chronicling this history); see also Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 59
Stat. 1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 286 (defining "crimes against peace" as including
"planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in viola-
tion of international law, treaties, agreements, or assurances"). Although the crime of
aggression was included within ICC jurisdiction, the negotiating parties could not
agree upon a definition. See Christopher M. van de Kieft, Note, Uncertain Risk: The
United States Military and the International Criminal Court, 23 CARDozo L. REv. 2325,
2362 (2002) (describing various proposed definitions of aggression giving rise to indi-
vidual criminal liability as including an option that would require, as a condition pre-
cedent, a determination of state responsibility for an unlawful war; a second option
limiting individual liability to those ordering the aggressive acts; and a third identical
to the first with the exception that peacekeeping operations were exempted). As a
result, the ICC will not exercise jurisdiction over aggression until the States Parties
agree, by a seven-eighths majority, to a definition and to any conditions precedent;
and in no event will this occur prior to seven years after the entry into force of the
Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 443, art. 5(1) (d), 37 I.L.M. at 1004
(granting the ICCjurisdiction over the crime of aggression); id. art. 5(2), 37 I.L.M. at
1004 (providing that the ICC "shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
once a provision is adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 123 defining the
crime and setting out the conditions under which the [ICC] shall exercise jurisdic-
tion"); id. arts. 121, 123, 37 IL.M. at 1067, 1068 (providing rules and procedures for
voting amendments to the ICC).
446 See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 401 (1979).
447 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1869).
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rant but was subsequently convicted for violation of a federal statute
prohibiting "obstructing or retarding the passage of the [U.S.]
mail."448 Kirby provides guidance to courts reviewing the acts of indi-
viduals caught in the vise between conflicting duties:
All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms
should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice,
oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be
presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language,
which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law
in such cases should prevail over its letter.
449
Whether the ICC would labor to provide the "sensible construc-
tion" to the definition of aggression that would be necessary to pre-
clude the attachment of criminal liability to the acts of U.S. civilian
and military personnel who plan and execute a preventive war against
WMD armed terrorists or their rogue state sponsors is unclear. Even
if the unauthorized resort to preventive war is preceded by gross mal-
feasance in the Security Council and justified by the President of the
United States as the discharge of his natural legal duty, the ICC may
well adhere to the principle established at Nuremburg that "[a] direc-
tive to violate international criminal ... law is... void and can afford
no protection to one who violates such law in reliance on such a direc-
tive"'450 in reaching the decision to charge and prosecute the entire
chain of command, stretching from the most junior enlisted person-
nel through the ranks and ultimately to the President of the United
States.451 Putting aside the practical questions whether the United
448 Id. at 482.
449 Id. at 486-87.
450 United States v. von Leeb, 11 TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No.
10, supra note 436, at 508.
451 It is also possible that, rather than criminalize the Bush Doctrine, the ICC
might adhere to the position that where failure to act-even if commanded by a legal
duty-would result in the forfeiture of life "for no benefit to anyone and no effect
whatsoever apart from setting a heroic example for mankind," the law cannot force
an individual into inactivity. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case IT-96-22-T, Trial Judg-
ment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber 1996) (Cassese, J., dis-
senting). Law cannot command suicide, as the criminalization of the Bush Doctrine
might be construed to require of the U.S. President and, derivatively, of the U.S.
population. As Judge Antonio Cassese noted further in his dissent, "[ l]aw is based on
what society can reasonably expect of its members. It should not set intractable stan-
dards of behaviour which require mankind to perform acts of martyrdom, and brand
as criminal behaviour falling below those standards." Id. 47 (Cassese,J., dissenting).
However, despite the inherent logic of the Cassese dissent, the majority opinion sug-
gests that national suicide is precisely what would be expected of the United States
under circumstances where failure to act could threaten national existence. Whether
the ICC would follow this line of "reasoning" is unknown.
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States would ever cooperate with the ICC, and how the ICC would
ever acquire custody of U.S. personnel in the absence of such cooper-
ation, 452 the prospect that the ICC might one day sit in judgment on
the legality of the Bush Doctrine dramatically heightens the salience
of theoretical partitions that pit restrictivists against pragmatists and
leave positivists and naturalists quarreling over the most fundamental
issue within the field of international law: May a state scorned by the
machinery of the U.N. framework lawfully resort to unilateral forcible
measures to defend against a threat that it believes, in good faith,
poses or will eventually pose an existential threat to its survival or to
the lives and well being of its nationals? Even if the ICC is never
tasked to adjudicate the criminal liability of the President of the
United States or of senior civilian officials within the politico-military
chain of command, the omnipresent possibility that the Bush Doc-
trine might one day intersect with the agenda of the ICC introduces
additional uncertainty into the decisional calculus of the United
States and other states, for whom the question of the lawfulness of
preventive war registers as perhaps the most critical foreign policy is-
sue. Without a formal paradigmatic transformation of international
law, the lawfulness of preventive war under the U.N. Charter will re-
main an open and hotly contested question. Accordingly, proponents
of the Bush Doctrine-predicated upon the theory that principles of
natural law predating the modern international system impose upon
the state and its officials a nonderogable duty to prevent grievous
harm to its people and their interests and that, where in conflict, in-
ternational law must be harmonized to support that duty-would be
well advised to develop a strategy, in advance of a future crisis, to
"make the world safe" for preventive war,4 53 as well as for U.S.
personnel.
452 The so-called "Hague Invasion Clause" of the American Servicemembers' Pro-
tection Act commands the President to use "all means necessary," including military
force, to rescue any U.S. national who falls into the custody of the ICC. American
Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA), Pub. L. No. 107-206, tit. II, 116 Stat. 899
(2002). ASPA was designed to protect U.S. military personnel and other elected and
appointed officials of the United States "from the risk of prosecution by the [ICC]."
To that end, ASPA prohibits all agencies and entities of the United States, or of any
state or local government, from cooperating with the ICC. Id. § 7423(e). The notion
that the ICC or any other institution, organization, or state might successfully defeat
an effort by the U.S. military to prevent the capture or liberation of U.S. personnel,
and in particular the President, from its custody, is, at best, fanciful.
453 President Woodrow Wilson led the United States into the Great War in 1917
on the slogan that the purpose of U.S. intervention was to defeat the imperial powers,
Germany and Austria-Hungary, and to "make the world safe for democracy." See Jo-
seph S. Nye, Scenarios for Making the World Safe: Middle East Futures, CHRISTIAN Sci.
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F. Resolving the Tensions between Positivism and Naturalism: Proposals
for Amendment of the U.N. Charter
The first plank of a proactive U.S. legal strategy in defense of pre-
ventive war might well be a proposal for an amendment to the U.N.
Charter. 454 Some scholars counsel that the Charter is presently ame-
nable to the resort to preemptive measures under circumstances of an
imminent threat, and that if further flexibility is necessary to shelter
the authors of preventive war it will evolve "through the persistent and
principled practice of its principle organs."45 5 Yet most commentators
who caution against amendment reposit great faith in the formal insti-
tutions of the Charter framework, 45 6 though recent practice, particu-
larly in the Security Council, casts doubt upon whether such trust is
well placed. 457 Article 51 has become the focus of proposals sug-
gesting amendments that would add explicit language recognizing
that the nebulous yet deadly threat posed by terrorists, and in particu-
lar those armed with WMD, is sufficiently imminent to confer, without
the requirement for any action by the Security Council, preauthoriza-
MONITOR, Mar. 12, 2003, at 9 (discussing comparisons between current U.S. foreign
policy and the Wilson era foreign policy).
454 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 108, 109 (providing procedures for amendment of the
Charter).
455 Franck, supra note 39, at 8. The discussion of the Charter as a malleable
blueprint, rather than as a rigid code of conduct, is old wine in a new bottle. See
Francis 0. Wilcox, How the United Nations Charter Has Developed, 296 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. SCI. 1, 4-11 (1954) (discussing modes of transformation of the U.N.
Charter, through nonimplementation of provisions, creation of treaties and other
supplementary agreements, and development of subsidiary organs).
456 Anne-Marie Slaughter proposes a U.N. Security Council that recognizes that
the following set of conditions would constitute a threat to the peace suffi-
cient to justify the use of force: 1) possession of weapons of mass destruction
or clear and convincing evidence of attempts to gain such weapons; 2) grave
and systematic human rights abuses sufficient to demonstrate the absence of
any internal constraints on government behavior; and 3) evidence of aggres-
sive intent with regard to other nations.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Chance to Reshape the U.N., WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2003, at B7.
However, while such a resolution might make other states feel "stronger and safer," a
lack of confidence-that the Security Council could be relied upon to act in good
faith and not obstruct preemptive and preventive applications of force-calls into
question whether a mere resolution would yield the transformative effects necessary
to harmonize the Bush Doctrine with international law.
457 See Koh, supra note 74, at 1519 (criticizing the member states of the Security
Council for their "obstinacy" and "fecklessness" in the months before the U.S.-led
intervention in Iraq in March 2003, and stating that "all deserve a good share of the
blame" for the failure to authorize intervention and for the "future weakening" of the
Council).
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tion for the use of force. 458 With a proposal that would far more nar-
rowly circumscribe the competence of the Security Council in regard
to the resort to force, at least one scholar suggests the replacement of
the language of Article 2(4) with text that would simply reinforce the
customary prohibition on the deliberate targeting of noncombatants
while permitting all other applications of force in international rela-
tions, including preventive war.
45 9
G. If All Else Fails: Denouncing the U.N. Charter
However, for many states, the War on Terror is of secondary or
even tertiary importance, and "soft threats" such as extreme poverty,
malnourishment, disease, and environmental degradation are far
more appropriate and timely subjects for international legal re-
form.460 Should international or domestic opposition to amendment
prove impossible to overcome, 461 the alternative may be to withdraw
from the U.N. Charter. If sovereignty has not been drained of all sig-
nificance, states are only bound by those rules of law to which they
consent,462 and when treaties, just as any other form of contract, be-
come injurious to fundamental state interests such as survival they are
made to be broken 463 or, better still, denounced. 464 In the words of
458 See Neil Frankland, Australian P.M. Ready to Act Against Terror, Assoc. PREss,
Dec. 1, 2002 (reporting proposal to this effect offered by Australian Prime Minister
John Howard); see also Richard N. Gardner, Neither Bush nor the "Jurisprudes, "97 Am. J.
INT'L L. 585, 590 (2003) (proposing a "modest reinterpretation" of Article 51 to per-
mit the use of force absent Security Council authorization to "destroy terrorist
groups" and prevent transfer of WMD to terrorists); Polebaum, supra note 82, at 216
(calling for the relaxation of the imminency standard, read into Article 51 by all but
the most restrictivist scholars, to permit preemption of nuclear threats).
459 See Slaughter, supra note 16 (arguing that the U.N. "cannot be a straitjacket,
preventing nations from defending themselves or pursuing what they perceive to be
their vital national security interests"). Guy Roberts would eliminate Article 2(4) alto-
gether on the basis that, in light of the numerous unsanctioned violations of its provi-
sions, it has become "clearly inconsistent with the overwhelming realities of state
practice" and thus is no longer "good law." Roberts, supra note 7, at 511.
460 See Annan, supra note 18 (stating that, for many states, the threat of WMD
armed terrorists is not "self-evidently the main challenge to world peace and
security").
461 Amendment of the U.N. Charter requires the affirmative vote of a two-thirds
majority of the member states in the General Assembly as well as the domestic ratifica-
tion of two-thirds of the member states. U.N. CHARTER art. 108.
462 Franck, supra note 16, at 618 (describing the "consent" theory of international
law).
463 The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus (so long as conditions remain the same) is an
implied term in every treaty that permits a state to terminate when a change occurs in
the circumstances that formed the intent to be bound and served as consideration
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Hobbes, "[t] o be tied to impossibilities.., is contrary to the very na-
ture of compacts. '"465 If the benefit of the bargain sought through
U.N. membership-a collective guarantee of security-can for
whatever reason no longer be secured in the post-September 11 mi-
lieu of the Security Council, the United States is entitled to denounce
the U.N. Charter, reclaim from a defunct and discredited institution
all the authority it delegated in 1945, and assume the exclusive com-
petence to provide for its own self-defense, whether individually or in
ad hoc coalitions of allied states whose views on crucial issue-areas are
closely aligned.4 66 While it should not be insensitive to international
public opinion in reaching the decision to withdraw from the U.N.,
neither should the United States allow considerations other than how
to most effectively discharge the duty to defend its nationals and inter-
ests to set its legal and political course.
between the parties. SeeJ.W. Garner, The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus and the Termina-
tion of Treaties, 21 AM.J. INT'L L. 509, 511-13 (1927). Traditional international law
treated peace treaties as the equivalent of other treaties for purposes of termination
analysis. See Hall, supra note 270, at 284-86 (discussing termination of peace and
security treaties).
464 Article 56 of the Vienna Convention provides that a party to a treaty that does
not contain a provision regarding its termination, and which does not provide for
denunciation or withdrawal, is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless the
parties intended the treaty to be so subject, or a right of denunciation or withdrawal
may be implied by the nature of the treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, supra note 35, art. 56, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 345. Although the U.N. Charter is silent
as to denunciation or withdrawal, the right to denounce or withdraw from the Char-
ter was arguably within the contemplation of the states-parties, suggesting that the
United States is free to withdraw from the Charter upon provision of no less than
twelve months' notice. Id. (providing for a minimum twelve months' notice as a
condition precedent for withdrawal from a treaty). State practice reinforces this inter-
pretation: in 1965, Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations. However, a counter-
argument suggests that the Charter was intended to create not merely a treaty
relationship but rather to serve as the constitution of a "community" with perpetual
life from which, like the U.S. Constitution, secession is, in practice, forbidden. For an
argument that the Charter does not permit withdrawal or denunciation, see Thomas
Franck, Is the U.N. Charter a Constitution?, in NEGOTIATING FOR PEACE 95 (Max Planck
Inst. Comp. Pub. L. & Int'l L. ed., 2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/fs/2003/
95_franck.pdf.
465 HOBBES, supra note 252, at 59. For Jefferson, when performance of a treaty
became "impossible, non-peformance [was] not immoral"-and the United States was
excused from "engagements contrary to it's indispensable obligations." JEFFERSON,
supra note 268, at 114-15.
466 See Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, FOREIGN AFF., May-June
2003, at 16 (predicting the collapse of the Security Council and its replacement with
ad hoc coalitions).
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CONCLUSION
It's better to be judged by twelve than carried by six.
Anonymous
The defense of the Bush Doctrine as merely an assertive acknowl-
edgement by a U.S. President of a duty to defend nationals and vital
interests is wholly consistent with, or at the very least readily harmo-
nized with, an international legal regime in which natural law still
holds pride of place. Nevertheless, it comes freighted with caveats.
Foremost among them is that the Bush Doctrine must never be appro-
priated as a pretext for aggression. A formal legal defense need not
necessarily follow immediately upon the heels of an exercise of rights
under the Bush Doctrine, but unless the United States is prepared to
demonstrate eventually that a particular act of preventive war was a
reasonable and necessary measure directed toward the reduction of a
threat of the highest magnitude-such as the elimination of terrorist
groups or rogue state regimes in pursuit or possession of WMD and
bent on using them against U.S. targets-the risk that the military ac-
tion may be characterized as a "U.S.-initiated 'Pearl Harbor' on a
small nation which history could neither understand nor forget"
467
militates in favor of other policy options.
Second, the Bush Doctrine should be categorically inapplicable
to lesser-order threats or military problems amenable to resolution by
other means. The Bush Doctrine is not a Panglossian palliative for all
that ails international relations or a cure-all for all the intractable
problems of the international system. To permit it to burst through
these conceptual boundaries would be a legal, political, and even
moral failure that would soon become the father to others.468 Unless
the United States is prepared to explain and justify its preventive wars
to other states on the grounds of necessity and domestic duty-and
explanations and justifications will ultimately, albeit not immediately,
require the sharing of some of the intelligence establishing the exis-
tence of the relevant threats with some responsible states 469-the cu-
467 Theodore Sorenson, Summary of Objections to Airstrike Option and Advan-
tages of Blockade Option (Oct. 20, 1962), reprinted in THE CUBAN MISSILE CEisIs, 1962,
supra note 121, at 143.
468 See CHAYES, supra note 121, at 65 (warning that expansion of the use of mea-
sures of preemption or prevention against lesser-order threats would estop the United
States from challenging similar measures by other states).
469 The question of precisely how much intelligence must be shared with which
states must be resolved if states are to be checked from "exercis[ing] broad defensive
action based on thin evidence" and, in the process, calling into question whether
their actions are better characterized as aggressive. Arai-Takahashi, supra note 55, at
1088. However, a dearth of discussion has prevented the development of principles
2004] 148.3
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
mulative costs associated with defending a doctrine stripped in
application from all connections to its theoretical roots in natural law
may outweigh the benefits.470 Even in a decidedly unipolar era of in-
ternational relations, the efficient assertion of American power de-
pends, in important part, upon the general sense that it is benignly
exercised.
4 7 1
Finally, it may be important to recognize that the traumatic
events of September 11 may have compromised the ability of all Amer-
icans, including U.S. decisionmakers, to exercise disciplined and in-
formed moral restraint in the aftermath. 472 Accordingly, preventive
war is a medicine to be used sparingly and in full cognizance of its
potential side-effects. The decision to apply the Bush Doctrine must
to guide post hoc analysis of the legitimacy of preventive actions, and this issue-area
must be invested with a significant deal of thought and negotiation if future applica-
tions of the Bush Doctrine are to benefit-without compromising U.S. sources and
methods-from the broad perception of legitimacy that accompanies the objective
proof of the nature and degree of threats giving rise to the use of military force. See
supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing potential dangers of an overbroad
sharing of intelligence).
470 See Franck, supra note 39, at 17 (positing that the maintenance of U.S. hegem-
ony depends in important measure upon its willingness to justify and explain its mili-
tary actions to other states).
471 Some scholars who would otherwise support preventive war would refrain from
approving unilateral measures and would instead insist that the five permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council grant pre-approval. See, e.g., David Sloss, Forcible Arms
Control: Preemptive Attacks on Nuclear Facilities, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 39, 55-57 (2003).
472 Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a complex of
characteristic symptoms that follow exposure to an extreme traumatic stres-
sor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or
threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one's physical integ-
rity; or witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the
physical integrity of another person; or learning about unexpected or vio-
lent death, serious harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by a family
member or other close associate.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
IV § 309.81 (1994). A diagnosis of PTSD generally requires that the subject experi-
ence intense fear, helplessness, or horror, and requires symptomatology that includes
persistent reexperiencing of the traumatic event, persistent avoidance of stimuli asso-
ciated with the trauma and a numbing of general responsiveness, and persistent
hyperarousal in response to a perceived ongoing threat that causes clinically signifi-
cant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of func-
tioning. Id. Traumatic events often include, inter alia, military combat, violent
personal assault, kidnapping, terrorist attack, torture, incarceration as a prisoner of
war, and manmade disasters. Id. That U.S. decisionmakers should be suffering from
PTSD after September 11 is not an impossibility, nor is the notion that their judg-
ment-particularly regarding the appropriate response to the actions of the perpetra-
tors-might be influenced by trauma.
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be made only after consultation with legal advisers steeped in an ap-
preciation of the relevant moral philosophical issues attendant to the
doctrine of preventive war, and after sober and deliberate contempla-
tion of a range of alternatives.
These proposed limitations upon the Bush Doctrine will not sat-
isfy a bevy of critics. For committed positivists, resort to natural law in
justification of preventive war is an epistemologically suspect venture,
inasmuch as the identification of a universally valid moral canon is
beyond the capacity of a human community divided along the fault
lines of religion and social ideology to discern, 473 and wholly inade-
quate to the project of informing rational international institutions in
the orderly administration of human affairs. The positivist optic in-
structs that, however well intentioned, the "contamination of legality
with morality" is "wholly outside the province of the lawyer."474 Fur-
ther, if preventive war does, in fact, merit admission to the pantheon
of legal doctrines-a determination that can only follow the running
of the Bush Doctrine, just as any other contested principle, through
the multilateral institutional gamut wherein other sovereign states
may assert their coequal lawmaking authority-it must be invited
through the front door of positive legislation. 475 The very most ideo-
logical of positivists may go so far as to insist that, even if extant inter-
national legal regime governing the resort to force is morally
bankrupt, the United States is obligated to scrupulously adhere to its
473 In other words, some critics may consider the resort to preventive war as a
normative claim of right to be culturally-bound. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, 'Moral Rela-
tivism, Truth, and Justification,' in THE MACINTYRE READER 202 (Kelvin Knight ed.,
1998) (questioning whether and how normative claims generated within one culture
can be universalized).
474 D'ENTR -Es, supra note 226, at 83-84.
475 A number of restrictivists hew to the positivist dogma that law and morality are
conceptually distinct and that it is solely through the formal, positive procedures of
the sovereign, or institutions invested with attributes of quasi-sovereignty such as the
ICJ, the Security Council, and the General Assembly, that law is to be made,
(re)interpreted, and applied. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 19, at 455-56 (castigat-
ing nonpositivists defined as "those inclined to pursue policy goals through a reinter-
pretation of the international law on the use of force, rather than explication of the
current rules"). O'Connell is critical of "scholars who, in the pursuit of their own
agendas, ignore or mischaracterize state practice, dismiss decisions of the ICJ, read
their own meaning into the actual terms of Security Council resolutions, or never
look at votes in the General Assembly." Id. Others, less absolutist in their positivist
commitment, concede that it may be possible to resist challenges to the positive law of
the U.N. Charter and the role of the Security Council, while at the same time insulat-
ing those challenges, provided that they reinforce communitarian standards of law
and governance, from legal sanctions. See Carsten Stahn, The Enforcement of the Collec-
tive Will After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 804 (2003).
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terms "because the law stands in for a social decision about what
ought to be done, collectively speaking, in the face of disagree-
ment. '476 The authoritative resolution of disputes, which depends
upon not reawakening conflict over the applicable rules or otherwise
"recapitulating . . . normative disagreement" that might "undercut"
the rule of law, is thus, for the most prescriptive legal positivists, more
important than striving toward substantive justice, even if the positive
law "commands a catastrophic moral evil."477
For very different reasons, realists may take umbrage at the asser-
tion that morality bears any relationship to law and may therefore de-
fend the Bush Doctrine on the unrelated and less defensible ground,
at least in a world aspiring to law, that preventive war makes efficient
use of power.478 Realists and liberals alike may express concern that
the Bush Doctrine is an invitation to imitation and that other states,
most of which will treat far less seriously the responsibilities that at-
tend to military and political leadership than the United States,
479 will
476 Wendel, supra note 405 (manuscript at 7-8) (on file with author). For ex-
treme positivists, the written law is a "substantial social achievement" inasmuch as it
secures some objective normative standards against which to judge conduct, and even
in the face of "deep and persistent disagreement about the underlying moral princi-
ples at stake" this codification, because it transports use beyond moral disagreement,
is the authoritative guide to practice. Id. (manuscript at 9-10).
477 Id. (manuscript at 92).
478 See Marshall Cohen, Moral Skepticism and International Relations, in INTERNA-
TIONAL ETHICS 6 (Charles R. Beitz et al. eds., 1985) (expressing the realists' doubt that
foreign policy should ever be justified on grounds other than power and security).
479 To their credit, many of the vociferous critics of the present Administration,
even while challenging what they deem is an increasing reluctance to "play by the
world's rules," recognize that the United States is an exceptional nation far more
likely to contribute positively to the development of international law, human rights,
and democracy than any other nation. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Law Under Stress
After September 11, 31 INT'LJ. LEGAL INFO. 317, 321 ("The United States remains the
only superpower capable, and at times willing, to commit real resources and to make
real sacrifices to build, sustain, and drive an international system committed to inter-
national law, democracy, and the promotion of human rights."); see also Koh, supra
note 74, at 1487 (cheering the United States for having been a "genuinely excep-
tional" nation in regard to the promotion and defense of international law, human
rights, and democracy, and noting that U.S. leadership in the defense of international
human rights is a necessary condition to success). The inference follows that other
nations are not so committed in practice to rights or to law, even if they do not openly
call the international legal regime into question. For a proposal recommending that
the Israeli government adopt the "newly-stated defense policy of The United States,"
see PROJECT DANIEL, ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC FUTURE: PROJECT DANIEL FINAL REPORT
(2003), available at http://www.acpr.org.il/ENGLISH-NATfV/03-issue/daniel-3.htm.
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promulgate preventive war doctrines4 0 that will one day 'justify"
strikes against the United States and its allies. 48 1 Fears that the Bush
Doctrine will open a Pandora's Box from which international law itself
may escape leads some commentators, who might be favorably dis-
posed to a more narrowly tailored expansion of the right to anticipa-
tory self-defense under international law, to reject preventive war as a
"drastic formulation" 48 2 that will have the unanticipated consequence
of undermining global security. Still others caution against the possi-
480 See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYEs, LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 21
(1991) (warning that by defending preemptive measures as lawful "the United States
is opening the international door for abuse by other nations"); Schmitt, supra note
48, at 548 (noting the "enormous risks associated with preemptive strategies").
"[E]ach preemptive act builds a body of State practice that can be relied upon by
those who would 'claim' the right malevolently." Id.; see also Gardner, supra note 458,
at 588 (condemning the Bush Doctrine as an "ominous" statement that would "legiti-
mize preemptive attacks by Arab countries against Israel, by China against Taiwan, by
India against Pakistan, and by North Korea against South Korea").
481 Gardner, supra note 458, at 588 ("By expanding the right of preemption
against an imminent attack into a right of preventive war against potentially danger-
ous adversaries, the Bush administration has created a 'loaded weapon' that can be
used against the United States and against the general interest in a stable world or-
der."). Whether the laws of war need only include doctrines of general applicability
binding equally upon all states or whether certain states might be deemed to enjoy
powers commensurate with their capabilities and interests, and with the threats posed
to those interests, is a question beyond the scope of this Article; it suffices to note that
the right under international law to engage in preventive war need not necessarily be
admitted in the case of rogue states or other states whose purposes in so doing are
other than purely defensive. For a discussion of and argument in favor of a "double
standard" that acknowledges overwhelming American power and moral near-hegem-
ony and would accord to the United States rights not available to lesser powers, see
Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United States Double Standard, 1
GREEN BAG 21 365, 371 (1998) (arguing that to permit U.S. paramountcy in economic
and military power to translate into immunity from international rules has beneficial
effects for mankind generally in terms of democracy, human rights, and trade).
482 Gardner, supra note 458, at 589; see also Stromseth, supra note 14, at 638-39
(arguing that "[i]t would be far better for the United States to articulate a more tai-
lored right of anticipatory self-defense focused especially on the unique attributes and
threats posed by terrorist networks"). Consistent with their commitment to a belief
that the Charter is a flexible, living document, these critics contend that the United
Nations is not a "legal prison" out of which the United States must break, destroying
fundamental norms in the process, if it is to be free to defend itself, and that the
Charter is instead an instrument within which adaptation to contemporary conditions
is possible. Falk, supra note 16, at 598 (insisting that it is unnecessary to jettison the
Charter in favor of the doctrine of preventive war because, under the Charter, "[t]he
law can be stretched as new necessities arise").
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bility of mistakes.48 3 Finally, with regard to the moral question, some
restrictivists worry that the resort to preventive war is little more than a
self-indulgent exemption from all legal accountability that will strip
the United States of its relative moral purity and render it "guilty of
the very act that it anticipates and judges on the part of its enemy.
'484
For the most strident moral auditors of the Bush Administration, the
Bush Doctrine is but Nazism repackaged, 48 5 and some commentators,
in thrall to a vision of the United States as a fallen nation, question
whether the American embrace of preventive war signals that it is no
longer the sort of state one need never suspect of harboring designs
of conquest or imperialist domination.
While the comparison of the Bush Doctrine to Nazism or the pas-
sive submission to the despotism of positive law may strike observers as
outlandish, the Bush Doctrine can only benefit from reasoned discus-
sion and critical analysis in the halls of government and in the legal
academy. Although the translation of the Bush Doctrine from a state-
ment of national policy into operational plans with rules of engage-
ment for warfighters cannot be predicted with certainty in advance of
future crises, critical examination of the law and policy underlying
preventive war is best performed well in advance when judgment is
less likely to be clouded by the emotional and physical crush of events.
Mistakes are possible, even if it is preferable that "the price of those
mistakes be paid by states that so posture themselves than by innocent
states asked patiently to await slaughter."4
86
Nonetheless, that the Bush Doctrine should be a residual policy
limited in its application to the most dangerous and compelling of
threats, or that policymakers who order preventive war should be pre-
pared to offer some objective evidence in support lest other states
seize upon it as precedent for more malicious acts far more destruc-
tive of international law, does not compromise the potential utility of
preventive war in the Age of Terror. Notwithstanding the rants of
483 See Glennon, supra note 56, at 552-53 ("Mistakes may be made. It is better,
however, that the price of those mistakes be paid by states that so posture themselves
than by innocent states asked patiently to await slaughter.").
484 Paul Jersild, Further Reflections on the "War Against Terrorism, "J. LUTHERAN ETH-
ics, Sept. 11, 2002, 3, available at http://www.elca.org/jle/articles/contemporary-
issues/septemberjl lth/article.jersild-paul_01.html; see also Falk, supra note 16, at 598
(categorically rejecting preventive war as inconsistent with the letter and spirit of in-
ternational law).
485 See FRANcis A. BOYLE, THE CRIMINALITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 28-29 (2002)
(equating the Bush Doctrine with the Nazi self-defense argument offered at
Nuremburg and suggesting that the Bush Administration is as evasive of its legal obli-
gations as was the Nazi regime).
486 Glennon, supra note 56, at 553.
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French intellectuals envious of American cultural and material he-
gemony,48 7 the Bush Administration is not, metaphorically speaking,
tilting at windmills. The Bush Doctrine is no ideological fever.
Threats abound, and others are gathering. Any President who failed
to respond aggressively to the scourge of WMD armed terrorism with
all the instruments of policy at his disposal would have failed in his
most basic obligation to the American people. If "mostly minor and
sometimes venal [ ] governments are able to project a degree of power
entirely incommensurate with reality"48 8 and clog the multilateral in-
stitutional machinery of the United Nations, then when they do the
bets are off, and collective security must yield to the individual right to
self-defense. Similarly, the law governing the resort to force, if it is to
continue to serve human values in the post-September 11 interna-
tional system, must remain concordant with the moral imperative that
states are entitled, and even obligated, to use all necessary means to
defend their existence, their nationals, and their interests. Shaping
the law to fulfill this function-without compromising its Grotian aspi-
rations toward a peaceful, rule-governed international system-is a
venture in which many parties have a stake, and it will require dia-
logue and even compromise.
Even if the Bush Doctrine is in tension with the positive interna-
tional legal regime governing the resort to force as codified in the
U.N. Charter, it is a creative tension, and natural law stands on guard,
prepared to release us from the captivity of a hypertechnical reading
of Articles 2(4) and 51. That positivists and restrictivists would coun-
sel reflexive obeisance to laws all but certain to deliver us up to evil
should stiffen our moral resolve and propel us to search the intellec-
tual history of the international legal enterprise for a way out of this
theoretical slough of despond. Having done so, we need but muster
the courage to plead that, in the Age of Terror, only preventive war-
the natural right and duty of states beset by existential threats-pre-
serves the highest communal values law is intended to serve: order,
justice, and ultimately peace.
Preventive war should never excite the same sort of enthusiasm
reserved for more peaceful forms of international intercourse. Still,
in this, the best of all possible worlds, even the most utopic of observ-
487 A passel of French intellectual elites excoriate U.S. foreign policy generally,
and the Bush Doctrine specifically, as a "domestic delusion[ ]" that is leading to
"brainwash [ing of] the world" and is geared toward establishment of an American
Empire. See, e.g., Regis Debray, Amfticans, si vous saviez [Americans, If You Only Knew],
FIGARO, Sept. 5, 2003, at 1.
488 Franck, supra note 16, at 615 (characterizing the Bush Administration's per-
ception of the workings of the United Nations).
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ers will be inclined to concede that the Bush Doctrine will likely be, in
residual instances, the least of many evils. 48 9 September 11 continues
to reverberate throughout the international system and in the con-
sciousness of many Americans. It is regrettable that the conclusions
drawn in the aftermath of that dreadful day by many members of the
international legal academy reveal little sympathy for the notion that a
reconception of the regime governing the resort to force, to grant
states a greater margin of appreciation in their struggle against ter-
rorists and rogue states, is essential to the preservation of civilization
against barbarity. 490 That it requires mention is disappointing, and
yet it must be remembered that the U.S. civilians and military person-
nel who may one day take the battle to their enemies before these
terrorists carry out their threats to attack American citizens are em-
phatically not the modern day equivalents of the Nuremberg defend-
ants. One must look not to Washington but to places such as
Baghdad, Pyongyang, Tehran, Gaza, Damascus, and the border re-
gions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, if one seeks the contemporary ana-
logues of the Nazis. Some moral perspective is in order.
49 1
Despite the fashionableness of the moral agnosticism as to the
inherent goodness of the United States, particularly in relation to
rogue states, and the studied indifference as to the legitimacy of its
cause that dominate contemporary discourses on international law,
the validity of certain moral truths captured by the Bush Doctrine
does not depend upon whether or not they are acknowledged by ma-
489 See generally THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA passim (George M. Logan & Robert M. Ad-
ams eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1516) (advocating a pragmatic form of mo-
rality that prefers policies that, analyzed in the abstract, are distasteful but in
comparison to alternatives are the lesser evil).
490 The erosion of the formal sovereign equality of states and its replacement with
a double standard that would permit the United States to engage in preventive war
while denying the same prerogative to other states-particularly those classified as
"rogues" or otherwise irresponsible members of the international community-re-
quires a defense beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of whether such a
double standard is morally defensible, see DAVID LUBAN, PREVENTIVE WAR 28-34 (Geo.
Univ. L. Center, Working Paper Series, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ab
stract=469862 (arguing that it is under limited circumstances in which the threatened
state alone acts to prevent a direct attack from a WMD armed rogue state or a terrorist
group). But seeJose E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
873 (2003) (arguing that it is not).
491 Ruth Wedgwood made a similar point in 1998 on the eve of U.S. enforcement
action against Iraq, noting that "as sometimes happens in international politics, the
question of the lawfulness of the putative U.S. enforcement action was allowed to
overshadow the grave violation of international law by Iraq that was its predicate."
Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of Force
Against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 724, 725 (1998).
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jorities or enshrined in constitutive documents. Nor does the deci-
sion to engage in preventive war require the blessing of other
states. 49 2 Under natural law, the President of the United States is inef-
fably bound to defend America, its nationals, and its vital interests,
against wicked malcreants whose predations are infinitely more threat-
ening to the civilizational values of order and justice than is the Bush
Doctrine. In an ideal world, international lawyers and international
institutions, recognizing that the Bush Doctrine is its best hope for the
continued viability of international law in the Age of Terror, would
rush forward to stamp it with their imprimaturs. In the world that is,
international law will have to be coaxed, and sometimes even dragged,
along. Where law fears to tread, there are moments when the Presi-
dent must nevertheless be ready and willing to rush in, ever hopeful
that his leadership will hearten the law and induce it to follow. There
may be places where law simply will not go. But in the Age of Terror,
duty must be intrepid, and forged of much sterner steel.
That this is so is testament to a gap between law and legitimacy
that has been widening for the better part of a decade. It is disquiet-
ing that, in an age of great moral contrast and conflict between ter-
rorists and their intended targets, some scholars and statesmen should
give positivism free rein to scrub international law clean of its natural
legal origins and to banish the relevance ofjustice from international
relations. However, from the ashes of September 11 a new impetus-
toward converging the conceptual and moral universes partitioning
positivists from naturalists, and restrictivists from pragmatists-has
arisen. There may well be a solution to the dilemma of choosing be-
tween positivism and substantive justice within the extant interna-
tional legal order, and it may well be that procedural safeguards can
be devised to protect intelligence sources and methods and en-
courage states to share the information thatjustifies their uses of force
and, derivatively, shores up the conceptual boundary between self-de-
fense and aggression. Even its authors would not claim that the Bush
Doctrine is the ultimate repository of all the wisdom and good judg-
ment that can be accumulated on the question of preventive war.
Nearly six decades after the founding of the United Nations, a thor-
ough reexamination of the doctrinal, philosophical, and moral bases
of the international law governing the resort to force is even more
492 See George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRtEs. Doc. 109, 114 (Jan. 28, 2003) ("[T]he
course of this nation does not depend on the decision of others. Whatever action is
required, whatever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the
American people.").
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overdue than is a legal restatement on preventive war that can claim
both natural and positive provenance and thus command more uni-
versal acceptance than does the Bush Doctrine. Interestingly, and
perhaps unwittingly, the Bush Doctrine, in the final analysis, has of-
fered up not merely a fundamentally reordered national security strat-
egy predestined to provoke controversy, but an entreaty, even an
exhortation, to responsible members of the international community.
The Bush Doctrine calls them to collectively diagnose the reasons for
the untimely divorce of law and legitimacy in the most vital issue-area
in international law and to negotiate toward a reconciliation. The exi-
gencies of our times behoove scholars and policymakers, whatever
their disciplinary, theoretical, or ideological commitments and
whatever their views on preventive war, to join this conversation.
